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Summary 
Unusual changes in grain markets have been the source of major concerns for the 
Government of Ethiopia and its development partners. Increase in cereal price presented 
serious challenges to the implementation of country’s food security programs. Local 
procurement of food by the WFP declined also in the recent years. Being one of the largest 
donors of local procurement of food, the European Union was particularly concerned about 
these developments. Thus, as a General Directorate in charge of supporting EU policies, the 
Joint Research Centre (JRC) of the EU developed the technical specification of a project to 
extend the scope of the usual Cereal Availability Study (CAS) in order to account for the 
developments in the Ethiopian cereal markets.  International Food Policy Research Institute 
(IFPRI) consortium with the Ethiopian Development Research Institute (EDRI) and the 
Ethiopian Institute of Agricultural Research (EIAR) was selected to carry out the study.  
A number of preliminary analyses, undertaken by the World Bank and IFPRI had put forward 
a number of hypotheses to explain unusual high cereal prices. While the different hypotheses 
were widely debated in the country, there is limited primary information to validate or refute 
them. It is in this context that the current study was undertaken. The focus has been mainly 
on achieving the following objectives:  
· To gather information regarding recent changes in cereal production, storage, and 
marketing patterns in order to test the hypotheses that have been proposed to explain the 
high price of cereals in Ethiopian markets. 
· To improve the general methodology of the past cereal availability studies. 
· To estimate the quantity of maize, sorghum, and wheat that can be procured from 
domestic markets in the 2008 for relief purposes without disturbing the local market.     
Implementation of the study was carried out in three broad stages. The first stage involved an 
overview of cereal availability methods and a consultation for determining the survey / 
sampling methods. Three surveys were conducted in the second stage, namely, a household 
survey, a traders’ survey, and a rapid assessment of cross border trade. At third stage, results 
from the surveys, and some secondary data, have been used to develop a spatial equilibrium 
multi-market model (ESGMM) to analyze policy impacts of various policy interventions. The 
results were presented in a final workshop held in the United Nations’ Economic 
Commission for Africa in Addis Ababa on December 5, 2008. 
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PART - I  
 
INTRODUCTION AND SYNTHESIS OF RESULTS
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Chapter 1:  The Strategic Context 
 
1.1   Background  
The unprecedented increase in the prices of all major cereals in Ethiopia during the past few years has 
been puzzling for a number of reasons. First, prices in Ethiopia started increasing long before food 
prices began to spike in the world market. This is evident in government’s decision to ban cereal 
export in early 2006; and the rapid assessment of rising prices carried out by the International Food 
Policy Research Institute and the Ethiopian Development Research Institute (EDRI).1  Second, prices 
were rising despite consecutive years of good harvest, which defied historical relationship between 
production and market prices.  For instance, in 2002 producer prices collapsed by an average of 60 
percent in response to what was then considered to be a bumper crop of 9 million tons, about 50 
percent lower than the 2006-2007 cereal harvest 18.2 million tons. Finally, domestic prices of cereals 
have historically been within export and import parity bands. Prices of both wheat and maize, which 
hovered around import parity until 2006, fell significantly below import in the wake of rising food 
prices during 2007, making these commodity completely non-tradable.  
These unusual changes in grain markets have been the source of major concerns for the Government of 
Ethiopia and its development partners. In addition to potential political and social consequences—as 
demonstrated in many occasions in developing countries—increase in cereal price presented serious 
challenges to the implementation of country’s food security and anti-poverty programs. Local 
procurement of food by the WFP, which are generally used to support food security programs within 
the country, declined from an average of more than 150,000 tons during 2003-20042 to practically zero 
in 2008. Being one of the largest donors of local procurement of food, the European Union was 
particularly concerned about these unusual developments. Thus, following extensive consultation with 
various stakeholders, the Joint Research Centre (JRC) of the EU developed a technical specification of 
project to extend the scope of the usual Cereal Availability Study (CAS) and account for the unusual 
developments in the Ethiopian cereal markets.  IFPRI consortium with the Ethiopian Development 
Research Institute (EDRI) and the Ethiopian Institute of Agricultural Research (EIAR) was selected to 
carry out the study.  
A number of preliminary analyses, undertaken by the World Bank and the International Food Policy 
Research Institute (IFPRI), pre-dated the launching of this study that had put forward a number of 
proximate hypotheses in explain unusually high cereal prices. Among the widely believed hypotheses 
were: (i) increased overall demand relative to supply; (ii) reduced domestic cereal availability due to 
                                               
1 Getnet, K., E. Gabre-Madhin, and S. Timrat (2006) 
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increased cross border exports of cereals; (iii) trade disruptions due to hoarding; and (iv) reduced food 
availability due to reduction in food aid inflow.  While these hypotheses were widely debated in the 
country, there is limited primary information to validate or refute them. It is in this particular context 
current study was undertaken. While the survey data can be used address host of different issue related 
to Ethiopian agriculture and household well-being, the focus has been on achieving the following main 
objectives:  
· To gather information regarding recent changes in cereal production, storage, and marketing 
patterns in order to test several hypotheses that have been proposed to explain the high price of 
cereals in Ethiopian markets. 
· To improve the general methodology of the past cereal availability studies.  Achieving the first 
objective in a rigorous way is critical, as data collected for this purpose will constitute the 
building blocks for achieving the second objective. 
· To estimate the quantity of maize, sorghum, and wheat that can be procured from domestic 
markets in the 2007/2008 agricultural year for relief purposes without disturbing the local 
market.     
Implementation of the study was carried out in three broad stages. The first stage involved a 
comprehensive overview of cereal availability methods and a multi-stakeholders’ consultation for 
determining the survey / sampling methods. Three sets of surveys were conducted—namely, a 
household survey (representative of the all major cereal producing regions); a traders’ survey, and a 
rapid assessment of cross border trade of cereals and livestock.  Based on the preliminary results, a 
preliminary findings meeting was held in Addis Ababa. Following that meeting, further analysis was 
carried out and the results were triangulated with a large body of secondary data. In addition results 
from all surveys, and some secondary data, have been used to develop a spatial equilibrium multi-
market model (ESGMM) to analyze policy impacts of various policy interventions. These results were 
presented in the final workshop held in the United Nations’ Economic Commission for Africa 
Auditorium on December 5, 2008. After the final workshop in December the study team has carried 
out further analyses and triangulated results with secondary and published sources. This report brings 
together all the pieces of works carried out under this project. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                
2 This does not include procurement by EGTE and other NGOs.  
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1.2 Methodology 
This section provides plain descriptions of the study methods employed for the three key surveys, 
namely (a) household surveys, (b) market surveys, and (c) rapid assessment of cross border trade.  
The household survey methodology 
The sampling of the household survey followed a three-stage stratified random sampling. In the first 
stage, the woredas from each region were selected randomly from a list arranged by degree of 
commercialization as measured by the woreda-level quantity of cereals marketed. This ensured that 
that woredas were uniformly distributed across the range of level of marketed cereal outputs. In the 
second stage, farmers’ or peasants’ associations (FAs or Pas) were random selected from each 
woreda.3 For the third stage of selection, households are randomly selected from the list provided by 
the PA office.    
Implementation of this sampling involved three technical considerations. The first consideration was 
identifying the outcome variable(s) of interest. Given the primary objective of the study, estimating 
cereal availability, the volume of marketed cereal the cluster (woreda) level was selected for this 
purpose. The information about the marketed cereal at woreda level was collected from the CSA for all 
four major cereal growing regions in the country—namely, Amhara, Oromiya, SNNPR, and Tigray.  
Samples were assumed to be clustered at the woreda level, which was dictated by the availability of 
data on the outcome variables. To ensure representative-ness and minimize precision errors, the study 
team has had a series of discussions with the CSA about the sampling frame.4  
Two other technical considerations in drawing household samples were design effects and allowable 
margins of errors, respectively. The margin of errors are important for all statistical surveys, but 
consideration of design effect is particularly import  for drawing samples from a cluster or strata, 
particularly determining sample size in each strata. After considering various levels of design effects 
and margin of errors, a sample size of 1500 was determined to adequate. Details of the sample sizes 
under alternative scenarios are presented in Table 1. Subsequently, sample size had to be increased to 
account for some idiosyncrasies in the Tigray region. 
 
 
                                               
3 The initial plan was to select Enumeration Areas (EAs) at this stage rather than Pas. In fact, EAs were randomly selected 
from each woreda. Our inability to obtain EA maps on time meant that we have to select PAs instead. We picked the PAs 
corresponding to the randomly selected EAs. This is analogous to selecting PAs randomly since the EAs were directly 
selected randomly from a list of EAs in each woreda and without any reference to PAs. This decision is made in 
consultation with CSA staff. 
4 The initial plan to survey a fraction of the sample of the the Ethiopian Household Income, Consumption, and Expenditure 
Survey 1999/2000 (HICE 1999/2000) has to be dropped. The Ethiopian Central Statistical Agency (CSA) has changed its 
sampling frame and insisted that the new frame has to be used. 
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Table 1.1 Sample size determinations 
 
Two-sided 
Confidence 
Interval = 95%  
Marketed 
surplus Margins of error (M) 
0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 
Design Effect  Normal Deviate Variance 
3.3 4.5 5.0 5.6 6.8 7.9 
1.96 0.25 1268 1710 1930 2151 2593 3035 
1.96 0.20 1014 1368 1544 1721 2074 2428 
1.96 0.15 761 1026 1158 1291 1556 1821 
1.96 0.10 507 684 772 861 1037 1214 
1.96 0.09 456 615 695 774 934 1093 
1.96 0.08 406 547 618 688 830 971 
1.96 0.07 355 479 541 602 726 850 
Source: Variances were calculated from the CSA data and the design effects are from the previous table. 
 
Figure 1.1 Locations of the household survey samples 
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Traders / market survey methodology 
The initial methodological plan was to follow up the 2002 IFPRI market survey samples in order to be 
able to compare the changes in structure-conduct-performance of the selected grain. The study team 
also tried to account for the traders’ survey conducted by the Ethiopian Commodity Exchange (ECX).  
There were two problems in adequately accounting for the both issues. First, ECEX baseline survey 
was conducted only on the wholesalers; and hence did not capture the implications for the smaller 
traders for whom market operations has greater food security implications. Second, covering market 
locations surveyed in 2002 study, proved logistically and financially infeasible.  
Through consultation with CSA, IFPRI, and other national agencies, the study team decided to draw 
the sample within the vicinity of the clusters from which household sample was randomly drawn.  For 
selected households sampling sites, drawing of traders sample is illustrated in Table 1.2.  Please note 
that this table only reflects selected sites not the entire sample. Note that the market survey 
methodology adopted for this study has three distinct advantages: (a) the market survey data can be 
matched with the household survey data with statistical validity, (b) it will enable studying the changes 
in structure, conduct, performance for surplus and deficit market for the same time period, and (c) it is 
more cost effective.  
Table 1.2   Illustration of traders’ survey sampling in selected woreda 
 
Region Zone Woreda Markets # of traders  
Oromiya West Shewa Nono Ambo 17 
Oromiya West Shewa Wonchi   
Oromiya West Shewa Woliso Wolliso 17 
SNNP Guraghe Qabeana   
SNNP Guraghe Silte   
SNNP Guraghe Sodo   
SNNP Hadiya S. Badawacho   
SNNP Hadiya Soro Hossena 17 
SNNP Benchi Maji Maji   
Oromiya Jimma Kersa   
Oromiya Jimma Limu Kosa Jimma 17 
SNNP Kaffa Decha   
SNNP Kaffa Gesha   
  Total Number of Sample    68 
 
Total targeted sample of at least 150 wholesalers. A total of 20 markets will be visited. Interview 50 % of the wholesaler in 
each market, if the  # of wholesaler is >= 10; If total number of traders is less than 10, interview a minimum of five. 
 
Total targeted number of retailer / Assemblers 200; 12 traders in each of the 9 deficit markets; 8 traders from each of the 11 
surplus markets. 
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Figure 1.2 Geographic locations of market samples in the trader survey 
 
 
Rapid assessment of cross border trade  
This study was based on rapid assessment official and unofficial trade flows in four major cross border 
trade points in Ethiopia: Kumruk-Assosa in the Benshangul-Gumuz region, Metema area in Amhara 
region, Humera in Tigray region and Moyale in Oromiya/Somali region (Figure 1.3). Kumruk-Assosa, 
Metema and Humara are trading points with Sudan and Moyale is the major trade route with Kenya. 
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Figure 1.3 Locations of four major cross border trade points addressed in the study 
 
 
Both primary and secondary data sources were employed for data analysis. The secondary data were 
collected from relevant government offices, including Customs Agency and Bureaus of agriculture and 
Rural Development at different levels (i.e., zone, region and federal level). The primary data were 
generated using a Rapid Market Appraisal (RMA), which is designed by the CAS study team and 
implemented by expert enumerators from regional offices of the Ethiopian Institute of Agricultural 
Research (EIAR) who has established contacts with the key players in the respective border points. 
The RMA employed group discussion, discussion with key informants, as well as direct observation by 
the researchers. In order to better guide the data collection during the discussions, checklists for the 
different target groups were prepared. The group discussions and discussion with key informants were 
conducted with experts of the Bureaus of Agriculture and Rural Development, respective offices of the 
Customs Agency, farmers group, and local traders. The group discussions were held particularly in the 
purposively selected domestic markets canters.  
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1.3 The study components 
The stakeholders in cereal markets are many. In addition to millions of farmers and traders, both 
governments and donors’ food security policies heavily influence grain markets in developing 
countries. Among the UN agencies, the WFP has played significant roles in grain markets 
development for decades, especially though local procurement. With supports of donor governments, 
WFP has spent over US$1.2 billion in food purchases in Africa alone from 2001 to 2007. In 2007, 
80% of WFP’s overall food purchases were made in developing countries, representing over US$612 
million or 1.6 million metric tons. Of the total purchase, 56% was procured in least developed and 
low-income countries, while 24% was procured in middle-income developing countries. In Ethiopia, 
local procurement has been substantial until the operation was temporarily suspended in the face of 
rising food prices. 
A critical factor in WFP’s guideline for local purchase is that its procurement should not de-stabilize 
the domestic markets. In particular, one of the conditions for local purchase is that the domestic prices 
should not exceed to import parity prices. However, as demonstrated in Ethiopia, there are important 
factors that can dictate local purchase operation. For example, while real prices of maize in domestic 
markets was falling in 2006/07 (World Bank, 2007) local purchase could not have been carried out due 
high nominal prices and hence government’s fear that local purchase could further increase the prices. 
The puzzling changes in grain markets and governments’ policy actions made it clear that CAS could 
not have been conducted the same way that it had been conducted for years. A clear understanding of 
behavioral changes at household levels, grain traders’ level, as we as policy actions had to be taken 
into account for a better assessment of cereal availability in Ethiopia.   
Keeping these realities in mind, the study was Availability Study (CAS) 2008 for Ethiopia that has 
four major research components. Two of the fundamental components are changes in household and 
grain market behaviors, which are addressed by conducting two intensive sets of surveys. The third 
component, cross border trade, does not involve formal surveys but certainly requires very intelligent 
rapid assessments and review of secondary data / documents. The final component of the CAS 2008 is 
a spatial equilibrium model, which makes use of data generated by the three other components of the 
study. In particular, the model is formulated to analyze how purchase of grain in various regions likely 
to affect prices. In addition, the model is flexible enough to analyze other policy shocks; changes in 
trade policies, reduction in transactions costs, etc.  
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1.4 Notes on organization and contents 
This report is organized with an objective to increase accessibility of the study findings to a wide range 
of readers. Four points about the organization are worth noting. First, each of the four core chapters 
(chapters 2-5) presents detail analyses based on household survey, traders’ survey, cross border trade 
assessments, and the modeling exercises. From a value chain perspective, these chapters are 
interlinked and feed each other for better understanding. For example, marketable surpluses, on farm 
storage, consumption behaviors are all critical determinants prices; and a household survey is 
necessary to capture them.  The information obtained from the household survey is then triangulated to 
ascertain whether the cross border trade and the market survey data are consistent. Finally data from 
all these three components are used to set up the spatial equilibrium model and carry out policy 
simulations. However, each of the chapters can be read as an independent piece of study without 
having to consult other chapters. For instance, if a reader is interested in the impacts of policy 
interventions (such as local food procurement or increased distribution of food under safety net 
programs) without worrying about how the model parameters are estimated, s/he can go directly to 
chapter 5. Similarly, readers interested in the results of the analysis on the changes in households’ 
production behaviors or grain traders’ storage behaviors can get the information from chapter 2 and 
chapter 3, respectively.  
Three other aspects of the report need especial mention. First, the technical details are kept into the 
minimum and only core tables are included in the text, with detail tables presented in the annex. In 
particular, this report does not include the detail equations and assumptions in generating the statistical 
/ econometric results presented in the respective chapters.5 Second, the report presents a synthesized 
summary of the study components in chapter 6, which is envisaged to serve as snap-shot summary of 
the study findings.  Finally, this report does not include important background papers produced for this 
project, which include (i) an overview report on CAS estimates and methods, (ii) a report on the 
sampling and survey administration, and (iii) a descriptive report on the preliminary findings. These 
reports are listed at the end of this report and are available from the both IFPRI and JRC.  
 
 
                                               
5 For details, please contact the authors who will be happy to answer to questions and to provide additional information 
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THE KEY STUDY COMPONENTS 
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Chapter 2:  Results from the household survey 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the main results of the 2008 Ethiopian Agricultural Household Marketing 
Survey, carried out as part of the Cereal Availability Study.  As indicated earlier, the central piece of 
the study has been has been a nationally representative household survey in the four main cereal 
growing regions namely, Amhara, Oromya, SNNPR, and Tigray.  This describes methods and presents 
results on various aspects of household activities that are likely to influence price—such as production, 
marketed surplus, consumption, storage and income diversifications. Some of the estimates from this 
chapter serve as the basis for modelling exercises as well as triangulation of the market and cross 
border trade surveys.   
2.2 Methods  
The household survey is based on a 16-page questionnaire covering household characteristics, housing, 
assets, land use, crop production, agricultural input use, crop storage, crop marketing, livestock 
production, non-farm income, credit, consumption patterns, and perception of changes.  The survey 
questionnaire capture the Meher season of 2007. However, the reference period for recall period was 
2004/05, which is used to compare the changes. 
The sample includes 1707 households in the four main regions of Ethiopia: Tigray, Amhara, Oromia, 
and the Southern Nations, Nationalities, and People’s Region (SNNP).  These four regions account for 
about 97% of cereal production in Ethiopia.  Excluded are three urban regions (Addis Ababa, Dire 
Dawa, and Harari), two sparsely-populated semi-arid regions (Afar and Somali), and two relatively 
small regions (Gambela and Benishangul-Gumuz) with less than one million inhabitants.  The sample 
was selected with the assistance of the Central Statistical Authority (CSA) and represents a three-stage 
stratified random cluster sample.  In the first stage, rural woredas were randomly selected from each 
region; in the second, enumeration areas and peasant associations were randomly selected from these 
woredas; and in the third stage, households were randomly selected from household from household 
lists. 
In February 2008, IFPRI staff trained 25 enumerators and four supervisors over a seven-day period.  
The training included field testing of the questionnaire and numerous revisions of the questionnaire.  
The data collection was carried out by four teams of enumerators over the period March-May 2008.   
The data entry was done using CS-Pro, a software package designed specifically for data entry of 
survey and census data.  The data entry program was designed to check the data for numbers that were 
out-of-range or inconsistent with other entered data.    
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The analysis was carried out using Stata, a software package used widely for analysis of household 
survey data.  Preliminary results of the survey based on partially-cleaned and un-weighted data were 
presented at a workshop in Addis Ababa in June 2008.  The results presented in this report cover a 
wider range of topics, are based on cleaned data, and make use of sampling weights.   
2.3 Household characteristics 
The average household in the sample has 6.5 members.  This result is somewhat higher than the 
corresponding figure in the Population Census of 2000-01, which estimated the average household size 
to be 5.2 members.  This difference may be related to a narrower definition of the household in the 
Census and/or the fact that our survey covers only the four main regions.  
The age composition of household members reflects the fact that the Ethiopian population is quite 
young.  The average age is 20 years old and half the rural population is less than 15 years old.  There 
were no notable differences in age composition across regions. 
According to the survey, rural inhabitants who are at least seven years old have an average of 2.2 years 
of schooling.  Almost half (48%) have no schooling, and just 7% have any secondary school 
education.  The literacy rate among this group is about 39%.  Among the four regions surveyed, 
literacy rates are highest in Amhara (47%) and lowest in SNNP (33%)  However, the results suggest 
that education levels are improving.   Those in the 50-59 year age category received less than one year 
of schooling on average, and their literacy rate is just 17%.  In contrast, those in the 10-19 year 
category have had three years of schooling on average and their literacy rate is 60%.   
There is a sizable gender gap in the level of education and the literacy rates.  Men have 2.7 years of 
schooling on average, compared to 1.6 years for women.  Furthermore, the literacy rate is 48% among 
men and just 30% among women.  However, this gender gap is much smaller among the youth than 
among adults.  For example, among those 10-19 years old, the literacy rates are 62% for boys and 59% 
for girls.  In contrast, among 40-49 year olds, the literacy rates are 47% for men and just 6% for 
women.   
The main activity of household members depends on their age and sex.  Among men over the age of 
20, 85% reported their main activity to be crop production.  The remainder said their main activity was 
studies (8%), raising livestock, wage employment, self-employment in non-farm enterprises, or 
retirement (1% each).  Among adult women, 60% had a reported main activity of unpaid housework, 
while 26% reported crop production and 3% small business owner.  The most common secondary 
activity for adult men was livestock production (28%), while for adult women it was crop production 
(39%). 
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Among the heads of household, the average age is 44 years, the average level of education is 2.1 years, 
and the literacy rate is 39-40%.  According to the survey, about 8% of rural households are female-
headed.  This proportion is smaller than estimated in the Population Census of 2000-01 and the 2005 
Ethiopian Demographic and Health Survey, both of which estimated that 20% of the rural households 
are headed by women (CSA and ORC Macro, 2006).  Part of this difference may be related to different 
definitions of female-headed households and to the fact that our survey covers only the four main 
regions of Ethiopia.  
The EAHM Survey collected basic information on the characteristics of the houses occupied by rural 
households in the sample.  About 80% of the houses have walls made of wood and mud, while the 
remainders have walls made of wood (7%), grass and mud (5%), and other materials.  Most of the 
houses (48%) have floors made from cow dung or mud mixed with soil, while 41% had sand or earth 
floors.  The roof is made of grass or thatch in 51% of the houses and of corrugated metal in 44% of 
them.  The roof type varied markedly across regions, with Amhara having the highest percentage of 
metal roofs (60%) and SNNP having the lowest (25%).  Almost all the houses owned by respondents 
in our sample have one, two, or three rooms, with an average of 1.9 rooms.  Similarly, almost all the 
houses had zero, one, or two windows, with the average being one window.  Electrification was quite 
rare among the rural households sampled, with less than 3% of them using electric lights. This result is 
comparable to that of the 2005 Ethiopia Demographic and Health Survey, which found that 1.9% of 
the rural households had electricity. 
According to the EAMHS, the average farm size is about 1.6 hectares, though the median is just 1.1 
hectares.  Only 4% of the plots are irrigated. These numbers are consistent with CSA data on holding 
size. According to 2007-08 agricultural sample enumeration survey, almost 60 percent of the farm 
households in Ethiopia operate on less than two hectares of lands.    
2.4 Crop production 
According to the Ethiopia Agricultural Marketing Household Survey (EAMHS), maize and teff are the 
most commonly grown crops, each being grown by more than 55% of farm households in Ethiopia.  
Wheat, sorghum, and barley are next, produced by 29-35% of farm households.  Faba beans and enset 
are each grown by more than 20% of farm households (see Figure 2.1).  
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Figure 2.1  Percentage of households producing and selling each crop 
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Respondents were asked about the timing of the harvest and the area and production of each crop 
during both Belg and Meher seasons.  Almost half the farmers reported carrying out the Meher harvest 
of teff, wheat, and sorghum in January, though the maize harvest starts earlier and ends later than the 
other cereals (see Figure 2.2).  
Figure 2.2  Timing of the Meher harvest of cereals (% of households) 
 
 
The estimates of land allocation by crops confirm well-known regional differences in cropping 
patterns (Table 2.2).  In Tigray, the crops with the greatest area are teff, sorghum, and, to a lesser 
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extent wheat, which account for about 40% of the crop area.  In Amhara, teff is the most important 
crop (19% of the area), followed by wheat, sorghum, and maize.  In Oromia, two-thirds of the cropland 
is allocated to cereals, with teff alone accounting for 22%.  In the SNNP region, maize accounts for the 
largest crop area (21% of the total), followed by teff and enset.   
Table 2.2 Share of crop area allocated to each crop by region (%) 
 
Crop Tigray Amhara Oromia SNNP Total 
Teff 15 19 22 18 20 
Barley 9 7 4 6 6 
Wheat 11 11 10 6 10 
Maize 4 10 18 21 15 
Sorghum 14 11 10 3 9 
Finger millet 4 6 2 0 3 
Faba bean 1 6 3 4 4 
Field peas 1 1 6 5 4 
Haricot beans 0 1 1 6 2 
Chick-peas 1 5 1 1 2 
Other pulses 2 2 2 2 2 
Oilseeds 3 8 2 0 4 
Vegetables 8 1 1 1 2 
Onion 2 1 1 0 1 
Potato 1 6 0 1 2 
Sweet potato 0 0 0 3 0 
Other root crops 3 0 1 2 1 
Fruit 2 0 1 1 1 
Chat 2 0 3 1 2 
Coffee 0 0 7 2 3 
Enset 4 0 6 12 5 
Other crops 12 5 0 3 3 
Source:  Estimated from 2008 EAMHS. 
 
Level of production  
According to the EAMHS, maize is the most important crop in volume terms, with an estimated 3.6 
million tons of production, most of which is grown in Oromia.  Teff is second in importance, with 2.1 
million tons.  Amhara and Oromia are the two main teff-growing regions, accounting for 83% of the 
national production.  Wheat and sorghum are also important crops, with 1.7 million tons and 1.5 
million tons of production respectively.  In both cases, Amhara and Oromia are the main producing 
regions.  In volume terms, these four cereals are followed in importance by potatoes, barley, and enset 
(see Table 2.3).  
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         Table 2.3    National production of main crops (1000 tons) 
 
Crop Tigray Amhara Oromia SNNP Total 
Teff 197 864 892 167 2,121 
Barley 172 390 213 54 829 
Wheat 173 709 682 106 1,670 
Maize 89 1,025 2,032 435 3,581 
Sorghum 304 571 597 67 1,539 
Finger millet 37 280 67 2 385 
Faba bean 18 225 127 68 438 
Field peas 5 32 112 51 200 
Haricot beans 0 70 109 88 267 
Chick-peas 7 183 58 5 253 
Other pulses 15 92 105 10 222 
Oilseeds 17 116 47 4 183 
Vegetables 45 67 190 31 333 
Onion 59 165 206 8 438 
Potato 36 889 85 83 1,093 
Sweet potato 0 0 10 201 211 
Other root crops 1 18 134 106 259 
Fruit 27 11 83 52 173 
Chat 4 0 288 18 310 
Coffee 1 3 259 36 299 
Enset 0 0 448 371 819 
Other crops 31 621 27 64 743 
Source:  Estimated from 2008 EAMHS. 
 
How do EAMHS production estimates compare to other estimates?  The 2001-02 Ethiopian 
Agricultural Sample Enumeration (EASE) was a massive data collection exercise that collected 
information from 450 thousand agricultural households and generated woreda-level production 
estimates.  The EAMHS data suggest that cereal production has grown about 18% since the 2000-01 
EASE survey.  The growth is highest for teff (29%) and lowest for sorghum (9%).  This pattern is 
consistent with a pattern in which production is responding to shifts in cereal demand in response to 
income growth, since teff is the most expensive cereal and is a preferred staple, while sorghum is less 
expensive and is consumed more among rural and low-income households (see Table 2.3).  
The 2007-08 Agricultural Sample Survey (AgSS) collected information from over 42 thousand 
agricultural households, producing estimates at the zone level for the Meher season only.  The 
EAMHS estimates for meher production are markedly lower than those of the 2007-08 AgSS.  The 
difference ranges from 29% lower for maize to 44% lower for sorghum (see Table 2.4).   
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Table 2.4 Comparison of different estimates of cereal production (1000 tons) 
 
Crop 
2001-02 
Ethiopian 
Agricultural 
Sample 
Enumeration 
(EASE)  
EAMHS 
estimates 
for 2007-08 
Belg and 
Meher 
seasons 
Percentage 
difference 
between 
EAMHS 
and EASE 
Agricultural 
Sample 
Survey  
(AgSS) for 
2007-08 
Meher 
season 
EAMHS 
estimates 
for 2007-08 
Meher 
season 
Percentage 
difference 
between 
EAMHS 
and AgSS 
production 
estimates 
 
Teff 1,644 2,121 29% 2,993 2,046 -32% 
Wheat 1,435 1,670 16% 2,314 1,596 -31% 
Maize 3,018 3,581 19% 3,750 2,652 -29% 
Sorghum 1,538 1,670 9% 2,659 1,497 -44% 
Total 7,635 9,042 18% 11,716 7,791 -34% 
Sources:  CSA, 2008 and estimated from 2008 EAMHS. 
 
Given the difference between the cereal production estimates of 2007-08 Agricultural Sample Survey 
and the 2008 EAMHS, it is useful to examine whether this difference is related to area or yield 
estimates.  In the case of maize and sorghum, the area estimates between the two surveys are within 
5% of each other.  In the case of teff and wheat, the area estimates of the EAMHS are 28% and 16% 
higher, respectively, compared to the AgSS area estimates. 
Clearly, the sampling error from the EAMHS is greater compared to big sampled AgSS, but non-
sampling error is likely to be larger than sampling error for AgSS.   Several other factors suggest that 
the cereal yields in the AgSS may be overestimated.  First, the yields for maize and sorghum in Kenya, 
Tanzania, and Uganda are considerably lower than the AgSS estimated yields for Ethiopia and are 
quite similar to EAMHS yield estimates (see Table 2.5).  The best teff yields in Eritrea over the period 
2000-2007 are substantially less than AgSS estimates but close to EAMHS estimates (for wheat, the 
AgSS yield estimates are within the range of other East African countries).  Second, AgSS cereal yield 
estimates are significantly higher than yields estimated by the CSA crop forecast and FAO (through 
MoARD) estimates five years ago.  This is reflected in rapid rates of yield growth in Ethiopia, several-
fold higher than yield growth in other East African countries (see Table 2.6).  Third, it is generally 
recognized that crop-cutting exercises tend to overestimate yields by 14-20% (Poate, 1988; David, 
1989; Svedberg, 2000).   
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Table 2.5 Cereal yields in Ethiopia and nearby countries (tons/ha)  
 
 Teff Wheat Maize Sorghum Average 
Ag sample survey 2007-08 1.17 1.62 2.12 1.73 1.66 
EAMHS  2007-09 0.62 0.96 1.46 0.94 1.00 
% difference EAMHS vs AgSS -46% -41% -31% -46% -40% 
FAO Kenya 2007  1.77 2.03 0.75 1.52 
FAO Uganda 2007  1.73 1.50 1.45 1.56 
FAO Tanzania 2007  1.25 1.13 1.00 1.13 
FAO Eritrea best of 2000-07 0.65 1.13 0.78 0.57 0.78 
FAO Avg 5 countries 0.65 1.47 1.36 0.94 1.11 
U.S. average 0.70     
Source: CSA, 2008.  Estimated from 2008 EAMHS. FAO, 2008. 
 
Table 2.6  Growth in yields (%) 
Over 2004-2007  Wheat Maize Sorghum Teff Average 
Kenya -29% 5% 33% - 3% 
Tanzania 18% 5% 3% - 9% 
Uganda 18% 4% 4% - 9% 
Average Kenya/Tanzania/Uganda 2% 5% 13% - 7% 
Ethiopia  42% 69% 25% 42% 45% 
Over 2000-2007 
  Wheat Maize Sorghum Teff Average 
Kenya 14% 41% 13% - 23% 
Tanzania -4% 109% -4% - 34% 
Uganda 1% -14% 13% - 0% 
Average Kenya/Tanzania/Uganda 4% 45% 7% - 19% 
Ethiopia  91% 68% 40% 27% 66% 
Source: FAO, 2008.      
 
In summary, for the four main cereals, the EAMHS production estimates are 9-29% higher than the 
2000-01 EASE estimates but 29-44% lower than 2007-08 AgSS estimates.  The real difference 
between the EAMHS and the AgSS estimates appears to be in the yield: the yield estimates from the 
EAMHS are substantially lower than those from the AgSS.     
Perceived change in production 
The EAMHS also included questions regarding the size of this years’ harvest compared to the 2003 
harvest.  This reference year was chosen because it represents a fairly “normal” year in Ethiopian 
agriculture and one that is recent enough to expect farmers to be able to compare with the current year.   
For each of the four cereals, at least 70% of the growers reported that the most recent harvest was 
smaller than the 2003 harvest.  By contrast, just 17% reported a higher harvest (see Table 2.7).  
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Table 2.7 Farmers’ perception of cereal production this year compared to 2003 
Harvest compared to 2003 Teff Wheat Maize Sorghum Total 
Much higher 4 4 8 6 5 
A little higher 11 14 11 10 12 
Roughly the same 7 8 10 8 9 
A little lower 39 38 38 46 39 
Much lower 40 37 32 29 35 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
Sources:  Estimated from 2008 EAMHS. 
 
We can also examine these results by region, as shown in Table 2.8.  The table suggests that this 
negative view of the recent harvest extends to all four regions.  The most negative responses came 
from SNNP, where 73% reported that the recent harvest was smaller than the 2003 harvest. 
Table 2.8 Farmers’ perception of crop production this year compared to 2003 by region 
Harvest compared to 2003 Tigray Amhara Oromia SNNP  Total 
Much higher 3 6 10 4 7 
A little higher 17 13 12 10 12 
Roughly the same 11 14 16 13 14 
A little lower 53 29 35 30 34 
Much lower 17 38 26 43 32 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
Sources:  Estimated from 2008 EAMHS. 
 
In interpreting these results, it is important to recognize that there is a tendency in many countries for 
farmers and other self-employed workers to emphasize the negative aspects of their business 
environment.   In the Ethiopian context, this tendency may be strengthened if the respondents think 
that their responses may affect their chances of eligibility for the PSNP or other public assistance 
programs. Although the enumerators were trained to tell the respondents that the results would be used 
for research purposes only, it is possible that some respondents did not believe this. 
Furthermore, the production estimates from the Ethiopian Agricultural Marketing Household Survey 
must be interpreted with caution.  Because the sample is relatively small (1707 households), the 
sampling error from our estimates is higher than that of the Agricultural Sample Survey.  In other 
words, the results may be influenced by the inclusion, by chance, of a typical farm in the sample.  
Alternatively, it is possible that farmers were systematically under-reporting teff, wheat, and sorghum 
production.  On the other hand, the production estimates and the negative comparison assessments 
suggest that the 2007-08 harvest may not have been as large as suggested by the Agricultural Sample 
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Survey.  If this were the case, it would help to explain the unusually high food prices observed in 
Ethiopian markets during late 2007 and 2008.   
2.5 Crop marketing and storage 
How much of the Ethiopian harvest is marketed by farmers?  How, when, and where do they sell their 
output?  And has the marketed share changed over time?  The Ethiopian Agricultural Marketing 
Household Survey (EAMHS) has several modules designed to address these questions.  The results are 
important for several reasons.  First, the results are useful in the design of the local purchase program 
of the WFP, which is based on up-to-date estimates of the volume of cereals available in the market.  
Second, some of the hypotheses to explain the high food prices are based on changes in agricultural 
marketing patterns.  Third, information on agricultural marketing patterns is generally not available 
from the annual Agricultural Sample Surveys carried out by the CSA, although the 2000-01 
Agricultural Enumeration Survey collected some information on marketing patterns.  
 
Marketed surplus 
Because the EAMHS took place soon after the harvest of the 2007-08 Meher crop, it was not possible 
to collect information on the use of the harvest.  Thus, the questionnaire collected information on the 
marketing of the 2006-07 Meher harvest and the 2007 Belg harvest.   To estimate the marketed volume 
available in 2008, we apply this marketed share to the production estimates for the 2007 Belg and 
2007-08 Meher harvest (see Table 2.9).  
Table 2.9 Total production and sales by crop 
 
Crop 
Production in 
2006-07 Meher 
and 2007 Belg 
(1000 tons) 
Sales  in 2006-
07 Meher and 
2007 Belg 
(1000 tons) 
Marketed 
share (%) 
Production in 
2007 Belg  and 
2007-08 Meher 
(1000 tons) 
Sales in 2007 
Belg  and 2007-
08 Meher (1000 
tons) 
Teff 2,286 714 31% 2,121 662 
Barley 1,052 146 14% 829 115 
Wheat 2,060 547 27% 1,670 443 
Maize 3,766 802 21% 3,581 763 
Sorghum 1,905 409 21% 1,539 330 
Finger millet 484 52 11% 385 41 
Faba bean 458 119 26% 438 114 
Field peas 227 83 37% 200 73 
Haricot beans 263 93 35% 267 94 
Chick-peas 270 119 44% 253 112 
Other pulses 200 104 52% 222 115 
Oilseeds 300 268 89% 183 163 
Vegetables 331 134 41% 333 137 
Potato 984 346 35% 1,093 384 
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Sweet potato 238 37 16% 211 33 
Other root 
crops 260 141 54% 259 140 
Fruit 139 83 61% 173 106 
Chat 378 262 72% 310 223 
Coffee 314 234 74% 299 221 
Enset 812 73 9% 819 74 
Other crops 691 299 43% 743 322 
Sources:  Estimated from the 2008 EAMHS data.    
 
The results indicate that a relatively small share of cereals are marketed, varying from 11% for finger 
millet to 31% for teff.   The marketed share of pulses is somewhat higher, ranging from 26% to 52%.  
The percentage of production that is marketed is particularly high for oilseeds, coffee, chat, and onions 
(72 to 89%), implying that these crop are primarily grown for cash income.  In contrast, just 9% of the 
enset harvest is estimated to be sold by farmers, indicating that it is primarily a subsistence crop (see 
Figure 2.3).  
Figure 2.3  Share of production of each crop that is sold by farmers (%) 
 
 
Applying the marketed surplus ratios from the previous year to this year, we estimate that the marketed 
volume of maize in 2008 is 763 thousand tons.  Although the volume teff produced is much lower than 
that of maize, the volume of teff on the market is only slightly less, at 662 thousand tons.  By contrast, 
the volumes of wheat and sorghum available on the market are significantly less; 443 thousand tons 
and 330 thousand tons, respectively (see Table 2.9). 
How do EAMHS estimates of the marketed surplus ratio compare to those of previous studies?  The 
IFPRI Commercialization Survey, carried out in 2005, generated markedly lower estimates of the 
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marketed surplus for all four commodities (see Table 2.10).  On the other hand, the EAMHS produced 
estimates for the marketed surplus of teff and wheat that are quite close to those of both the CSA 
Ethiopia Agricultural Sample Enumeration of 2000-01 and the Grain Marketing Research Project 
(GMRP) of the late 1990s.   In the case of maize, the EAMHS estimates lie in between the higher 
estimate from the GMRP and the lower estimates of the EASE.  Finally, the market surplus estimate 
for sorghum is somewhat higher than the EASE estimate.  Of course, the marketed surplus will vary 
from year to year depending on the size of the harvest and other factors. 
 
Table 2.10 Comparison of estimates of marketed surplus of cereals 
 
Crop  
MSU Grain 
Marketing 
Research Project 
(1995-96) 
CSA Agricultural 
Enumeration 
Survey 
(2000-01) 
IFPRI 
Commercialization 
Survey (2005) 
IFPRI 
EAHMS 
estimate (2007-
08) 
Teff 31% 30% 24% 31% 
Wheat  28% 24% 17% 27% 
Maize  30% 16% 8% 21% 
Sorghum  n.a. 15% 9% 21% 
Source:  Negassa and Jayne, 1997;  Pender and Alemu. 2007;   Analysis of data from the 2008 EAMHS. 
 
Characteristics of sales transactions 
The EAMHS also collected information on the characteristics of crop sales, such as the location of the 
transaction and the type of buyer.   The results indicate that a large majority of crop sales transactions 
(88%) occur at the local market place (Table 2.11).   This percentage is somewhat higher in Tigray and 
Amhara (95%) and somewhat lower in Oromia (83%).  Most of the remainder of the sales transactions 
took place at the home or farm of the respondent.   Sales at a roadside, at the cooperative center, or at 
other locations were quite rare (1-6% of all sales).  The location of sale is partly dependent on the crop 
being sold.  For example, over half of the on-farm/home sales were sales of chat.  This suggests that, 
apart from chat, it is quite rare for farmers to sell their produce at their home or farm.  
 
Table 2.11 Location and type of buyer for crop sales by region 
 
 Tigray Amhara Oromia SNNP Total 
Location of sale     
On farm/home 4 2 14 7 8 
Local market 95 95 83 88 88 
Roadside 0 1 1 4 1 
Cooperative 1 2 1 1 1 
Other 0 1 1 1 1 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
34 
 
                             Tigray Amhara Oromia SNNP Total 
Type of buyer     
Farmer 0 2 1 1 1 
Trader 59 75 82 76 77 
Processor 22 1 0 1 2 
Cooperative 2 2 1 1 1 
EGTE/Govt 0 0 0 0 0 
Consumer 16 20 15 22 18 
Other 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
Source:  Estimated from the 2008 EAMHS data. 
 
Who is the buyer?  In more than three-quarters of the sales recorded in the EAMHS (77%), a trader is 
the buyer of the crop (see Table 2.11). Sales directly to consumers are the second-most common type 
of transaction.  Respondents in Tigray reported that 22% of their sales were to processors.  More than 
two-thirds of the sales to processors were cereals, so this presumably refers to grain millers who 
purchase grain directly from farmers.  In general, however, sales to cooperatives, processors, the 
Ethiopia Grain Trading Enterprise (EGTE), and others were rare.   
Role of cooperatives 
It should be noted, however, that cooperatives may be involved in sales transaction even if they are not 
considered the buyer; often cooperatives act as brokers, facilitating sales by their members to a trader 
or processor.   For this reason, a separate section of the questionnaire asks directly about cooperative 
membership and what services of the cooperative are used by the household.  These results indicate 
that somewhat more than one-third of farm households are members of an agricultural cooperative, the 
share being highest in Amhara (54%) and lowest in SNNP (21%) (see Table 2.12).  
Table 2.12 Cooperative membership and use of cooperative for grain sales 
 
Region 
Share of households 
are members of 
agricultural 
cooperatives 
Share of cooperative 
members that sell 
grains through a 
cooperative 
Share of households 
that sell grain through a 
cooperative 
Tigray 33% 8% 3% 
Amhara 54% 38% 21% 
Oromia 31% 25% 8% 
SNNP 21% 19% 4% 
Total 36% 28% 10% 
Source:  Estimated from the 2008 EAMHS data. 
 
Of the cooperative members, about 28% of them sell grain through the cooperative.  Thus, across all 
farm households (including cooperative members and others), about 10% sell grain through an 
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agricultural cooperative.  This percentage is somewhat higher in Amhara (21%), both because of the 
large number of cooperative members and because a relatively large share of members market their 
grain through the cooperative.   
Crop storage 
The EAMHS asked about the types of crop storage used by farmers and the storage capacity.  Almost 
all (97%) farmers reported having some storage capacity.  The most common ways of storing grains 
were in a gotera (39% of households), in the house in a container (34%), and in the house without a 
container (24%).  The percentages sum to 130%, indicating that most farm households use just one 
form of storage, but about 30 percent have more than one (see Table 2.13).  
Table 2.13  Types of storage used by farmers 
 
Type of storage Percentage of farms using this type 
Gotera (Grainery) 39.1 
Gudegade (pit in ground) 14.8 
In house in a container 34.2 
In house not in container 23.7 
Other 18.8 
Source:  Estimated from the 2008 EAMHS data 
 
The average storage capacity is about 1.7 tons, but the median capacity indicates that half the farmers 
have less than one ton.   As shown in Table 2.14, average storage capacity varies by region, being 
greatest in Oromia (2.1 tons) and least in SNNP (1.1 tons). 
 
Table  2. 14  Storage capacity by region 
  
Region 
Average storage 
capacity 
Median storage 
capacity 
Tigray 1,294 1,000 
Amhara 1,474 1,000 
Oromiya 2,107 1,300 
SNNP 1,085 500 
Total 1,656 1,000 
Source:  Estimated from the 2008 EAMHS data 
 
The average quantity of cereals in storage one month after the Meher harvest is about one ton, though 
the regional variation is quite wide.  The average ranges from 1.4 tons in Amhara to less than 300 kg in 
SNNP (see Table 2.15).  At the national level, these figures imply that farmers hold 9.6 million tons of 
cereals in storage one month after the Meher harvest.  This implies that on-farm storage dwarfs the 
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quantities stored by the government and private traders. It also means that farmer storage behaviour 
has a large effect on the seasonal availability of marketed grain and on seasonal price patterns. 
Table 2.15  Volume of cereals in storage one month  after the Meher harvest 
 
Region 
Average volume of cereals 
in storage one month after 
meher harvest 
Median volume of cereals in storage one 
month after meher harvest 
Tigray 1,193 950 
Amhara 1,370 1,100 
Oromiya 942 600 
SNNP 297 150 
Total 1,001 700 
Source:  Estimated from the 2008 EAMHS data 
 
Farmers were also asked how long their cereal stocks from the Meher season last.  Slightly more than 
one-half of the respondents reported that their stocks last six months.  Not surprisingly, the duration of 
stocks depends on the size of the farm: just 35% -third of the smallest tercile of farms had stocks 
lasting six months, while more than 60% of the largest tercile of farms did (see Figure 2.4).   
Figure 2.4  Duration of cereal stocks by size of farm 
 
Respondents say that almost all cereal storage is for later consumption (88%) or seed (2%).  Just 10% 
of respondents say they plan to sell their stocks later to get a better price or to meet cash needs later. 
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Changes in marketing and storage patterns 
The EAMHS also collected information on changes in marketing patterns over time.  Respondents 
were asked whether the share of cereal production that is marketed has increased or decreased since 
2003.  The upper part of the table shows the percentage of households reporting each type of response.  
Overall, 62% report smaller shares of cereal production being sold and 23% report larger shares. The 
decline seems sharper in Tigray according to the regional breakdown of the figures (Table 2.16).  The 
results do not change even when the sample is weighted by volume of production, although the pattern 
becomes somewhat weaker (as shown in the Bottom panel of Table 2.16). The most common 
explanation given by respondents for the reduction in the marketed share of production is a decline in 
the level of production.  This is consistent with the production trends reported above, but surprising in 
light of the growth in cereal production estimated in official statistics. 
 
Table 2.16 Perceived change in share of cereal production that is marketed since 2003 
 
Tigray Amhara Oromia SNNP      Total 
Responses 
Percentage of households 
Smaller share 83 60 59 58 62 
Same 9 15 18 15 16 
Larger share 8 25 23 27 23 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
 Percentage of households weighted by production 
Smaller share 78 48 39 39 46 
Same 11 16 18 11 16 
Larger share 11 37 44 50 38 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
Source:  Estimated from the 2008 EAMHS data. 
 
Finally, respondents were asked whether the timing of crop sales had changed since 2003.  The 
percentage of household reporting selling later (33%) is somewhat higher than the percentage 
reporting selling earlier in the season (28%).  These differences are magnified when the percentages 
are calculated using weights to represent the volume of cereals marketed (see Table 2.17).  However, it 
should be noted that a delay in the timing of cereal sales would have the effect of reducing seasonality 
in cereal prices, but it would not, by itself, help to explain the increase in cereal prices since 2005.     
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Table 2.17 Perceived change in timing of cereal sales since 2003 
 
 Tigray Amhara Oromia SNNP Total 
 Percentage of households 
Selling earlier 45 28 20 38 28 
No change 33 41 44 30 39 
Selling later 22 32 36 32 33 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
 Percentage of households weighted by sales 
Selling earlier 44 23 18 29 23 
No change 40 39 35 29 36 
Selling later 16 38 48 42 41 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
Source:  Estimated from the 2008 EAMHS data. 
 
2.6 Income diversification 
As part of the Agriculture-Led Development Strategy (ALDS), the government of Ethiopia has used a 
variety of policies and programs to promote diversification from low-value staple crops into higher-
value commercial crops, livestock, and non-farm activities.  Thus, one hypothesis to explain the 
unusually high food prices over the past 18 months is that this is a side-effect of the process of 
diversification.  In other words, if large numbers of farmers shifted from staple crop production to 
high-value crops and activities, this might be reflected in a relative decline in cereal production, 
resulting in higher prices for basic cereals.  And in addition to its implications for food prices, we are 
interested to know whether there is evidence of a shift in rural livelihoods toward higher-value crops 
and activities.   
In order to address this question, the EAMHS asked farmers several questions regarding changes in the 
income-generating activities they were involved in and changes in the importance of these activities in 
household income.  Again, we use 2003 as the reference period, based on the idea that it is long 
enough ago that we can observe changes but recent enough to allow farmers to their economic 
activities.  Because it is difficult to remember the percentage contribution to income of different 
activities from four years before, the questionnaire merely asks whether or not the household was 
involved in each activity and whether it has become more or less important in household income since 
2003.   
The results provide clear evidence of diversification away from grain crops.   For almost all the cereals 
and pulses, more households report a declining importance than an increasing importance as a source 
of income.  Maize, finger millet, chick peas, and faba beans are the only grains showing no downward 
trend.  Similarly, oilseeds show no trend in either direction (see Table 2.18 and Figure 2.5).  
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Table 2.18 Change in importance of crops as a source of income compared to 2003 
 
Crop Not a  grower Less important Same More important 
Teff 36 31 7 26 
Barley 64 18 5 12 
Wheat 58 21 4 17 
Maize 32 27 17 24 
Sorghum 66 17 6 12 
Finger millet 87 5 2 5 
Faba bean 74 11 3 12 
Field peas 87 7 1 5 
Haricot beans 88 5 4 4 
Chick-peas 91 4 1 4 
Lentils 94 3 1 2 
Grass peas/vetch 95 2 1 2 
Neug 95 2 0 3 
Linseed 96 2 0 2 
Sesame 98 1 0 1 
Cabbage 90 4 3 3 
Tomatoes 97 1 0 1 
Green peppers 95 2 1 1 
Red peppers 92 3 1 5 
Other vegetables 99 0 0 0 
Onion 90 3 1 5 
Potato 85 4 5 6 
Garlic 95 1 1 2 
Taro/godere 94 3 1 2 
Sweet potato 93 3 1 2 
Avocado 97 1 0 2 
Banana 93 2 1 4 
Orange 99 0 0 0 
Papaya 99 0 0 1 
Chat 81 7 2 10 
Coffee 81 6 2 11 
Hops 97 1 1 2 
Enset 72 8 5 14 
Other crops 92 1 1 5 
      Source:  Estimated from the 2008 EAMHS data. 
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Figure 2.5  Changes in the importance of each crop in income (% of farm households) 
 
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
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A few vegetable crops appear to be rising in importance, namely red peppers, onions, potatoes, and 
garlic.   On the other hand, other vegetables, fruit, and several root crops appear to be stable or 
declining in importance.  Finally, coffee, chat, and enset show some of the strongest tendencies of 
rising importance, with at least 50% of the growers reporting that it has become more important as a 
source of income since 2003 ( Table 2.18).  
This question about changes in the importance of different economic activities was also asked with 
regard to various types of livestock and animal products.  In almost every case, 50-60% of the 
producers reported that production of this animal was a more important source of income than four 
years before.  Finally, there is strong evidence that agricultural wage labor, non-farm self-employment, 
and transfers are become more importance source of income compared to the situation in 2003 (Table 
2.19).  
 
Table 2.19 Change in importance of livestock income compared to 2003 
 
Livestock type Not a producer 
Less 
important Same 
More 
important 
Oxen 41 15 11 33 
Cattle 35 18 11 37 
Horse 92 2 2 5 
Donkey/mule 74 6 7 13 
Goats 74 9 3 14 
Sheep 61 11 5 23 
Chickens 55 12 6 27 
Honey 89 3 1 7 
      Source:  Estimated from the 2008 EAMHS data. 
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Figure 2. 6 Changes in the importance of non-crop income sources (% of households) 
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In summary, the results of the 2008 Ethiopian Agricultural Marketing Household Survey suggest that 
farmers have diversified from low-value staple crops to higher-value crops and activities.  In 
particular, staple grains crops are becoming less important as a source of income and vegetables, 
perennial commercial crops, livestock, and non-farm activities are becoming more relatively 
important.  Nonetheless, in an absolute sense, staple grain crop production remains more widespread 
and important than any of these other individual crops or activities and will probably remain so for the 
foreseeable future.  
2.7 Perceptions of changes 
Perceived changes in input markets and public services 
The EAMHS asked farm households whether access to inputs and public services has improved, 
remained unchanged, or worsened over the past four years.   More specifically, households were asked 
about their perceptions about input markets, credit, extension, marketing information, the quality of 
local roads, and the number of crop buyers.   
In every category, more respondent reported improvement than deterioration.  The universal positive 
assessments, even in areas that do not seem to have changed much according to objective measures, 
raises the possibility that respondents were answering “strategically,” giving responses that they 
thought the enumerators (or local officials) would want to hear.  However, this does not explain the 
variation across questions, with the proportion of household reporting improvement ranging from 40% 
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(for availability of cereal seed) to 77% (for number of crop buyers).  Thus, we will interpret the results 
in relative terms.   
The highest proportion of respondents found improvements in the number of crop buyers (77%), the 
availability of advisory services (70%), the availability of market information (68%), and the quality of 
roads in the woredas (61%).  The improvements in the local roads and advisory services may reflect 
efforts on the part of the government as part of its Agriculture-Led Development Strategy.  The 
improved number of crop buyers probably refers to greater competition among traders to purchase 
surplus grain since traders account for the vast majority of crop buyers.  This trend and the increased 
availability of market information may well be associated with the increased use of mobile phones by 
traders, as documented in the trader survey conducted at the same time as the EAMHS.  Although less 
than 2% of farmers own mobile telephones according to the EAMHS, they may have access to market 
information through traders and other villagers who do have mobile phones.    
The lowest proportion of respondents reporting improvements was in the area of input marketing: 
availability of cereal seed (40%), quality of cereal seed (42%), timing of fertilizer availability (44%), 
and the availability of fertilizer (47%) (Table 2.20)  
Table 2.20 Perceived changes in input markets & public services since 2004 
 
 Improved No change Worse Total 
Availability of cereal seed 40% 40% 21% 100% 
Quality of cereal seed 42% 40% 18% 100% 
Availability of fertilizer 47% 29% 24% 100% 
Timing of fertilizer availability 44% 32% 24% 100% 
Availability of credit 52% 32% 16% 100% 
Availability of advisory services 70% 22% 8% 100% 
Number of crop buyers 77% 20% 3% 100% 
Availability of market information 68% 25% 7% 100% 
Quality of roads in woreda 61% 34% 5% 100% 
Source: Estimated from the 2008 EAMHS. 
 
Perceived changes in household well-being 
Respondents were asked “How has the well-being of your household changed since 2003-04?”  In 
general, the responses were quite positive, with 48% reporting either some improvement or big 
improvement.  Less than one-third of the respondents (32%) reported some deterioration or big 
deterioration (Table 2.21). 
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Table 2.21 Perceived changes in household standard of living compared to 2004 
 
 Change in standard of living of household  
 
Big 
improve-
ment 
Some 
improve-
ment 
No change 
Some 
deterio-
ration 
Big 
deterio-
ration 
Total 
Region       
  Tigray 1 34 21 42 2 100 
  Amhara 17 39 21 15 8 100 
  Oromia 15 35 24 21 5 100 
  SNNP 7 26 15 34 18 100 
Farm size       
  Small 6 22 24 34 14 100 
  Medium 8 35 20 27 9 100 
  Large 21 42 19 14 4 100 
Total 13 35 21 24 8 100 
 
There were marked differences in perceived changes in household well-being across regions.  
Respondents in SNNP were generally negative, with a majority of households (52%) reporting 
deterioration and just one-third reporting improvement.  This is not surprising given that the harvest 
was very poor in parts of SNNP in 2007-08.  Households in Tigray were also negative, on average, 
though less so than in SNNP.  In contrast, households in Amhara and Oromia were much more 
positive than average, with 56% and 50%, respectively, reporting improvement in their household 
well-being.  
There were also substantial differences between the perceived changes in well-being by farm size.  The 
categories were defined by terciles of farm size, so “large” farms refer to those with more than 1.12 
hectares and small farm refer to those with less than 0.83 hectares.   Among the larger farms, 63% 
reported improved well-being, while among the smallest farms just 28% did.  
Finally, respondents were asked for the reasons behind the changes in household well-being.  Among 
those reporting improved well-being, the most common explanations given were the increase in crop 
prices (81%), followed by increased livestock income, increased yields, and improved health of family 
members (47-53% each).   Among those reporting deterioration in household well-being, the most 
common reasons given were lower crop yields (81%), followed by higher food prices (45%).  These 
results confirm the importance of agricultural income in influencing household well-being, for better 
or for worse.  They also highlight the mixed effect of higher crop prices on rural well-being.  The 
higher prices brought significant benefits to many farmers (four-fifths of those whose well-being rose), 
and, at the same time, was a significant factor in adversely affecting other households (almost half of 
those reporting lower well-being). 
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2.8 Summary and conclusion 
We can summarize the main results of the 2008 Ethiopian Agricultural Marketing Household Survey 
as follows: 
· The EAMHS cereal production estimates are lower than those of the CSA Agricultural Sample 
Survey, mainly because of lower yield estimates.  Other sources point to an overestimation of 
cereal yields in Ethiopia, including lower yields for maize, sorghum, and teff in neighboring 
countries and the surprisingly rapid growth in Ethiopian yield estimates in recent years.  Lower 
cereal production would also help explain the rise in real cereal prices.   
· The estimated portion of marketed surplus of cereals is 21-31%, roughly similar to estimates from 
the 2000-01 Ethiopian Agricultural Sample Enumeration and estimates from the Grain Marketing 
Research Project in the 1990s. 
· There do not appear to be any major changes in agricultural marketing behavior over the past five 
years that would explain the higher cereal prices.  Farmers report selling a smaller percentage of 
the harvest than before, but this is due to the size of the harvest rather than increases in 
consumption.  There is some evidence of farmers, particularly larger farmers, selling later in the 
season, but this would affect the seasonality of prices rather than causing a trend of rising prices. 
· Farm households have, on average, about one tons of cereals in storage a month after the harvest.  
This represents about 9.6 million tons at the national level, dwarfing quantities stored by private 
traders and the government.   
· Almost all farmers sell crops at local markets (rather than at home) and to traders (rather than 
processors or government agencies).  The role of agricultural cooperatives in cereal crop marketing 
is relatively minor, with just 10% of farmers selling any cereal through cooperatives.     
· The EAMHS does provide evidence of gradual diversification away from low-value crops such as 
cereals and pulses toward higher-value crops including some vegetables, coffee, and chat and 
toward livestock production, wage income, and non-farm business income.   However, cereals and 
other staple crops continue to account for a large share of cropped area and rural income. 
· Farm households report improvements in a number of dimensions of the rural economy, 
particularly advisory services, marketing information, the number of crop buyers, and rural roads.   
· The EAMHS results suggest that more rural households are reporting improved well-being over 
the past four years than are reporting deterioration.  Nonetheless, the gains appear to be 
concentrated among larger farmers, who benefit from higher prices, and among those in Amhara 
and Oromia.   
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Chapter 3:  Results from Grain Trader’s Survey6 
High transaction costs in crop marketing simultaneously contribute to high urban food prices and low 
producer prices. High transaction costs also create a price range in which an agricultural household (or 
a region) will choose to neither buy nor sell a good, causing households (or regions) not to be 
integrated in trade (Key et al 2000). In these cases food markets that exist are very thin, and the 
subsistence strategies of farming households are reinforced by the price volatility that results from thin 
markets (Fafchamps 1992).  Investments in crop marketing to reduce the size of transaction costs 
allows efficiency gains to be realized from higher and less volatile prices, as well as relatively higher 
farm-gate and lower consumer prices. 
A number of studies have indicated that the spatial integration of markets in Ethiopia (at least for 
cereal crops) improved during the 1990s (Dercon, 1995; Negassa and Jayne, 1997; Gabre-Madhin and 
Mezgebou 2006). Although there may still be some markets that are not integrated (as suggested in 
Gabre-Madhin and Mezgebou 2006, and Negassa and Myers 2007), prices tend to move together and 
local supply shocks (in the form of food aid) do not have an impact on local prices as one would 
expect in segmented markets (Rashid, Dorosh, and Seyoum Taffesse 2008). However, the cost of 
transacting remains substantial which is reflected in relatively low producer price shares. Estimates 
from 2007 suggest farmers receive 50-60% of Addis retail prices, and other estimates put this as even 
lower at 30% (Gabre-Madhin and Mezgebou 2006). As a point of comparison, in Vietnam the share of 
the retail price farmers received remained constant throughout the late eighties and the nineties, at 71% 
in the South and 83% in North (Goletti and Minot 1997).7 
In recent years, as part of a strategy to realize growth in smallholder agriculture, the Government of 
Ethiopia has undertaken substantial market reforms and accelerated investments in road and 
communication networks. These investments have been made in order to reduce the magnitude of 
transacting and thereby improve the efficiency of cereal markets.  
It is likely that the cost and nature of trading in Ethiopian grain markets has evolved as a result of these 
infrastructural and institutional changes. For example, one could hypothesize that increased ownership 
of mobile telephones has changed the way in which traders search for price information, buyers and 
sellers. In particular we might expect that traders have increased knowledge about prices and trade 
volumes in other markets, increased the efficiency with which trading partners can be identified, and 
perhaps improved the integration of prices between markets.  The commensurate increases in fuel 
                                               
6 This chapter is prepared by Ruth Vargas Hill . 
7 Even taking the farmer price in the surplus south as a share of the retail price in the deficit north, the share of the price 
received by Vietnamese farmers is still much higher than that received by farmers in Ethiopia at 55%. 
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prices and investments in road infrastructure do not allow for clear ex-ante predictions about what has 
happened to transportation costs during this time, but it may be the case that substantial road 
investments reduced the cost of transporting.  More recently, large increases in cereal prices may have 
increased the cost of financing faced by cereal wholesalers, or perhaps increased incentives for storage.  
To assess changes in the cost and nature of cereal trading over the last seven years, a survey of 316 
grain traders was conducted in 20 fixed, permanent markets in the four regions of Amhara, Oromia, 
SNNP and Tigray. Markets were chosen to include the main terminal markets in these four regions and 
to represent both surplus and deficit markets. This data was compared with data from a similar survey 
undertaken in 2001-2 by IFPRI-ILRI to determine changes in returns to trade, transaction costs, search 
patterns and storage behavior.   
In the following sections we briefly describe the 2002 and 2008 surveys (Section 3.1), present some 
basic descriptive statistics on the nature of cereal traders (Section 3.2), assess changes in the behavior 
of grain traders (Section 3.3) and provide some analysis on areas of continued constraints to efficiency 
(Section 3.4). Section 3.5 concludes. 
3.1 The 2002 and 2008 trader surveys 
The 2008 trader survey 
Fixed, permanent markets were visited in 20 woredas in the four regions of Amhara, Oromia, SNNP 
and Tigray. Markets were chosen to include the main terminal markets in these four regions and to 
represent surplus and deficit markets. The markets chosen are listed in Table 1. In each market 
wholesalers and retailers of grains (teff, wheat, maize, barley, sorghum and finger millet) were 
sampled proportional to the total number of wholesalers and retailers found in the market.8 On average 
18 traders were sampled in each market. 
 
                                               
8 The following sampling rules were used to select traders: (i) when the total number of wholesalers in the market was more 
than 10, 50% were interviewed. If 10 or fewer wholesalers were found, a minimum of 5 wholesalers were interviewed. (ii) 
The targeted number of retailers and assemblers to be interviewed depended on the type of market sampled. In deficit 
markets 12 retailers / assemblers were targeted, in surplus markets 8 retailers / assemblers were targeted. 
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Table 3.1 Markets included in the 2008 trader survey  
Amhara Oromia SNNP Tigray 
Markets 
included in 
survey 
No. of 
traders 
Markets 
included in 
survey 
No. of 
traders 
Markets 
included in 
survey 
No. of 
traders 
Markets 
included in 
survey 
No. of 
traders 
Bahirdar  17 Ambo  15 Hosena  20 Shire  17 
Deberemarkos  18 Welisso  22 Arbaminch  17 Mekele  16 
Metemma  17 Jimma  33 Wolayita 
Soddo  
18   
Bure  17 Yabello  14     
Dessie  21 Shashemene  17     
Deberberihan  17 Nazerate  20     
Source: 2008 trader survey 
 
The majority of traders included in the survey are retailers: 69% of traders sampled identified 
themselves as retailers, compared with 29% that identified themselves as wholesalers (we return to 
these definitions later on in the analysis). Although retailers are more numerous in both the market and 
the survey, the small number of wholesalers account for larger traded volumes. We present some 
results for the average trader, and some results for the average quintal traded to control for this where 
important. Traders without permanent stores in a permanent market are difficult to survey, and this 
survey was no exception, not including these. As a result the proportion of traders involved in 
transportation or in touring the countryside to aggregate quantities from farmers may be under-
sampled.  This is taken into account in the presentation and interpretation of results where necessary.  
The 2002 trader survey 
At various points in the subsequent analysis the 2008 trader survey data is compared with data from a 
similar trader survey conducted by IFPRI/ILRI in 2001-2002. The 2001-2002 trader survey 
interviewed grain coffee and livestock traders in 45 markets in the country in 3 regions (Amhara, 
Oromia and Tigray) and 2 urban centers (Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa). There were a total of 692 
private traders interviewed of which 514 were grain traders. It is the grain traders in Amhara, Oromia 
and Tigray that are compared with grain traders interviewed in these three regions in 2008 (the 
comparison of these two surveys is discussed further in Section 3.3).  
In order to facilitate comparison across these two surveys the structure and questions included in the 
two surveys were, to the extent possible, kept identical. Some sections were omitted in the 2008 survey 
to ensure the survey fielded was short, and some sections of particular interest (such as perceptions in 
the changes in the structure of markets) were added. However the sections that are compared in this 
analysis were kept identical. 
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Comparing the 2002 and 2008 trader surveys 
Cereal traders interviewed in 2008 were compared with cereal traders interviewed in the same markets 
in 2002. The list of markets that were included in the surveys in both years, and the number of traders 
interviewed in each market, is presented in Table 3.2 In total 178 traders interviewed in 9 markets in 
Amhara, Oromia and Tigray 2002 are compared with 163 traders interviewed in 2008. 
Table 3.2 Markets included in both surveys 
 
 
Market Locations 
Number of traders 
interviewed in 2002 
Number of traders 
interviewed in 2008 
Amhara   
Bahirdar 29 17 
Deberemarkos 20 18 
Bure 10 17 
Dessie 35 21 
Oromia   
Nazarete/Nazareth 25 20 
Assela 14 17 
Asebteferi 10 18 
Tigray   
Shire 8 17 
Mekele 27 16 
Total 178 163 
Source: 2008 trader survey 
 
Differences in storage, transaction costs and search behavior between traders in these two years was 
examined. Extreme cases of measurement error were checked and cleaned, but given the measurement 
error often associated with trader survey data (Fafchamps, Gabre-Madhin and Minten 2005) a number 
of outliers remain and differences in medians may be a better test of changes. Additionally, given 
trader behavior varies with the trading functions undertaken, differences in the composition of trader 
types sampled (i.e. the number of retailers or wholesalers sampled) in each market should also be 
controlled for assessing what real changes are present.  
 
3.2 Characteristics of cereal traders 
Before moving to the analysis of how cereal markets have changed in recent years, we use data 
collected in the 2008 trader survey to present some simple descriptive statistics on trader 
characteristics. As noted in an earlier section, the majority of traders sampled were retailers, buying 
from other traders and selling to consumers. Only a third of traders sampled are buying from farmers 
(Table 3.3). Thus it would appear that this sample of traders over-represents transactions at the end of 
the marketing chain.  However, retail traders trade much smaller quantities than other traders and when 
we weight the results by the amount of crop traded and consider the average quintal traded we see that 
each end of the marketing chain is equally well represented in the sample with farmers comprising 
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22% of the suppliers, and consumers comprising 26% of buyers (Table 3.3). Based on this data we 
categorize traders sampled into three types: (i) assemblers collecting quantities and selling to 
wholesalers (14%), (ii) wholesalers selling to retailers or flour mills and factories (10%), and (iii) 
retailers selling to consumers (74%). These categories are used at various points in the analysis. 
 
Table 3.3 Location of traders sampled in marketing chain 
 
 Average trader Average quintal traded 
Main supplier is (%):    
  Farmer 34 22 
  Assembler 10 24 
  Wholesaler 48 48 
Main buyer is (%):    
  Consumer 74 26 
  Retailer 7 23 
  Wholesaler 14 38 
  Flour mill or factory 3 11 
  EGTE 1 1 
Source : 2008 trader survey 
 
If the selected sample is representative this evidence suggests that the market chain is quite long: 
comprising 4 traders on average, compared to 2 or 3 in other countries in sub-Saharan Africa 
(Fafchamps, Gabre-Madhin and Minten 2005). When weighting by quantity, the market share of 
processors (flour mills or factories) also increases showing that larger traders are more likely to sell to 
processors. Before continuing, it is important to note that this survey did not include the major cereal 
market of Addis Ababa, it thus does not represent retailers in the city, or very large wholesalers that 
operate there. The results provide information on traders and volumes traded in regional and rural 
markets.  
Weighting by quantity we find that 50% of crop purchased is transported. Although a high proportion 
of farmers report travelling to the market to make a sale, 64% of quantities bought from farmers is 
immediately transported. The proportion of crop transported increases after this stage: 84% of the crop 
sourced from assemblers is transported and 90% of crop sold to retailers is transported. Retailers 
transport very small quantities, only 27% of crop sold by retailers was transported by the retailer. 
When transportation is undertaken, it tends to be with a transporter (of those that transport, 88% 
transport only with a transporter). 
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Figure 3.1 Seasonal patterns in purchases and sales 
 
Source: 2008 trader survey and EGTE prices 
 
Trader activity is somewhat seasonal, with more traders actively trading from November to May. 
However a high proportion of traders reported trading throughout the year, on average above 80% for 
each crop. Stronger patterns of seasonality are observed when considering the size of purchases and 
sales made in each month (Figure 3.1), which suggests that despite an increasing trend in prices during 
the year for which this data was collected, there does not appear to be much of an increase in storage 
among traders. This is considered further in Section 3.3.  
Most traders are male and are sole owners of an enterprise that has been in business for 8 years (see 
Table 3.4). Only 8% of traders own a vehicle and a third of traders own a store. Nearly all traders own 
a phone, 66% reporting ownership of a landline and 84% ownership of a mobile phone. The median 
working capital is 30,000 Birr allowing for the purchase of 6 tons of maize at average 2008 prices. 
Median total asset value is smaller at 7,809 Birr. These numbers can be compared with summary 
statistics on traders surveyed in 2002 (see Table 3.5) 
Table 3.4 Profile of traders (2008) 
 
  Measurement unit All traders 
Proportion female % 12 
Proportion sole owners % 96 
Years of business Mean 11 
 Median 8 
Average working capital (Birr) Mean 83,647 
 Median 30,000 
Proportion owning a transport 
vehicle % 8 
Proportion owning a store % 32 
Proportion owning a telephone % 66 
Proportion owning a mobile % 84 
Total asset value (Birr) Mean 53,047 
 Median 7,809 
Source : 2008 trader survey 
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Table 3.5 Profile of traders (2002) 
 
   Unit All traders 
Proportion female % 5 
Proportion operating as a broker or 
agent in addition to trading % 6 
Proportion with a non-trading 
occupation % 20 
Proportion of trading revenue as a 
share of total revenue (%) Mean 90 (22) 
Proportion of grain trade revenue as a 
share of total trade revenue (%) Mean 83 (22) 
Proportion who are a sole owner % 91 
Years of business Mean 9 (9) 
Working capital (Birr) Mean 27,627 
 Std dev 63,062 
Proportion owning a transport vehicle % 9 
Proportion owning a store % 28 
Proportion owning a telephone % 36 
Proportion owning a mobile % 5 
Total asset value (Birr) Mean 23,044 
 Std dev 84,995 
Source: Gabre-Madhin and Amha 2004. *Numbers in parenthesis are standard deviations. 
An interesting picture emerges when key asset holdings are disaggregated by regions and by gender, as 
presented in Table 3.6. Notice that while there are some variations across regions, most significant 
changes are observed when the phone ownerships are disaggregated by gender. In all regions, phone 
ownerships by female traders are remarkably lower than their male counterparts. The highest 
proportions of female traders who owned a cell phone is 17.58 percent in Amhara and the lowest is 
only 4 % in Tigray. 
Table 3.6 Geographic and gender variation in access to information 
 
Regions Ownership  by gender 
 Tigray Amhara Oromia SNNP Total 
Traders with land line phone (%) 60.61 67.31 68.02 63.64 66.48 
Male  90.00 81.43 87.18 91.43 86.36 
Female 10.00 18.57 12.82 8.57 13.64 
Traders with cellular phones (%)  75.76 85.85 81.29 90.91 83.56 
Male 96.00 82.42 88.49 94.00 88.20 
Female 4.00 17.58 11.51 6.00 11.80 
Proportion of Bank account holders 78.79 60.38 32.56 71.43 50.68 
 
3.3 Changes in the behavior of grain traders between 2002 and 2008 
A key question is the extent to which trader behavior and the costs of transacting have changed in 
recent years. In particular, how investments in road infrastructure and growth in the use of mobile 
phones has changed trading behavior, collection of information on prices, suppliers and buyers. The 
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following sub-sections compare responses in the 2002 and 2008 surveys to assess some of these 
changes. 
Marketing margins 
We first consider whether absolute price differentials and marketing margins have changed (Table 3.7) 
by comparing data on prices and costs incurred in the last transaction. All 2002 nominal prices were 
converted into 2008 prices to determine whether real changes have taken place. The average absolute 
difference between the sales and purchase price (the price differential) did not change between 2002 
and 2008. However, given the rise in real prices between these two years, the constant price 
differential represents a reduction in gross margin rate.9 Traders’ total out of pocket transaction costs10 
have not changed much between 2002 and 2008. An increase of 1 Birr per quintal is reported in the 
mean, but the difference is not significant. Combined with a constant price differential, this suggests 
that unobservable costs (such as the costs of labor involved in search) have not changed much during 
these two periods. This is evidenced by the fact that net margins (the price difference less the total 
transaction costs) did not change much.  
Table 3.7 Comparisons of margins between 2002 and 2008  
 2002 2008 Difference 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Price difference 
(Birr per quintal) 14 10 14 10 
No significant 
difference 
No significant 
difference 
Gross margin rate 1.07 1.04 1.04 1.03 
Significant negative 
difference 
Significant 
negative difference 
(although not 
within assemblers) 
Net margin 
(Birr per quintal) 4 5 5 6 
No significant 
difference 
No significant 
difference 
Total out of pocket 
transaction costs 
(Birr per quintal) 8 3 9 3 
No significant 
difference 
 
No significant 
difference 
Source: 2002 and 2008 trader survey 
 
The structure of transaction costs  
Although it does not appear that the magnitude of overall transaction costs has changed much, it is 
instructive to examine whether there have been any significant changes in the structure of transaction 
costs. Again using data from traders’ last transactions, changes in the structure of transaction costs 
between 2002 and 2008 are presented in Table 3.8.  
 
                                               
9 The gross margin rate is defined as the sales price divided by the purchase price. 
10 Out of pocket transaction costs include costs of bags, handling, transport, road payments, taxes, storage, personal travel, 
intermediaries, telephone costs and financial capital (using the average interest rate as the opportunity cost of finance if it is 
not borrowed) incurred during the last transaction undertaken by the trader. 
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Table 3.8 Comparisons of out of pocket transaction costs between 2002 and 2008  
 2002 2008 Difference 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Total transaction 
costs per quintal 
(Birr) 
8 3 9 3 No significant 
difference 
Significant positive 
difference 
Proportion spent 
on: 
      
 Sacks 0.46 0.50 0.32 0.10 Significant negative 
difference 
Significant negative 
difference 
 Handling 0.20 0.06 0.27 0.08 Significant positive 
difference 
Significant positive 
difference 
 Intermediaries 0.09 0 0.03 0 Significant negative 
difference 
Significant negative 
difference 
 Transport 0.13 0 0.15 0 No significant 
difference 
No significant 
difference 
 Road 
payments 
0.01 0 0.003 0 No significant 
difference 
No significant 
difference 
 Storage 0.001 0 0.01 0 Significant positive 
difference 
Significant positive 
difference (although 
only among retailers) 
 Personal travel 0.01 0 0.01 0 No significant 
difference 
No significant 
difference 
 Taxes  0.03 0 0.01 0 Significant negative 
difference 
Significant negative 
difference 
 Telephone 0.01 0 0.07 0 Significant positive 
difference 
Significant positive 
difference 
 Financing 0.06 0 0.11 0 Significant positive 
difference 
Significant positive 
difference 
Source: 2002 and 2008 trader survey 
 
 
The proportion of the total cost of transacting that is spent on each item is presented. Given 
proportions are constrained to fall between 0 and 1; analysis of differences in the mean should be 
adequate. However median values are also reported (although they appear as zero whenever a majority 
of farmers did not report spending on a certain item). A number of differences are noted:  
· The proportion of spending on bags fell between the two surveys and the proportion of spending on 
handling increased. This could be due to the way costs were recorded between bags and handling 
(the main difference in sacks is not the cost of them but the much lower proportion of traders 
reporting spending on this item in 2008) or differences in the structure of payments to handlers. 
Considering spending and handling together there has not been much change.  
· The proportion of transaction costs spent on taxes has fallen indicating a reduction in the burden of 
taxes on marketing. 
· Financing costs now account for a much larger share of the costs of transacting, most likely on 
account of higher relative prices of cereals. Financing costs could also increase if traders were 
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taking more days to complete purchases, but data presented in Table 3.8 below suggests this is not 
the case. 
· A significant difference in the structure of transaction costs is the reduction in the payments of 
intermediaries and the increase in the costs of telephone calls. Intermediary costs fell from 9% to 
3% of transaction costs and the proportion of costs coming from telephone calls increased from 1% 
to 7%. This suggests there has been some substitution between the use of intermediaries and the 
use of telephones to source suppliers and/or buyers.  
· There has also been an increase in the proportion of transaction costs that are spent on storage, 
apparently driven by increased spending on storage by retailers.  
 
Interestingly, there was no evidence of a difference in the proportion of transaction costs spent on 
transportation, suggesting that perhaps investments in road infrastructure have offset increasing costs 
of fuel. To further test this, the cost of transporting one quintal was regressed on distance, distance 
squared (in case there are decreasing costs of transporting with distance) and a year dummy. Results 
are presented in Table 3.9. The year dummy was insignificant suggesting that the cost of transporting 
has not changed.  This is perhaps as a result of commensurate improvements in transportation 
infrastructure and increases in fuel prices: the real price of fuel increased by 25% between the two 
surveys. When transportation costs are deflated by the price of fuel11, the year dummy is negative and 
significant; suggesting that had fuel prices been constant, some increased efficiency in transportation 
as a result of improvements in infrastructure or other factors would have been observed.  
 
Table 3.9 Testing for differences in transportation costs between 2002 and 2008 
 
Regression on … Transport costs per 
quintal 
Transport costs per quintal 
deflated by fuel increase 
 Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value 
Distance (km)  0.05 0.000 0.04 0.001 
Distance squared (km2)  0.00002 0.090 0.00002 0.167 
Year  -0.21 0.878 -2.70 0.070 
Constant  8.27 0.000 9.67 0.000 
Number of observations  104 104 
Pseudo R-squared  0.36 0.35 
Source: Median regressions using 2002 and 2008 trader survey 
                                               
11 Teravaninthorn, and Raballand (2008) present data suggesting that the median proportion of fuel costs in total transaction 
costs in major transport corridors in Africa is 0.54. This proportion of transport costs is deflated by 25% to determine 
whether transport costs would have fallen had fuel prices remained constant throughout this period.  
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Search behavior  
We further consider the impact mobile phones may have had on trader search behavior by comparing 
information on the collection of price information and search behavior of traders between the two 
surveys. The results are presented in Table 3.10. There has been a substantial increase in the number of 
telephone conversations between traders in one market and another over the six years between 2002 
and 2008 with the median number of phone calls increasing from 12 to 104. This is perhaps not 
surprising given only 5% of traders owned a mobile phone in 2002 compared to 84% in 2008. 
 
Table 3.10 Changes in search behavior 
 
 2002 2008 Difference 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Number of telephone 
conversations with 
traders for business 
purposes on other 
markets 
125 12 568 104 Significant positive 
difference 
Significant positive difference 
Search for price information      
Number of grain 
products followed 
3.9 3.5 4.2 3 No significant 
difference 
No significant difference 
Number of supply 
markets followed 
1.6 1 2.2 1.5 Significant positive 
difference 
Significant positive difference 
Number of sales markets 
followed 
1.1 1 1.4 1 Significant positive 
difference 
Significant positive difference 
Number of people in 
main market consulted 
on prices 
3.8 3 2.8 2 Significant negative 
difference 
Significant negative difference 
Number of people in 
other markets consulted 
on prices 
1.7 0 1.9 1 Significant positive 
difference 
(not when controlling 
for trader type) 
No significant difference 
Number of people in 
enterprise collecting 
price information 
2.3 1 1.3 1 Significant negative 
difference 
No significant difference 
Proportion reporting 
receiving accurate 
information without 
visiting markets 
personally 
0.55 - 0.68 - Significant positive 
difference 
- 
Other search behavior 
Number of trips made to 
purchase markets (for 
any purpose) 
4.4 0 12.9 0 Significant positive 
difference 
No significant difference 
Number of trips made to 
sales markets (for any 
purpose) 
2.8 0 4.1 0 No significant 
difference 
No significant difference 
Time taken to find a 
buyer (days) 
49 14 21 15 Significant negative 
difference 
No significant difference 
Time take to find a 
supplier (days) 
33 14 14 7 Significant negative 
difference 
Significant negative difference 
Source: 2002 and 2008 trader survey 
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This has resulted in both a change in the nature of price discovery, and the way other buyers are found. 
In sum:  
· Traders were able to follow more markets in 2008 than in 2002: the number of products followed 
has not changed, but the number of markets followed has increased.  
· Traders are consulting more traders in other markets on prices: although traders reported 
consulting fewer people on prices in their main market, they reported a significant increase in the 
number of traders consulted in other markets on prices.  
· Collection of price information was taking less time: fewer people in the business were engaged in 
the business of collecting price information, and a higher proportion of traders reported receiving 
accurate price information without visiting other markets.  
· The number of trips made to other markets by traders did not change: putting this finding together 
with the above, it suggests that traders are now privy to better quality price information than in 
2002.  
· The amount of time taken to find a buyer and seller has fallen: Disaggregating these number by 
trader type indicates that this has had a particularly large effect on wholesalers and retailers, 
perhaps contributing to the finding above that these traders have a shorter transaction completion 
time in 2008 than they did in 2002. 
 
To really determine whether these changes are as a result of the presence of mobile phones information 
on exogenous variations in access to phones and networks would be needed (such as the quality of 
network coverage in the area where they operate). Traders with and without mobile phones could then 
be compared, using the exogenous variation to instrument for a trader’s decision to own a mobile 
phone. In the absence of this information we examine how these indicators vary for traders without 
and without mobile phones, controlling for trader type. Results are presented in Table 3.11.  Given so 
many traders in the survey have a mobile phone it is difficult to have powerful tests of significant 
differences between traders with mobiles and those without. All the differences have the sign as 
expected: traders make more calls, follow more markets, consult more people on other markets, have 
fewer people employed in the collection of price information, make fewer trips to other markets, spend 
less time finding buyers and supplies, and receive better quality information without visiting markets 
personally. These differences are significant when it comes to the number of phone calls made to other 
traders, the number of supply markets followed, the quality of the price information received and the 
number of days taken to find a seller. These results suggest that mobile phones have had an impact on 
search behavior in Ethiopian cereal markets. Further work should also determine whether this has 
increased the quality of market integration, one would expect it has. 
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Table 3.11 Differences in search behavior between traders with and without cell phone 
 With phone Without Difference 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
# of telephone conversations with 
traders for purposes on other markets 
901 208 190 6 Significant 
positive 
difference 
Significant 
positive 
difference 
Search for price information       
Number of grain products followed 4 3 4 3 No significant 
difference 
No 
significant 
difference 
Number of supply markets followed 2.4 2 1.8 1 Significant 
positive 
difference 
No 
significant 
difference 
Number of sales markets followed 1.8 1 1.5 1 No significant 
difference 
No 
significant 
difference 
Number of people in main market 
consulted on prices 
2.9 2 3.3 3 No significant 
difference 
No 
significant 
difference 
Number of people in other markets 
consulted on prices 
2.3 2 1.6 1 No significant 
difference 
No 
significant 
difference 
Number of people in enterprise 
collecting price information 
1.3 1 1.4 1 No significant 
difference 
No 
significant 
difference 
Proportion reporting receiving 
accurate information without visiting 
markets personally 
0.64 - 0.47 - Significant 
positive 
difference 
- 
Other search behavior       
Number of trips made to purchase 
markets (for any purpose) 
30 0 60 0 No significant 
difference 
No 
significant 
difference 
Number of trips made to sales 
markets (for any purpose) 
13 0 22 0 No significant 
difference 
No 
significant 
difference 
Time taken to find a buyer (days) 35 15 42 15 No significant 
difference 
No 
significant 
difference 
Time take to find a supplier (days) 15 4 28 7 Significant 
negative 
difference 
Significant 
negative 
difference 
Source: 2008 trader survey 
 
Storage behavior  
One factor hypothesized to contribute to the rise in food prices experienced in 2008 was an increase in 
speculative storage among traders. As noted in Section 3.2 although price increases in teff and maize 
were occurring during the 2008 trader survey recall period, it did not appear that large changes in 
stocks were taking place. This is confirmed in Figure 3.2 which shows that although there was some 
increase in stock towards the end of this time, the increase was quite limited, and very small in 
comparison to the average quantities traded by these traders. To further test this hypothesis, we 
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examine a number of indicators of storage behavior. In each case indicators are disaggregated by trader 
type, so that the results are not dominated by the large number of small retailers in the sample. It also 
allows us to control for differences in the composition of traders between the 2002 and 2008 sample. 
Figure 3.2 Volume of trade and changes in stock, March 2007 to February 2008 
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Source: 2008 trader survey 
First we consider two indicators of increased storage from the 2008 trader survey: whether the number 
of days between their purchase and sale was reported to be more or less than usual, and quantities of 
stock held in January 2004 and January 2008. Assemblers and retailers did not report a clear trend in 
the amount of time taken to complete a transaction nor much change in the amount held in storage 
(Table 3.12 and Figure 3.3).  
 
Table 3.12 Number of days between purchase and sale, 2008 
Is the number of days between purchase and 
sale more or less than usual?  
Assemblers 
(n=52) 
Wholesalers 
(n=22) 
Retailers 
(n=221) 
  Less (%) 19 41 24 
  Same (%) 56 50 49 
  More (%) 25 9 27 
Source: 2008 trader survey 
However wholesalers were found to be holding significantly more stock in January 2008 than they had 
in January 2004, and they were also found to be more likely to converge on reporting a shorter 
duration of transaction (perhaps consistent with trying to hide speculative behavior, given the survey 
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was undertaken during a time in which there was considerable public suspicion and frustration that 
traders may be hoarding).12  
Figure 3.3 Comparing storage in January 2004 and January 2008 
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Source: 2008 trader survey 
 
To further examine changes, survey responses in 2002 were compared with survey responses in 2008. 
We find that there is no significant difference in the quantity held in stock in January 2008 and January 
2002, however some difference does remain in the number of days taken between purchase and sale, 
with both wholesalers and retailers reporting quicker completion in 2008 than in 2002 (Table 3.13). 
The results do not indicate that there were large increases in storage by traders in regional markets 
during 2007 and early 2008, although recall data suggests stocks held by wholesalers may have been 
higher. 
Table 3.13 Comparing storage in 2002 and 2008 
 
 Assemblers Wholesalers Retailers 
Time between purchase and sale (days, median) 
2002  14  15  15 
2008  10  10  12.5 
Significance of difference (p-
value) 
 0.486  0.087*  0.796 
Amount in store (quintals, median)     
2002  100  93  57 
2008  575  90  56 
Significance of difference (p-
value) 
 0.201  0.774  0.796 
Source: 2002 and 2008 trader survey 
                                               
12 Disaggregation of traders along other lines were also tried—such as disaggregating traders with and without access to 
credit on the basis that traders without access to finance would find it harder to store—however no differences were found 
in storage behavior and so the results are not reported here.  
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3.4 Evidence of increasing returns to scale 
In this final section we explore whether there are increasing returns to scale to be found in cereal 
trading in Ethiopia. Evidence that increasing returns to scale are present indicates the presence of 
constraints or bottlenecks to increased efficiency and reduced transaction costs. There are two types of 
test that can be undertaken to explore increasing returns to scale: (i) examine aggregate returns to trade 
for all quantities traded by one trader throughout the year and determine whether the per unit return 
received increases with the scale of the trading enterprise, (ii) examine individual transactions to 
determine whether the per unit return to the transaction increases with the quantity traded. In both 
cases a significant positive coefficient on quantity or measures of scale indicates that increasing returns 
to scale are present. In this case easing constraints to capital accumulation experienced by traders 
would result in increased efficiency in grain markets.  
Using the 2002 trader survey data Gabre-Madhin and Negassa (2004) found evidence of increasing 
returns to scale for traders in Ethiopia, suggesting that some traders are limited in the scale which they 
operate and their ability to exploit opportunities for spatial or temporal arbitrage. The estimation 
method they used was the first one outlined above, namely assessing whether the annual per unit return 
to trading increased with the scale of the trading enterprise. Both tests have been carried out on similar 
trader survey data from a number of Sub-Saharan African countries (Benin, Madagascar and Malawi) 
and have indicated that although some aspects of trading experienced increasing returns to scale (such 
as search costs), overall few returns to scale (either at the aggregate level or at the transaction level) are 
found (Fafchamps, Gabre-Madhin and Minten 2005). It is important to note that this evidence only 
suggests there are few returns to scale given current market institutions. Other work suggests that the 
structure of such crop markets limits the extent to which branding can develop (given the absence of 
grades and standards or vertical integration through contracting) causing reputation effects to be 
constrained to the size of a trader’s personal trading network (Fafchamps and Minten 2002). This in 
turn causes few returns to scale to be observed. This is consistent with many examples that suggest 
returns to scale are present when branding does exist and can assure quality (e.g. supermarkets).  
It is only possible to look at increasing returns to scale at the transaction level with the 2008 trader 
data, as information on two crucial factors of production— labor and trader networks — needed for the 
aggregate analysis was not collected. It is argued, however, that this is an appropriate level of analysis 
as it is the level at which the difference between the buying and selling price, the ultimate measure of 
efficiency, can be compared, and it is also the level at which marketing costs and their impact on this 
price differential can best be examined (Fafchamps, Gabre-Madhin and Minten 2005).  
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The conceptual framework and estimation method used was that used in Fafchamps, Gabre-Madhin 
and Minten (2005). Gross margin rates were regressed on characteristics of the sale that may affect the 
size of the cost, namely the distance travelled, the duration of the sale, and the type of crop being 
transacted. The gross margin rate was also regressed on quantity, and the significance of the measure 
of quantity was taken as a test for the presence of increasing returns. This was done for all traders 
together and by type of trader. When all traders were pooled the marketing functions performed by the 
trader (assembly, wholesale and/or retail trade) were controlled for through the inclusion of trader type 
dummies. Given the measurement error present in the data, the log of the gross margin rate was used 
as the dependent variable and a quantile regression estimation procedure was used. Similarly, for each 
type of marketing cost incurred the unit cost was regressed on the same variables and the significance 
of quantity was taken as a test for increasing returns. However, as there is self-selection into whether 
or not each type of marketing cost is incurred, in these estimations a Heckman estimation procedure 
was used using trader characteristics (such as gender, number of vehicles owned, working capital and 
storage capacity) as instruments in the selection equation. In each equation the dependent variable was 
the log of per unit costs to reduce the impact of outliers on the estimation.  
The coefficient these regressions are summarized in Table 3.14.  Considering all traders together, there 
appears to be little indication of increasing returns to scale from undertaking larger transactions. Total 
per quintal transaction costs and the gross margin rate do not appear to exhibit increasing returns to 
scale. However, there are a number of trading activities that do show evidence of the presence of high 
fixed costs, particularly costs associated with search of suppliers, buyers and prices. Personal 
transportation costs, telephone costs and handling costs all exhibited decreasing unit costs, and thus 
increasing returns to scale were found among traders—traders whose primary activity was that of 
purchasing quantities from farmers and aggregating them for sale to wholesalers—who focused on 
these activities.  
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Table 3.14 Testing increasing returns to scale 
 
 
Coefficient 
on 
quantity* 
Test of 
significance 
(t-or z-test) 
Interpretation 
Gross margin rate    
 All -0.0001 -0.16 Constant returns to scale 
 Assemblers 0.09 2.97*** Increasing returns to scale 
 Wholesalers -0.002 -0.91 Constant returns to scale 
 Retailers 0.0004 0.34 Constant returns to scale 
Cost of transporting per quintal 0.06 0.72  Constant unit costs with scale 
Cost of road payments per quintal -0.33 -1.25 Constant unit costs with scale 
Cost of handling per quintal -0.06 -1.46’ Decreasing unit costs with scale 
Cost of personal travel per quintal -0.75 -6.92*** Decreasing unit costs with scale 
Cost of telephone calls per quintal -0.80 -9.82*** Decreasing unit costs with scale 
Cost of bags per quintal 0.01 0.44 Constant unit costs with scale 
Cost of intermediaries per quintal 0.25 1.65 Increasing unit costs with scale 
Source: 2008 trader survey 
  
*The result from a regression which included appropriate controls.  
 
These results suggest that the fixed costs (costs that are incurred regardless of the amount being bought 
or sold) that are associated with search in markets with non-standard qualities of goods do result in 
increasing returns to scale, and that assembly traders are limited in the scale to which they can operate. 
Increased access to credit may allow these traders to operate at increased scale and become more 
efficient. Increased quantities of transactions at the first stage of marketing such as through farmer 
specialization or cooperatives aggregating quantities for sale may also help.  
In looking at these results and assessing their implications for Ethiopia it is important to bear in mind 
that they assess the returns to scale given the structure of market institutions as they currently are. For 
example if all retailers operate on a small scale (as is generally true for grain retailers), it is only 
possible to determine whether, for the range of sizes observed, there are increasing returns to scale. It 
is becoming evident from studies in other countries that a move to “modern” market structures—i.e. 
supermarkets—allows increasing returns to scale to be realized at the wholesale and retail levels. 
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3.5 Conclusions 
This chapter has assessed changes in the cost and nature of cereal trade in Ethiopia using survey data 
on cereal traders from a unique panel of regional markets. Despite substantial infrastructural 
investments and rising fuel and cereal prices between 2002 and 2008, little change in the magnitude of 
margins or total out of pocket costs of transacting was observed. However, this stability in aggregate 
margins and costs masks substantial changes in the structure of transaction costs and the nature of 
search for prices and buyers. Whilst transportation costs were constant during this time, it appears 
improvements in transport efficiency helped offset a 25% increase in fuel prices.  
Further reductions in transaction costs will improve the quality of Ethiopia’s domestic cereal market 
and offers the opportunity to reduce urban consumer prices without reducing returns to rural 
producers. The results of this analysis suggest that reducing the fixed costs of search at the first stage 
of the marketing chain (such as reducing mobile telephone costs and improving feeder roads) or 
enabling traders and farmers to increase the scale at which they operate at this first stage (such as 
through increasing access to credit to assembly traders, farmer specialization or the development of 
farmer groups that can aggregate quantities for sale) are some means by which transaction costs can be 
reduced. 
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Chapter 4: Assessment of Cross Border Trade Cereals and Livestock 
4.1   Introduction 
This component of the study has examined the possibility of whether cross border trade might have 
contributed towards price hikes. The study has monitored both formal and informal trade flows in four 
major cross border trade points, namely Humera, Metema, Assosa/Kumruk and Moyale (Figure 1.3). 
The study has employed both primary and secondary data. The primary data were collected using 
Rapid Market Appraisal (RMA) method. Expert field researchers from the regional offices of the 
Ethiopian Institute of Agricultural Research interviewed officials of the Bureaus of Agriculture and 
Rural Development and experts of Customs Agency at different level. In addition, the team also 
conducted interviews with farmers group, local traders, and community leaders. This section provides 
a summary of that exercise.  
4.2   Structure of cross border trade 
There are both official and unofficial cross border trade between Ethiopia and its’ neighbors. The 
official trade is governed by two types of regulations—that is, formal procedure of import-export and 
by the small-scale cross border trade regulation (Franco-valuta arrangement).  The illegal cross border 
trading, on the other hand, is carried out by various market actors, including: (a) licensed small traders 
engaged in cross border trade legally (franco-valuta), (b) licensed small traders renting out their 
licenses to other non licensed traders, (c) large traders engaged in legal import export trade, (d) large 
import–export traders engaged in an illegal border trade by renting the border trade license from the 
small traders, and (e) commercial farms nearby the cross-border areas. 
The major commodities traded are cereals, pulses, and oil seeds in cereal category and cattle, shoats, 
camel, horse and mule in livestock. The types of commodity, however, seem to vary across border 
points. In Metema, sorghum among the cereal crops, faba beans among pulses are major traded 
commodities across the border. In Humera areas sorghum and teff among cereals, faba beans, field 
pea, lentil and chickpeas among pulses and sesame among oil crops are frequently traded across the 
border. Sorghum and maize among the cereals, faba beans, field pea, lentil and chickpeas among 
pulses are traded across the Kumruk-Sudan border areas. Along the Ethio-Kenya border of Moyale 
area, maize, wheat and teff among cereals and haricot beans among pulses are traded.  Cattle are traded 
in all cross border areas, whereas sheep and goats are traded across the Moyale and Kumruk-Assosa 
cross border areas.  
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4.3 Estimated trade volumes 
The estimated value of cross border trade is presented in Table 4.1. The trend shows that both legal 
and illegal trade values have increased over the years in nominal terms, although the legal trade has 
increased faster than the illegal trade values. The overall trend in both illegal and legal cross border 
trade of agricultural commodities in the four cross border areas is increasing. The estimated value of 
illegal export has jumped from ETB 14.4 million in 2003/04 to ETB 69 million in 2006/07 cropping 
season. Similarly, the value of agricultural commodities exported formally through the cross border 
has made quantum jump from ETB 0.31 million in 2003/04 to ETB 421 million in 2006/07.  
 
Table 4.1   Estimated value of cross border exports, 2003/04 – 2007/08 
 
Crops Livestock 
  Year Value in birr 
% of 
total Value in birr 
% of 
total Total 
2003/04 7,528,136.00 52 6,892,104.56 48 14,420,240.56 
2004/05 15,437,107.00 62 9,307,749.00 38 24,744,856.00 
2005/06 18,145,767.00 55 15,133,148.00 45 33,278,915.00 
2006/07 32,053,559.00 46 36,993,927.00 54 69,047,486.00 
Illegal 
2007/08 30,657,662.00 53 27,639,895.00 47 58,297,557.00 
2003/04 134,088.00 43 176,314.00 57 310,402.00 
2004/05 544,944.00 37 937,860.00 63 1,482,804.00 
2005/06 231,548,030.00 94 15,820,396.00 6 247,368,426.00 
2006/07 336,447,680.00 80 84,812,866.50 20 421,260,546.50 
Legal 
2007/08 4,135,601.00 24 13,270,060.00 76 17,405,661.00 
2003/04 7,662,224.00 52 7,068,418.56 48 14,730,642.56 
2004/05 15,982,051.00 61 10,245,609.00 39 26,227,660.00 
2005/06 249,693,797.00 89 30,953,544.00 11 280,647,341.00 
2006/07 368,501,239.00 75 121,806,793.50 25 490,308,032.50 
Total 
2007/08 34,793,263.00 46 40,909,955.00 54 75,703,218.00 
Source: Cross border Rapid Market Appraisal, 2008 and Customs Office, respective border area 
 
Table 4.2 and 4.3 summarize the estimated cross border trade of the different crops through legal and 
illegal means. The types of crops exported legally with significant volume are sorghum, faba beans 
and sesame. There was an increasing trend in the volume of export till 2005/06 for the three 
commodities. Sorghum was exported mainly through Metema and Kumruk and to lesser extent 
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through Humera borders. Faba bean is exported solely through Metema border and sesame through 
Humera.  
Over the stated period the maximum export value of sorghum was in 2005/06 with the estimated value 
of about 20 million ETB. The export of faba bean to Sudan shows an increasing trend following the 
normalization of the trade relation between the two countries. In 2006/07, the value of faba bean 
export reached 17.3 million ETB. Similarly, the export of sesame to Sudan through Humera is showing 
increasing trend and reached about 316.9 million ETB in 2006/07 production season.  
The Rapid Market Assessment (RMA) team gathered that a significant proportion of the illegal 
transaction of teff is taking place through Humera and Metema via Sudan to Eritrea and Moyale to 
Kenya. Illegal trade transaction for Haricot beans have also shown increasing trend in Moyale and 
Humera border areas. Wheat is important for Metema and Moyale area. This shows that overall 
Moyale cross border trade is an important area and has implication for the domestic market of the 
stated commodities. Sesame illegal cross border takes place in Humera areas; where about 10.5 million 
birr value of sesame is estimated to enter Sudan in 2006/07 production season. Due to the recent price 
parity difference, where the domestic price of sesame is getting higher as compared to Sudan price, the 
volume of the illegal export has been sharply declined and hence estimated to be negligible.  
 
Table 4.2  Volume of legal cross border exports in quintals (2003/04 – 2007/08) 
 
Metema Humera Kurmuk Total  
Commodity Year 
Quintal Value in Birr Quintal Value in Birr Quintal Value in Quintal Value in Birr 
2003/04 NS -- NS -- 480.00 72,000.00  480.00 72,000.00  
2004/05 NS -- NS -- 624.00 96,720.00  624.00 96,720.00  
2005/06 135,669.00 20,214,681.00  NS -- 960.00 134,400.00  136,629.00 20,349,081.00  
2006/07 4,729.00 945,800.00  5,900.00 1,115,100.00 672.00 110,880.00  11,301.00 2,171,780.00  
 
Sorghum 
 
2007/08* NS  -- NS -- 720.00 215,280.00  720.00 215,280.00  
2003/04 398.00 62,088.00  NS -- NS -- 398.00 62,088.00  
2004/05 2,436.00 448,224.00  NS -- NS -- 2,436.00 448,224.00  
2005/06 11,868.00 2,409,204.00  NS -- NS -- 11,868.00 2,409,204.00  
2006/07 54,156.00 17,329,920.00  NS -- NS -- 54,156.00 17,329,920.00  
 
Faba 
Beans 
2007/08* 11,633.00 3,920,321.00  NS -- NS -- 11,633.00 3,920,321.00  
2003/04 NS -- NS -- NS -- - 0.00  
2004/05 NS -- NS -- NS -- - 0.00  
2005/06 NS -- 444,233.50 208,789,745.00 NS -- 444,233.50 208,789,745.00  
2006/07 NS -- 530,010.00 316,945,980.00 NS -- 530,010.00 316,945,980.00  
Sesame 
2007/08** NS -- 392,850.00    363,779,100.00 NS -- 392,850.00    363,779,100.0
 
Source:  Customs Office at respective border area. * covers the first 6 months of the year, ** annual estimate, NS 
= non significant, meaning less than 100 quintals.  
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Table 4.3 Estimated volume of illegal cross border trade of cereals (2003/04 – 2007/08) 
 
Volume in quintals 
Crop Year 
Metema Humera Kumuruk Moyale Total 
Total value in 
birr 
National 
Supply in 
Quintals 
% of total 
supply 
2003/04 822   576   1,398.00  143,418.00    
2004/05 1,185.00  768 16,880.00 18,833.00 1,480,539.00 24,067,000 0.08% 
2005/06 2,117.00  720 11,116.00 13,953.00 1,636,637.00 33,368,000 0.04% 
2006/07 2,350.00  864 17,040.00 20,254.00 3,001,264.00 37,764,000 0.05% 
Maize 
2007/08 2,167.00  480 8,800.00 11,447.00 1,297,836.00 37,497,000 0.03% 
2003/04 493.00  -  493.00 116,348.00   
2004/05 711.00  - 16,575.00 17,286.00 2,401,110.00 21,766,000 0.08% 
2005/06 1,270.00  - 13,000.00 14,270.00 1,697,670.00 22,191,000 0.06% 
2006/07 1,410.00  - 17,500.00 18,910.00 4,034,220.00   24,630,000 0.08% 
Wheat 
2007/08 1,300.00   23,590.00 24,890.00 6,676,070.00 23,144,000 0.11% 
2003/04 4,934.00 2,500.00   7,434.00 1,597,196.00   
2004/05 7,109.00 5,000.00  14,980.00 27,089.00 5,344,798.00 20,255,000 0.13% 
2005/06 12,700.00 7,000.00  16,100.00 35,800.00 8,037,800.00 21,756,000 0.16% 
2006/07 14,100.00 7,000.00  18,375.00 39,475.00 14,178,250.00 24,377,000 0.16% 
Teff 
2007/08 12,999.00 8,500.00  19,370.00 40,869.00 15,702,165.00 29,929,000 0.14% 
2003/04 411.00    411.00 96,174.00   
2004/05 592.00   8,960.00 9,552.00 1,298,160.00   
2005/06 1,058.00   10,160.00 11,218.00 3,013,660.00   
2006/07 1,175.00   13,800.00 14,975.00 374,825.00   
Haricot 
Beans 
  
2007/08 1,083.00   19,200.00 20,283.00 6,981,591.00   
2003/04  12,500.00   12,500.00 5,575,000.00   
2004/05  12,500.00   12,500.00 4,912,500.00   
2005/06  8,000.00   8,000.00 3,760,000.00   
2006/07  17,500.00   17,500.00 10,465,000.00   
Sesame  
2007/08         
 
Source: Cross border Rapid Market Appraisal, 2008 
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Implications of the cross border trade to domestic market 
 
The general trend for cross border trade shows that major cereals enter into both legal and illegal 
markets. Nevertheless, the illegal form of market has major share in total cross-border trade for 
cereals. Similar trend exists for livestock nearly in all the four cross-border areas under study. 
However, the current share of the total cross border trade (legal and illegal) is not that significant from 
the total domestic production or supply. As a result, it may not bring significant effect on the domestic 
markets for grain in general. Some policy measures such as export ban might have elicited the illegal 
trade although this needs further assessment of the issue at hand. While some measures of export ban 
may help to contain pressures on domestic prices, but may also serve as disincentive to farmers. Export 
restrictions exacerbate the price spiral and instability in regional markets, with high distortional effects 
on cross-border trade, especially when they are implemented in uncoordinated manner by different 
countries.  It may be possible that economic boom in Sudan might have increased the purchasing 
power and the demand for cereals and this has to be supplied from Ethiopia. It appears that given such 
scenarios the overall trend of cross-border trade for cereals seems to increase in the future mainly 
through the legal routes. This is due to the fact that there is strong GOE move towards regulating and 
controlling cross border trade. 
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Chapter 5:   Spatial Equilibrium Modeling Results on the Impacts of 
Policy Interventions13 
5.1 Introduction 
Over the past two years, interest in the operation of grain markets in Ethiopia has increased as a result 
of the dramatic increase in the price of staple foods since early 2007.  Various hypotheses have been 
proposed to explain the rise in food prices: diversification from cereals into high-value crops by 
Ethiopian farmers, increased demand for grain by rural consumers, changes in the timing of grain sales 
by farmers, general inflation, and the impact of higher grain prices on world markets.   
The higher food prices have highlighted the impact of various food assistance programs in Ethiopia on 
food markets.  Ethiopia is a major recipient of food aid, though food aid imports have declined from a 
peak of 1.6 million tons in 2003 to less than 400 thousand tons in 2006.  In addition, since 1996 the 
World Food Program (WFP) has had a local procurement program, under which it purchases grain 
within Ethiopia for distribution as food aid within the country.  The volumes ranged from 51 to 248 
thousand tons per year, but were suspended in 2007 and 2008 in response to the high food prices 
(WFP, 2008).  Finally, the Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP) has provided labor-intensive public 
works and food and cash transfers to eligible households in selected districts since 2005-06.  The 
PSNP and the local procurement program are, in part, a response to the concern that imported food aid 
was depressing food prices.  More recently, the concern is that the PSNP and local procurement 
programs may contribute to higher food prices.     
In order to address these issues, we have developed a model of grain markets in Ethiopia to simulate 
the impact of various “shocks” on prices, production, consumption, and the internal trade of grain.  
This chapter describes the structure of the Ethiopian Spatial Grain Marketing Model (ESGMM) and 
the results of simulations using the model.  
More specifically, the model is used to examine the following questions: 
· What is the effect of local grain procurement by the WFP on domestic grain markets?  
· How does the distribution of imported food aid influence domestic grain markets?   
· What is the impact of the Productive Safety Nets Programme (PSNP) on domestic grain markets? 
· To what degree can the increase in domestic food prices be attributed to the spike in global food 
prices?   
                                               
13 This chapter is prepared by Nicholas Minot. 
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In section 2, we describe the Ethiopian Spatial Grain Marketing Model (ESGMM).  Then in section 3, 
we provide some results of simulations using the model.  Section 4 concludes and discusses possible 
extensions. 
5.2  Description of the ESGMM 
General characteristics  
The ESGMM is a partial-equilibrium spatial-equilibrium model of cereals markets in Ethiopia.  It is a 
partial-equilibrium model in that it simulates the markets of several closely-related commodities, but 
does not attempt to represent all sectors in the economy.  General equilibrium models, which represent 
all sectors of the economy and make all income endogenous, are useful for simulating the effects of 
economy-wide policies such as broad trade reform and exchange rate policy.  To simulate the impact 
of sector-level policies and shocks, however, a partial-equilibrium model is often a lower-cost, more 
transparent alternative.   
The ESGMM is a spatial-equilibrium model in that it simulates the markets in different regions, taking 
into account the cost of transporting goods from one market to another.  More specifically, a spatial 
equilibrium model allows the direction of trade between two markets to be endogenous (determined 
conditions in the model), rather exogenous (fixed in the design of the model).  This feature is 
particularly important in Ethiopian cereals markets for two reasons.  First, cereals have low value-bulk 
ratios14 and Ethiopia is a vast country, so the prices of cereals vary substantially across the regions of 
the country.  Second, the geographic distribution of surplus and deficit zones in the country is such that 
direction of flow of cereals changes from year to year, depending on the rainfall and size of the harvest 
in each region.  A non-spatial model cannot capture this because the direction of flow between each 
pair of markets must be fixed in such a model. 
                                               
14 The value-bulk ratio refers to the monetary value of the commodity per unit of weight or volume. A low value-bulk ratio 
implies that the cost of transportation is a large share of the total cost of delivering it to the final consumer, which implies 
that the price will vary considerably between surplus and deficit zones. 
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Table 5.1   Description of market regions in the Ethiopian Spatial Grain Markets Model  
 Market 
regions 
Populatio
n 
Characteristics 
1 Addis Ababa 2,973 Largest city, largest terminal market and transit point, deficit region, 
particularly in wheat and teff  
2 Desse 3,707 Amhara region, northern Ethiopia, deficit in maize and wheat, surplus in 
sorghum  
3 Mekele 9,514 Tigray region, northern Ethiopia, terminal market, deficit in all cereals 
4 Dire Dawa 6,619 Eastern Ethiopia, second-largest city, deficit in maize, teff, and wheat, 
surplus in sorghum  
5 Bale 12,890 Oromia region, southwest of Addis, wheat surplus zone, self-sufficient in 
maize, deficit in sorghum  
6 Hossana 13,411 SNNP region, south of Addis, teff and wheat surplus zone, self-sufficient in 
maize and sorghum 
7 Jimma 9,446 Oromia region, southwest of Addis, maize & teff surplus zone, deficit in 
wheat, self-sufficient in sorghum  
8 Bahir Dar 8,826 Amhara region, northwest of Addis, maize and teff surplus zone, deficit in 
wheat and sorghum 
9 Gonder 3,907 Amhara region, northwest of Addis, sorghum surplus zone, deficit in maize, 
teff, and wheat 
 
Structure of the ESGMM 
The Ethiopian Spatial Grain Marketing Model (ESGMM) simulates the markets for four commodities: 
maize, teff, wheat, and sorghum.  These four cereals account for 61% of the caloric intake of the 
Ethiopian population (FAO, 2008a).   In addition, they account for over half of the cultivated crop area 
in Ethiopia, according to both the FAO (2008b) and the 2008 Ethiopian Agricultural Household 
Marketing Survey (EAMHS).  These crops are also among the most widely grown crops: maize and 
teff are each grown by over half of Ethiopian farmers, while wheat and sorghum are each grown by 
more than a quarter of them.  
The ESGMM divides the country into nine market regions, each one represented by at least one large 
market town: Addis Ababa, Desse, Mekele, Dire Dawa, Bale, Hossana, Jimma, Bahir Dar, and 
Gonder.  Each administrative zone in Ethiopia has been allocated to one of the nine market regions.  
The market regions are listed in  
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Table  5.1 and illustrated in Figure 5.1.  For each commodity and each market region, the model 
ensures that demand equals supply plus net imports and net inflows from other market regions. 
Figure 5.1 Map of nine market regions used in the ESGMM 
 
 
The supply of each commodity in each market is a function of the prices of all four commodities in the 
same market region.  Similarly, the demand for each commodity is a function of the prices of all four 
commodities in that region.  In other words, the four commodities are linked to each other by 
substitution in production and consumption.  For example, if the price of wheat increases, this will 
decrease the supply of the other three commodities as land is diverted to wheat production, and it will 
increase the demand for the other three commodities as consumers scale back wheat consumption and 
increase demand for the other commodities.   
 
The prices of commodities in different market regions are linked through spatial arbitrage: if the price 
of maize in one region rises enough so that the price gap between two markets exceeds the cost of 
shipping goods between the two markets, this will induce a flow of maize toward the high-priced 
market, thus maintaining the price differential to be no greater than the cost of marketing between the 
two markets (including loading, transport, unloading, risk premium, and profit).  Thus, when there is a 
flow of commodities between two markets, the prices in the two markets will move together.  But if 
there is no trade between markets, their prices will not necessarily move together.   
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Table 5.2   Supply and demand elasticity assumptions in the ESGMM 
Crop Price elasticity of 
demand 
Income elasticity of 
demand 
Price elasticity of 
supply 
Maize -0.5 0.6 0.51 
Teff -0.7 1.0 0.28 
Wheat -0.7 1.0 0.28 
Sorghum -0.5 0.4 0.43 
 
 
Calibration of the model 
The ESGM model is calibrated to represent the year 2006, a year of “normal” production before the 
rapid increase in commodity prices15.  Production in each market region is based on zone-level 
production data from the 2005 Agricultural Census, aggregated to the level of the nine market regions.  
The production figures are scaled up to make the national production of each crop equal to the 2006 
level, as estimated by the Central Statistical Agency. 
Per capita consumption of the four main cereals is based on the 2008 Ethiopia Agricultural Marketing 
Household Survey, which estimated per capita consumption for each of the four largest regions: 
Tigray, Amhara, Oromia, and the Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples (SNNP) region.  
Consumption in other rural regions (Afar, Somali, Benishangul-Gumuz, and Gambella) is assume to 
resemble that in Tigray.  Per capita consumption in Addis Ababa, Dire Dawa, and Harari are based on 
the urban consumption patterns estimated in the 1999-2000 Household Income Consumption and 
Expenditure (HICE) survey.  In both urban and rural areas, consumption is rescaled to be consistent 
with national trade statistics.    
Prices are based on the average wholesale price in 2006 for the main market, as reported by the 
Ethiopian Grain Trading Enterprise (EGTE).  The own-price elasticities of demand are based previous 
estimates of cereal demand in low-income countries (see Seale and Regmi, 2006), which found 
elasticities of around -0.6.  We use a slightly higher elasticity (-0.7) for wheat and teff, which are the 
“luxury” cereals whose demand is presumably somewhat more price sensitive and a slightly lower 
elasticity (-0.5) for maize and sorghum.  These elasticities are confirmed by the observed impact of 
production shocks on prices in Ethiopian grain markets.  The cross-price elasticities of demand 
describe the effect of the price of one cereal on the demand for another.  They are calculated by 
assuming that 1) 60% of the reduction in caloric intake from one crop whose price increases is offset 
                                               
15 The base year for the simulations is different than the reference year for the household and trader surveys because the 
criteria for selecting the two are different. The surveys compare the current situation with 2003 because five years was 
considered long enough to observe trends but short enough to allow reliable recall. For the model, we use 2006 as the base 
year for the simulations because it is the most recent “normal” year. In selecting a base year for simulations, there is no 
need to choose a year that is long enough ago to observe trend since then. 
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by increased consumption of the other three crops and 2) the other three crops increase in equal 
proportions16. 
The income elasticities for the four commodities are based on those estimated by Washimo and Yu 
(2007) for rural areas, using the 1999-2000 HICE data.  We revise the rural income elasticity for teff 
downward from 1.65 to 1.00 based on international experience (income elasticities for grains are 
usually less than 1.0).  
The own-price supply elasticities are based on those estimated by Alemu et al (2003) using time-series 
data for Ethiopia: 0.51 for maize, 0.28 for teff, 0.28 for wheat, and 0.43 for sorghum.  Traditional 
production of staple food crops is relatively unresponsive to market prices, partly because many 
farmers are relatively isolated from the market and partly because farmers are constrained from using 
inputs more intensively when price increases.   Cross-price elasticities of supply describe the effect of 
the price of one commodity on the supply of another.  These elasticities are generated by assuming that 
1) change in supply are mainly driven by reallocation of land among cereal crops, 2) 55% of the 
reduction in area for one crop in response to a price decrease is offset by increases in the area allocated 
to the other three cereals, and 3) the area allocated to the other three crops increase in equal 
proportions. 
The cost of shipping grains between market region is based on Desallegne et al (1998), who estimate 
costs at 2.5 birr/quintal for handling, 0.05 birr/quintal-km for transport, and 20 birr/quintal profit.  For 
example, the distance between Addis Ababa and Mekele is 783 kilometers, so the cost of transporting 
grain from one to the other is estimated to be 2.5+39.1+20=61.6 birr/quintal.  This is roughly 
consistent with observed price differences between markets in 2006. 
With regard to international trade, Ethiopia is assumed to be a “small country” in that it cannot 
influence the international grain prices.  In the base scenario, maize, teff, and sorghum are not traded, 
but there are 400 thousand tons of imported wheat, accounting for about 13% of domestic use.  The 
model includes import and export parity prices for all four commodities, and the volume and direction 
of international trade is endogenous.  For example, if we simulate a negative shock to maize 
production and domestic prices rise high enough, the model will start to import maize.  Similarly, if we 
simulate a dramatic increase in world prices, the export parity price may rise enough to induce grain 
exports. 
                                               
16 Cross-elasticities of demand are notoriously difficult to estimate with cross-section data, so it is difficult to confirm this 
assumption empirically. Nonetheless, intuition and economic theory indicate that the percentage offset must be greater than 
zero but less than one. 
78 
 
The model is written in the General Algebraic Modelling Software (GAMS), the standard software for 
economic modelling.  Spatial equilibrium models are characterized by spatial arbitrage constraints, in 
which the gap in prices between two markets may be less than or equal to the cost of transporting 
goods between them.  Solving economic models with inequality constraints is called mixed 
complementarity programming (MCP).  The Ethiopian Grain Market Spatial model includes 476 
endogenous variables (Table 5.3) and an equal number of equations and inequalities. 
Table 5.3 List of endogenous variables in the Ethiopia Spatial Grain Market Model 
 
Category of variable Dimensions Number of variables 
Price 4 commodities x 9 regions 36 
Quantity consumed 4 commodities x 9 regions 36 
Quantity produced 4 commodities x 9 regions 36 
Quantity transported 4 commodities x 72 region-pairs 288 
Implicit export tax 4 commodities 4 
Implicit import tax 4 commodities 4 
Exports 4 commodities x 9 regions 36 
Imports 4 commodities x 9 regions 36 
Total  476 
 
Use of the model 
The simulations are run by changing one of the exogenous variables, running the model, and 
comparing the results to the original base scenario.  The exogenous variables include: 
· Supply shifts  
· Demand shifts  
· Income shifts  
· International prices 
· Transportation costs 
· Trade policy 
Supply shifts can be used to simulate weather-related shocks such as droughts as well as the 
distribution of food aid.  Demand shifts can be used to represent the effect of local procurement of 
grains for redistribution as food aid.  Income shifts can be used to simulate the impact of cash transfer 
programs such as the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP).  The effect of the world food crisis 
can be simulated by increasing the international prices, which raises both import and export parity 
prices in the country.  Improvement in the road network can be simulated by reducing the 
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transportation cost between selected pairs of markets.  The model also can be used to simulate import 
and export taxes and quantitative restrictions on trade.   
Of course, any economic model is only as good as the assumptions that go into it.  The main value of 
an economic model is that it demonstrates the logical consequence of the assumptions that are built 
into the model.  Refining the model is an iterative process, in which unrealistic or implausible results 
reveal the need to modify parameter assumptions or revise the structure of the model.   
5.3 Base scenario and overview of simulations 
Base scenario 
 
Constructing the base scenario involves developing an internally consistent set of production, 
consumption, and flow estimates for each of the four main cereals in each of the nine market regions 
used in the model.  Table A-5.1 shows the food balance sheet for each commodity and each region.  
The columns are defined as follows: 
· Production refers to the harvested volume in thousand metric tons in the base year.  This is based 
primarily on the 2005 Agricultural Census, but the model makes some revisions to maintain 
consistency with consumption and price data.   
· Net inflow refers to the annual commercial movement of grain into the region (or out of the region 
if the number is negative).  The national total net inflows for each commodity are zero.   
· Net import refers to grain imports minus grain exports, but in the base scenario there is no 
commercial trade in the four commodities. 
· Net aid inflow is estimated food aid distribution minus local procurement.  The food aid 
distribution is based on the percentage of PSNP resources distributed to each woreda, aggregated 
up to the market region.  The negative numbers for Addis Ababa reflect the assumption that local 
procurement occurs in Addis Ababa.  In the base scenario, there are 400 thousand tons of imported 
food aid in the form of wheat and 180 thousand tons of locally procured food aid in the form of 
maize, wheat, and sorghum. 
· Consumption refers to the total utilization of the grain in thousand metric tons.  The estimates are 
based on household survey data, as discussed above, but the model makes some adjustments for 
consistency. 
· Consumption per capita is the utilization per inhabitant, expressed in kilograms per person. 
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It is worth briefly describing the marketing patterns for each commodity as described in the base 
scenario: 
· Maize.  The table shows that the two main maize surplus regions are Jimma and Bahir Dar.  It is 
useful to keep in mind that each market region includes an average of six zones.  Thus, Bale zone 
may have a maize surplus, but this may be off-set by maize deficits in other zones of the Bale 
market region.   The main maize deficit region is Desse.  It is initially surprising that Addis Ababa 
is not a major deficit region.  However, with a population of about 3 million and per capita maize 
consumption of just 18 kg/person (according to the 1999-2000 HICE), total maize consumption 
(and the maize deficit) is 54 thousand tons.  By comparison, the Desse region consumes 58 
kg/person and has over 9 million inhabitants, so total consumption is 553 thousand tons.  After 
taking into account production, the deficit for this region is close to 500 thousand tons, dwarfing 
the deficit in Addis Ababa.   
· Teff.  Hossana and Bahir Dar are the main surplus regions, generating 440 thousand tons for the 
rest of the country, although Jimma also generates a small surplus.  The main deficit regions are 
Dire Dawa and Addis Ababa.  Although the population in Addis is smaller than in many market 
regions, per capita teff consumption in urban areas is much higher than in rural areas.  
· Wheat.  The main surplus regions are Bale, which generates 714 thousand tons of surplus, and 
Hossana, which supplies 258 thousand tons.  The net aid inflow of 400 thousand tons of wheat for 
the country reflects imported food aid.     
· Sorghum.  Surpluses are produced by Gonder, Desse, and Dire Dawa.  The main deficit region is 
Bale, not because per capita consumption is particularly high but because of the low level of 
production and the large population.   
The volumes of cereals traded between regions are 20-23% of production for maize, teff, and sorghum 
and 35% for wheat.  These percentages are somewhat higher than would be expected based on the 
results of the Ethiopian Agricultural Marketing Household Survey, which found that 21-31% of the 
production of the four main cereals is marketed by farmers.  The percentage of production traded 
between regions should be no larger than the percentage of production sold by farmers.   
Overview of simulations 
We use the model to carry out four types of simulations: 1) the impact of the local procurement food 
aid program, 2) the impact of the imported food aid program, 3) the impact of the Productive Safety 
Net Program (PSNP), and 4) the impact of the recent spike in world grain prices.  The summary results 
for the key policy simulations are shown in Table 5.4 and details are included in the appendix.  
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Table 5.4 Summary results from key policy simulations 
 
Changes in the prices of: Policy Simulations 
 Maize Teff Wheat Sorghum 
A. Impacts of changes in local procurement and food aid      
      Eliminating locally procured food aid with no 
      displacement -9% -3% -6% -6% 
Eliminating locally procured food aid with full 
displacement -2% -1% -1% -1% 
Doubling locally procured food aid with no displacement 8% 2% 5% 1% 
Doubling locally procured food aid with full displacement 2% 1% 1% 1% 
Eliminating imported food aid in the short run 8% 4% 20% 7% 
Impact of eliminating imported food aid in the long run 4% 3% 15% 3% 
B. Impacts of changes in PSNP     
Impact of eliminating the PSNP in the short run -5% -4% -4% -4% 
Impact of eliminating the PSNP in the long run -2% -2% -2% -2% 
In the first simulation, the model is used to simulate the impact of changing the size of the local 
procurement food aid program on grain markets and grain consumption in different regions of 
Ethiopia.  In the base year of 2006, the World Food Program local procurement program purchased 
180 thousand tons of maize, wheat, and sorghum for redistribution in the country.  We simulate the 
effect of eliminating the local procurement program and the effect of doubling the size from 180 
thousand tons to 360 thousand tons.  For each of these two variations, we make two alternative 
assumptions:  
· that the distribution of food aid displaces commercial purchases of grain so the distribution acts 
like an injection of additional grain into the local market, in addition to its effect on surplus zones 
through the local procurement, and  
· that the impact of the distribution does not displace any commercial purchases, so that the 
distribution of food aid no effect on local grain markets and the program only affects markets 
through the procurement of grains.   
In the second simulation, we use the model to examine the impact of the imported food aid program. In 
the base scenario, food aid imports consist of 400 thousand tons of wheat , reflecting the situation in 
2006.  We simulate the impact of eliminating the imported food aid in the short and long run.  In the 
short run, consumers respond to the higher price of grains, but farmers do not.  In the long run, farmers 
respond by increasing grain output in response to the higher prices.   
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In the third simulation, the model is used to simulate the impact of the Productive Safety Net Program 
(PSNP) on cereal markets.  In 2006, the PSNP distributed about 1300 million birr to selected 
households in 203 woredas.  Since the PSNP is already part of the base scenario, we simulate the 
impact of eliminating the PSNP transfers in each market region.  As in the second simulation, we 
simulate the impact in the short run (before farmers can respond to the new prices) and the long run 
(after they respond).   
In the fourth simulation, we use the Ethiopia Spatial Grain Markets Model to simulate the impact of 
the global food crisis of 2007-08 on Ethiopian grain markets.  More specifically, we simulate the effect 
of a doubling of the world prices of wheat and maize, reflecting the approximate increase in prices 
between August 2006 (the period used to calibrate the ESGMM) and the average price over January-
November 2008.  We do not simulate any increase in the international price of teff and sorghum 
because teff is not traded in international markets and sorghum is not traded by Ethiopia.   
5.4 Impact of local procurement of cereals  
Since 1996, the Ethiopian government, non-government organizations, and the World Food Program 
have purchased 1.6 million tons of cereals from within Ethiopia for redistribution as food aid in the 
country.  The annual volume has varied from 51 thousand tons to 248 thousand tons and is composed 
of maize and smaller quantities of wheat and sorghum.  Local procurement provides food aid in the 
form of locally preferred grains at a lower cost than imported food aid and is intended to promote the 
development of local grain markets with minimal impact on local prices (WFP, 2008).  However, it is 
difficult to empirically evaluate the impact of local procurement on domestic prices because prices are 
simultaneously being influenced by other factors, particularly weather-related variations in production.   
The Ethiopia Spatial Grain Market Model (ESGMM) can be used to simulate changes in the level of 
local procurement of food aid.  In the base scenario, 180 thousand tons of grain, composed of 100 
thousand tons of maize, 60 thousand tons of wheat, and 20 thousand tons of sorghum.  In the model, 
the additional grain purchases occur in Addis Ababa reflecting the fact that the tenders for local 
procurement are issued in the capital city.  However, the model determines the lowest-cost source of 
supply taking into account local prices and the cost of transportation to Addis.  The grain is distributed 
among the regions in the same proportion as PSNP allocations.  We simulate the effect of a) 
eliminating local procurement program and b) doubling it to 360 thousand tons.   
The distribution of the food aid is modeled in two ways because there is some uncertainty regarding 
how much food aid displaces commercial food purchases.  There are two extremes: 
· No displacement means that the food aid distribution does not affect commercial transactions by 
recipients so food consumption increases by the full quantity donated.  In this case, food 
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distribution has no effect in suppressing grain prices in beneficiary regions, though the 
procurement does raise prices in supply regions.   
· Full displacement means that recipient households either reduce food purchases or increase sales 
so that food distribution suppresses prices in the beneficiary regions, at the same time that 
procurement raises prices in the supply regions.  In this case, the food aid distribution is modeled 
as the “sale” of additional food in the beneficiary region combined with a cash transfer of the value 
of the food aid. 
In practice, the truth is probably between these two extremes: food aid increases food consumption, 
but not by the full amount of the aid, implying partial displacement.  However, by modeling the two 
extremes, we can establish upper and lower boundaries on the likely impact.  Finally, the simulation 
represents that short-term impact of the procurement before farmers are able to respond, reflecting the 
fact that farmers do not know how much will be procured when they make planting decisions.  
 
Impact of eliminating local procurement with no displacement  
As described above, we model the elimination of local procurement for food aid with no displacement 
by assuming that the program affects food markets only through the procurement program.  Thus, 
eliminating the program entails stopping the purchase of 180 thousand tons of maize, wheat, and 
sorghum in Addis Ababa.  This, of course, has indirect effects on surplus regions that would face 
reduced demand for their grain.   
There is no change in grain production because this is a short-run simulation and farmers have not had 
time to respond to new prices.  Since there is no trade (other than a fixed level of imported food aid) 
and no change in production, national consumption of each cereal is also unchanged.  However, the 
elimination of the local procurement program does reduce the demand for grain, so national average 
grain prices fall 3-9%.  Maize prices fall 9% on average because the elimination of the local 
procurement program ends the purchase of 100 thousand tons of maize, more than the amounts of 
other grains purchased under the program.  Wheat and sorghum prices fall 6% as a result of the end of 
purchases of those commodities under the program.  Teff prices decline by 3%.  Although teff is not 
purchased under the local procurement program, its price falls as well, though to a lesser degree, 
simply because they are partial substitutes.  In other words, the lower price of maize, wheat, and 
sorghum reduce the demand for, and the price of, teff.   
Looking at the regional results, the elimination of the local procurement program causes maize prices 
to fall 5-12%, teff prices decline about 3%, wheat drop 3-8%, and sorghum prices decrease 5-7%. 
Ending the local procurement program has a uniformly negative effect on prices because we are 
assuming that the program only affects prices on the procurement side.  Since the program raises 
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prices, ending it lowers them.  The largest price decreases are in those regions that are in surplus for 
that cereal: Jimma and Bahir Dar for maize, Bale and Hossana for wheat, and Gonder, Desse, and Dire 
Dawa for sorghum.  This is partly because these regions had the lowest prices in the base scenario, so a 
given price reduction is a larger percentage of the original price in these regions.   
Although national grain consumption is unchanged in this short-run simulation, the local procurement 
program does result in some modest changes in grain consumption across regions.  In particular, 
eliminating the local procurement program, reduces grain consumption in Mekele, Hossana,  and 
Dessie.  These are the regions that rely most heavily on food aid, with food aid contributing 9-13% of 
the consumption of these four cereals.  As important beneficiaries of the local procurement program, it 
is not surprising that their grain consumption declines when the program is eliminated.  In contrast, the 
elimination of the program causes grain consumption to rise in Jimma (2%) and Bahir Dar (1%).  
These are the regions that supply maize for the program, so the elimination of the program causes 
grain prices to decline and consumption to rise.   
 
Impact of eliminating local procurement with full displacement 
The simulations in section 5.1 assume that food aid distribution has no effect on local prices.  In this 
section, we simulate the elimination of the local procurement program with full displacement, meaning 
that the distribution of food aid is treated as additional sales combined with cash transfers in the 
beneficiary regions.  This means that food aid distribution does suppress local prices.   
The results of the simulation are shown in Table A-5.3.  Once again, national production is unaffected 
by the elimination of the local procurement program because this is a short-run simulation.  National 
consumption is unchanged because there is no trade (other than the fixed level of imported food aid) 
and no change in production.    
The elimination of the local procurement program causes maize prices to decline 2% and other prices 
to decline 1% on average.  The effect on prices is much smaller than in the previous section because of 
different assumptions about the impact of food aid distribution.  In section 5.1, we assumed that the 
program only affected prices by raising them through procurement.  In this simulation, we assume the 
program also lower prices in the beneficiary region.  Because the program has mixed effects on prices, 
ending the program has a smaller net effect on prices than in the previous simulation.   
Looking at the regional results, maize prices fall 0-3%, teff and sorghum prices decline 1%, and wheat 
decrease 2% (although they rise 3% in Desse).  Again, the effect on prices is roughly proportional to 
the volume of grain handled by the local procurement program: greatest for maize, followed by wheat, 
85 
 
and then sorghum and teff.  Although the local procurement program does not handle teff, teff prices 
are indirectly influenced by the lower prices for maize, wheat, and sorghum prices.   
As mentioned above, the net effect of eliminating the program on grain prices is smaller than in the 
previous simulation.  This explains why the effect of eliminating the local procurement program on 
grain consumption is marginal (0% to -1%).    
Although the effect of eliminating the local procurement program on overall grain consumption is 
quite small, this does not mean the program is not achieving its objectives.  The program is not 
designed to increase overall grain consumption in the country, but to provide assistance to the poorest 
and most vulnerable households, thus reducing hunger and malnutrition. 
 
Impact of doubling local procurement with no displacement 
We now turn to the short-run impact of doubling the local procurement program from 180 thousand 
tons of grain per year to 360 thousand tons, maintaining the same proportions of 56% maize, 33% 
wheat, and 11% sorghum.  In this section, we assume no displacement so that the program has no 
effect on the beneficiary regions; its only effect is through the procurement.  
The results of this simulation are shown in Table A-5.4. Grain production is unchanged because this is 
a short-run simulation so there is no supply response.  Grain production is practically unchanged, 
though the price of sorghum raises high enough to justify small quantities of sorghum imports.   
The expanded local procurement increases grain prices.  Maize prices rise the most (8% on average) 
because of the additional procurement of 100 thousand tons of maize.  Wheat prices rise an average of 
5%, as a result the additional purchase of 60 thousand tons of wheat.  The price of sorghum rises the 
least (1% on average) because only 20 thousand tons of additional sorghum is purchased and because 
the domestic price reaches the “ceiling” of the import parity price.  Although teff is not part of the 
local procurement program, its price rises 2% as a result of consumers shifting away from more 
expensive grains toward teff.   
The results of the simulation show some regional variation.  For example, maize prices rise only 3% in 
Bale but 10-12% in Jimma, Hossana, and Bahir Dar.  The explanation is that Bale is self-sufficient in 
maize in the base scenario, so its prices are partially insulated from the rise in maize demand.  In 
contrast, the three regions with large price increases are surplus regions, so their initial prices are 
lowest.  Thus, a given absolute increase in prices is a larger percentage increase in these regions.  The 
increase in wheat prices is between 2% in Desse and 7% in Bale.  The price increase in Desse is small 
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because Desse is self-sufficient in wheat in the base scenario, while Bale is the main surplus region 
and has the lowest initial wheat price.   
Although national grain consumption is mostly unchanged by the expansion of the local procurement 
program, there are some changes at the regional level.  Mekele, Desse, Hossana, and Gonder 
experience somewhat higher grain consumption, largely because they are beneficiary regions under the 
program.  In contrast, Jimma and Addis Ababa experience small decreases in grain consumption (1-
2%) because of large price increases in those regions and the fact that they are not major beneficiaries 
of the program.  In the other regions, the positive effect of larger food aid distribution is offset by the 
negative effect of higher food prices, leaving grain consumption unchanged.  
 
Impact of doubling local procurement with full displacement 
In this section, we again simulate the doubling of the local procurement food aid program, but in this 
case we assume full displacement, meaning that the distribution of food in beneficiary region will 
displace commercial purchases and suppress local prices.  The results of this simulation are shown in 
Table A-5.5.  As this is a short-term simulation, there is no impact on grain production.  Since there is 
no commercial trade in grains in this simulation, national grain consumption is also unchanged.   
The expanded local procurement program raises grain prices in supply regions, but, unlike the previous 
simulation, the distribution of food aid displaces commercial food purchases and thus suppresses 
prices in beneficiary regions.  As a result, the average increase in prices across the country is 2% for 
maize and 1% for the other three cereals.  The effect on prices is more muted than in the previous 
simulation where we assumed no displacement, meaning that the expanded program only affects grain 
markets through the procurement side. 
The change in grain prices does not show much regional variation. Almost all commodities in all 
regions experience a 1-2% increase in prices, as the procurement effect of the expanded program 
dominates the distribution effect.  The two exceptions are maize in Bale and wheat in Desse, which 
decline somewhat.  Bale is autarkic in maize (neither buying from nor selling to neighboring regions) 
so the maize price is insulated from small changes in maize prices in other regions.  Thus, Bale is 
unaffected by the expanded procurement but still affected by the expanded distribution of locally 
procured maize food aid.  Similarly, Desse is autarkic in wheat, so prices are unaffected by the larger 
procurement but they are suppressed by the increased distribution of wheat food aid.   
Regional changes in grain consumption are negligible, In most regions, the effect of increased 
distribution of food aid is offset by the slightly higher grain prices, leaving grain consumption 
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essentially unchanged (from -0.4% to +0.4%).  Only in Desse does the change in grain consumption 
reach +0.6%.  The model is not designed to simulate the changes in grain consumption for different 
types of households within each region, but the negligible effects at the regional level probably mask 
increases in grain consumption among food-aid beneficiaries and decreases among non-beneficiaries. 
5.5 Impact of imported food aid  
Traditionally, food aid has taken the form of imports of cereals (primarily wheat) from donor 
countries.  Some of this is distributed directly to beneficiaries, while the remainder is sold on the local 
market and the proceeds are used by non-governmental organizations to fund development projects.  
Over the period 1994-2003, Ethiopia imported an average of 715 thousand tons of food aid, almost all 
of which was in the form of wheat or wheat flour.   This represented about 27% of cereal consumption 
in the country.  Imported food aid peaked during the 2003 drought, when 1.6 million tons of wheat and 
wheat flour were imported under these terms.  Since then, the amount of imported food aid has 
declined.  In the base scenario, food aid imports consist of 400 thousand tons of wheat, reflecting the 
situation in 2006 (World Bank, 2007). 
Previous studies have examined the impact of food aid imports on local markets.  For example, 
Negessa and Jayne (1997) studied Ethiopian price data and found that local wheat prices fell 2-5 
birr/quintal (roughly 2-4%) for each 30 thousand tons of imported wheat sold in the regional market.  
Levinsohn and McMillan (2007) use data from 1999 and a simple one-market, one-commodity model 
to predict that eliminating imported food aid, which was then 663 thousand tons, would increase wheat 
prices by 53%.   More recently, Rashid et al (2006) estimate that the effect of imported food aid in 
Ethiopia has been to suppress domestic wheat prices by 2-26%, depending on the year.  On the other 
hand, Abdulai et al (2005) question whether food aid has a disincentive effect.  They use Ethiopian 
household survey data to show that food aid recipients behave no differently than non-recipients, after 
controlling for household characteristics that may influence the probability of being a beneficiary.  
Furthermore, an econometric analysis of national panel data reveals no negative effect of food aid on 
food production.  Finally, Kirwan and McMillan (2007) found that, over the period 1984-2003, 
Ethiopian imported food aid was uncorrelated with domestic wheat production, but rather was 
negatively correlated with international wheat prices (the correlation coefficient was -0.76).  The 
probable explanation is that food aid budgets are generally fixed by donor nations at the beginning of 
their fiscal year, so that any subsequent change in wheat prices will result in an opposite change in the 
volume of food aid.  In emergencies, donor may provide supplemental funding, but bureaucratic inertia 
works against this. 
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In this section, we use the Ethiopia Spatial Grain Market Model (ESGMM) to simulate the elimination 
of imported food aid.  The simulation assumes that the food aid is distributed in the same proportions 
as the PSNP cash disbursements.  Under these assumptions, Mekele, Hossana, and Desse rely on 
imported food aid wheat for more than 23% of wheat consumption, while Addis Ababa, Jimma, Bahir 
Dar, and Bale rely on it for less than 10% of their wheat consumption.  We assume full displacement, 
meaning that either a) the wheat is monetized (sold on local markets by the government), b) it sold by 
beneficiaries, or c) it displaces commercial purchases that beneficiaries would have made17.  Food aid 
is simulated as an increase in grain sales in the beneficiary regions combined with a cash transfer of 
the equivalent value.  In each case, we look at both short-term impact (before farmers respond to the 
new prices) and long-term impact (after they respond). 
Elimination of imported food aid in the short run 
Table A-5.6 summarizes the results of the simulation of the short-term impact of eliminating imported 
food aid, which consist of 400 thousand tons of wheat in the base scenario.  Eliminating these imports 
reduces the availability of wheat, causing consumption to fall by 11% and the price of wheat to rise 
20% on average.   
Production is unchanged because, by definition, farmers are unable to respond in the short run.  The 
price of the other three cereals rises 4-8% as consumers attempt to switch from wheat into the other 
cereals.   
The increase in wheat prices is enough to induce 45 thousand tons of commercial wheat imports.  
Thus, although food aid imports are cut by 400 thousand tons, wheat consumption declines by “only” 
355 thousand tons, because the commercial imports partially offset the elimination of imported food 
aid.    
Looking at the regional results, the price of wheat in Bale, Desse, and Hossana rises the greatest in 
percentage terms (24-25%).  Bale and Hossana are surplus regions that have low initial prices, and 
Desse moves from autarky to net inflows.  The wheat prices in other regions rise 18-20%, while other 
cereal prices rise 4-11% depending on the commodity and region.   
Most surplus regions expand their outflows in response to the higher prices, which suppress internal 
demand.  An important exception is Hossana, which benefits from imported food aid flows in the base 
scenario.  With the elimination of this imported food aid, Hossana reduces its outflows of wheat and 
sorghum in order to replace the lost food aid.   
                                               
17   Alternatively, if we assumed zero displacement, imported food aid would have no effect on Ethiopian grain markets 
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Similarly, wheat inflows in deficit regions contract in regions that received little food aid (Addis 
Ababa, Jimma, and Bahir Dar) because of the higher price.  However, in regions where imported food 
aid was important (Mekele and Desse), inflows increase to fill the gap.   
All regions see total cereal consumption decline by 2-4%, largely due to higher wheat prices and the 
resulting reduction in wheat consumption.  The decreases are largest in regions that were major 
beneficiaries of the imported food aid, including Desse and Mekele. 
Elimination of imported food aid in the long run 
As shown in Table A-5.7, the elimination of imported food aid has somewhat more moderate effects in 
the long run than in the short run.   The higher prices, particularly for wheat, stimulate an expansion in 
production and moderate the increase in prices.  Wheat output rises 4% compared to the base scenario, 
while maize and sorghum output expands marginally.   
As a result, wheat consumption falls 9% (rather than 11% in the short run).  In other words, the 
elimination of 400 thousand tons of imported food aid in the form of wheat causes wheat consumption 
to fall “only” 293 thousand tons, because wheat supply response partially offsets the loss in imported 
food aid. Consumption of all four cereals falls even less, 250 thousand tons, because of the supply 
response in the other three commodities.  The decline in cereal consumption ranges from 1% in Jimma 
to 3% in Desse and Mekele, the national average being a 2% decline.  
The supply response also moderates the increase in food prices associated with the elimination of 
imported food aid.  Wheat prices increase 15%, on average, in the long run, compared to 20% in the 
short run.  The average prices of the other three grains rise 3-4% in the long run, compared to 4-8% in 
the short run.  Because the wheat price is lower in the long-run than in the short-run, commercial 
wheat imports become unprofitable and disappear.  In other words, in the short run, commercial 
imports partially fill the gap from the elimination of the imported food aid, but in the longer run wheat 
production expands and commercial wheat imports return to zero. 
The results presented here from the ESGMM show a smaller impact of eliminating imported food aid 
on wheat prices (-15%) than the study of Levinsohn and McMillan (-58%).  However, the discrepancy 
is not due to different assumptions in the model, but rather different base scenarios.  Levinsohn and 
McMillan simulate the elimination of food aid in 1999, when food aid was 663 thousand tons and 
represented 37% of wheat consumption.  In contrast, we are simulating the situation in 2006, when 
imported food aid was 400 thousand and accounted for just 13% of wheat consumption.  According to 
                                                                                                                                                                
and prices would be unchanged, though grain consumption would be increased in the beneficiary regions. 
90 
 
their model and elasticities, eliminating 400 thousand tons of imported food aid in 2006 would result 
in a 14% increase in wheat prices, somewhat less than our estimate.  Finally, we note that our results 
are well within the range of wheat price impact (between 2 and 26%) estimated by Rashid et al (2006). 
In summary, according to the Ethiopia Spatial Grain Marketing Model eliminating 400 thousand tons 
of imported wheat food aid would increase the price of wheat by 15% and other cereals by 3-4% in the 
long run.  The elimination of imported food aid does reduce cereal consumption in the country, but 
only by 250 thousand tons because increased production partially offsets the loss of food aid. This is 
equivalent to 2% of cereal consumption and 62% of the loss in food aid. 
5.6 Impact of the Productive Safety Net Programme  
The Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP) is an attempt to replace ad hoc emergency relief assistance 
with a stable program to help improve the well-being of poor households.  Covering 7 million people 
at a cost of almost US$ 500 million, it is one of the largest safety net programs in sub-Saharan Africa.  
It targets poor households in two ways.  First, it operates in 203 woredas identified as poor and 
vulnerable.  Second, it involves some self-targeting in its public works program, under which 
individuals in the selected woredas are given the opportunity to work on labor-intensive community 
projects for a wage rate of 6 Ethiopian birr per day (US$ 0.75/day).  In addition, there is a direct 
support program, under which cash or food is distributed to labor-scarce households, including those 
with elderly or disabled members (Gilligan et al, 2008).   
A recent evaluation of the PSNP found that many households were receiving transfers below the 
planned amount, but among beneficiaries receiving at least half the intended amount, experienced 
improved food security.  Furthermore, those receiving both transfers and packages of agricultural 
support were significantly more food secure and more likely to use improved agricultural technologies.   
A separate question is whether the cash transfers under the PSNP may have increased rural demand for 
food, thus contributing to the recent increases in food prices.  There is little doubt that the program 
increases the demand for cereals in rural areas and that this results in higher prices.  The real question 
is whether the impact is large enough to be a factor in the rise in food prices in Ethiopia.   
In this section, we address this question by using the Ethiopian Spatial Grain Market Model (ESGMM) 
to simulate the effect of the PSNP on cereal prices.  In 2006, the PSNP distributed about 1300 million 
birr to selected households in 203 woredas.  We have aggregated the woredas-level disbursements to 
the nine market regions defined in the ESGMM, giving us the total amount of money allocated to each 
market regions.   Since the PSNP is already part of the base scenario, we simulate the impact of 
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eliminating the PSNP transfers in each market region.  As before, we simulate the impact in the short 
run (before farmers can respond to the new prices) and the long run (after they respond).   
Short-run impact of eliminating the PSNP 
The elimination of the PSNP would have two types of effects on households in Ethiopia.  First, it 
results in a loss of income and reduced food consumption for beneficiary households.  Second, the 
lower income among former beneficiaries would reduce the demand for, and the price of, cereals and 
other non-tradable goods.  The lower prices could actually increase cereal consumption among some 
non-beneficiary households.   
Table A-5.8 shows the short-run impact of eliminating the PSNP.  In the short-run, agricultural 
production is unaffected and, in the absence of international trade in the basic cereals, this implies that 
national consumption is also unchanged.  However, the reduced income leads to lower food prices: the 
national average prices of maize, teff, wheat, and sorghum decline by 4-5%.  There is not much 
difference in the price declines across regions, with prices falling 3-6% for all four commodities and in 
all nine regions.  
The elimination of the PSNP causes short-run changes in total cereal consumption across regions that 
are small, but they include both increases and decreases.  Cereal consumption increases slightly (1%) 
in Addis Ababa, Jimma, and Bahir Dar. These are regions where the PSNP allocations are relatively 
small, so the dominant effect is through the lower price of cereals.  In contrast, the elimination of the 
PSNP causes cereal consumption to fall slightly (1-2%) in Mekele and Desse, which have larger 
numbers of PSNP beneficiaries. 
Long-run impact of eliminating the PSNP 
In the long run, the lower prices resulting from the elimination of the PSNP cause cereal production to 
decline slightly, as shown in Table A-5.9.  Maize and sorghum production decline 1% and wheat and 
teff production decline even less.  The slight decrease in cereal production partially offsets the original 
decline in price.  In the long run, national average cereal prices decline just 2% compared to 4-5% in 
the short run.  The variation across regions is between -1% and -3%.   
The impact of the loss in PSNP income and the lower cereal prices on cereal consumption ranges from 
-3% in Mekele to +1% in Addis Ababa.  Cereal consumption rises in Addis Ababa because households 
are not directly affected by the elimination of the PSNP, but they benefit from the (slightly) lower food 
prices.  On the other hand, the effect of the loss of PSNP income is greater than the effect of lower 
prices in Mekele, Desse, Dire Dawa, Hossana, and Gonder, resulting in lower cereal consumption.   
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In summary, the impact of the PSNP on food prices is quite small.  In the long run (after one year), 
eliminating the PSNP causes cereal prices to fall just 2%.  This implies that the PSNP, as currently 
designed, raises cereal prices just 2% above what they would be without the PSNP.   As such, the 
PSNP cannot be considered a significant contributor to the rise in food prices in Ethiopia since 2006.  
5.7 Impact of higher global food prices 
Since 2006, the world prices of most agricultural commodities has increased dramatically, peaking in 
2008, and then fallen back almost to 2006 levels.  For example, the benchmark price for maize is the 
FOB price of US No. 2 yellow maize in the Gulf of Mexico.   According to the FAO (2008c), this 
maize price rose from US$114/ton in August 2006 to US$311/ton in late June 2008, before falling to 
US$ 158/ton in February 2009.  Similarly, a frequently cited “world” price of wheat is the FOB price 
of US No 2 hard red winter wheat in the Gulf of Mexico.  This price increased from US$ 201 in 
August 2006 to US$ 510/ton in late February 2008, but has since fallen to US$ 238/ton in February 
2009.   
We simulate the spike in the global food prices with a doubling of the world prices of wheat and 
maize, reflecting the approximate increase in prices between August 2006 (the period used to calibrate 
the ESGMM) and the average price over January-November 2008.    We exclude teff and sorghum 
because teff is not traded in international markets and sorghum is not traded by Ethiopia.  The results 
of this simulation, shown in Table A-5.10 are easy to summarize: there is no impact on domestic grain 
markets in Ethiopia.  There are separate explanations for the maize and wheat markets.  In maize 
markets, if the world price doubles from US$ 114/ton to US$ 228/ton, it still costs US$ 120/ton to get 
maize from Ethiopia to the Gulf.  Thus, the export parity price rises to US$ 108/ton or roughly 100 
birr/quintal, which is still substantially below the market price of maize in Ethiopia.  In the case of 
wheat, food aid imports of wheat are assumed to be fixed and therefore unaffected by the increase in 
the world price of wheat.   
In practice, each of these explanations is subject to some qualification.  Although it may not be 
profitable for Ethiopia to export to world markets, even at the high world prices of 2008, it may be 
profitable to export maize to Kenya.  A study by the World Bank (2007) shows that in Ethiopia the 
export parity price for export to Kenya is generally higher than the export parity price based on world 
markets.  Kenya is a consistent maize importer, so Kenyan maize prices are higher than, but correlated 
with, world prices.  Thus, if Kenyan and world prices rose in parallel, Ethiopia would begin to export 
to Kenya before exporting to the world market.  On the other hand, the government recently 
implemented a food export ban in response to high food prices. 
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With regard to wheat, although the simulation assumes that food aid is unaffected by world prices, in 
fact food aid tends to be negatively correlated with international wheat prices, as discussed above 
(Kirwan and McMillan, 2007).  Thus, the doubling of international wheat prices could affect Ethiopia 
through reduced food aid.  As discussed in Section 5, even the elimination of imported food aid would 
only increase wheat prices by 17% and other cereal prices by 4-5%, so this cannot be a major factor 
behind the increase in food prices in Ethiopia.  
In summary, we find that the doubling of wheat and maize prices that occurred between 2006 and 2008 
would not induce maize exports to the world market, nor would it affect wheat imports, which are 
almost exclusively in the form of food aid.  Although not represented in the model, these price 
increases could result in maize exports to Kenya (if allowed) and they might affect the volume of 
imported food aid imports.   
5.8 Summary and conclusions 
Interest in the operations of Ethiopian grain markets has been stimulated by the dramatic increase in 
the price of staple foods since early 2007.  This paper explores the impact of various policies and other 
“shocks” on grain markets using the Ethiopian Spatial Grain Market Model (ESGMM), a spatial 
partial-equilibrium model of four staple grains (maize, teff, wheat, and sorghum) in nine market 
regions of the country.  The model is used to examine the likely impact of the local procurement food 
aid program, the imported food aid program, the Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP), and the 
recent spike in world grain prices.   
In the base year of 2006, the World Food Program local procurement program purchased 180 thousand 
tons of maize, wheat, and sorghum for redistribution in the country.  The model is used to simulate the 
impact of eliminating this program on grain markets and grain consumption in different regions.  If we 
assume that food aid distribution does not affect local prices, but local procurement does, then the 
model indicates that eliminating the program will have the following effects: 
· maize prices fall 5-12%, depending on the region, averaging 9%.   
· wheat prices fall 6% on average and sorghum and teff prices fall just 3%, reflecting the importance 
of each commodity in the local procurement program.   
· grain consumption falls somewhat in regions that rely heavily on food aid while rising in Addis 
Ababa and surplus regions.   
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If we assume that food aid fully displaces commercial transactions, thus affecting prices in beneficiary 
regions as well as in procurement regions, then we get the following results: 
· maize prices fall 0-3%, averaging 2% and other grain prices fall an average of 1% 
· the small net effect on prices is due to the combination of procurement raising grain prices and 
food aid distribution reducing them. 
· there are only minor changes in grain consumption across regions as slightly lower prices are offset 
by the reduction in food aid distribution.  
We also simulate the doubling of local procurement from 180 thousand tons to 360 thousand tons.  If 
we assume the program only affects prices through procurement, then the results are as follows: 
· maize prices rise 3-12%, averaging 8%, due to the larger procurement program. 
· wheat prices rise 2-7%, averaging 5%, and sorghum and teff by 1-2%. 
· grain consumption is affected by both the increased distribution and the higher prices.  The net 
effect is positive (1-3%) in regions that are major beneficiaries of the program and negative in 
others (-1 to -2%).   
Finally, doubling the local procurement program has smaller effects if we assume that food aid 
distribution displaces commercial purchases, thus suppressing local prices: 
· maize prices rise 2% and other grains just 1% on average because the effect of local procurement 
on prices is largely offset by the effect  of food distribution. 
· there are only minor changes in grain consumption across regions as slightly high prices are offset 
by the increase in food aid distribution.    
Ethiopia is a major recipient of imported food aid, mainly in the form of wheat, though the levels have 
declined from 1.6 million tons during the drought of 2003 to about 400 thousand tons in 2006.  We 
simulate the impact of eliminating imported food aid.  In the short run: 
· the price of wheat rises 20% on average, with the increase being greater in surplus zones of Bale 
and Hossana. 
· the price of other grains rise 4-8% as consumers shift from wheat to other grains. 
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· the high price of wheat triggers commercial imports of 45 thousand tons 
· wheat consumption declines 2-4% in all regions, particularly in major beneficiary regions.  
In the long run, eliminating imported food aid has the following effect: 
· wheat output rises 4% in response to the higher prices, 
· the supply response dampens the price increase to 15% on average and eliminates commercial 
wheat imports, 
· in response to the loss of 400 thousand tons of wheat food aid, cereal consumption falls by 250 
thousand tons or 2% overall.  
In 2005-06, Ethiopia introduced the Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP), which provides cash-for-
work, cash transfers, and food aid in 203 woredas.  In 2006, the cash benefits were 1.3 billion birr 
(about US$ 144 million).  Some observers has questioned whether this program may have increased 
rural food demand, thus contributing to the food price increase.  We simulate the elimination of the 
PSNP on grain markets.  In the short run, the model suggests that: 
· grain prices fall 3-6% because the elimination of PSNP cash transfers lowers the demand for 
grains. 
· grain consumption falls slightly (1-2%) in Mekele and Desse, which have a large number of 
beneficiaries, but rises slightly (1%) in Addis Ababa, Jimma, and other regions with few 
beneficiaries. 
In the long run: 
· grain prices fall just 2% compared to the base scenario, the initial price decline having been 
dampened by the resulting supply response. 
· changes in cereal consumption are similar to the short-run simulation, but smaller.   
Finally, the model was used to simulate a doubling of maize and wheat prices, roughly simulating the 
trend in world prices between 2006 and 2008.   The results of this simulation are as follows: 
· the doubling of world maize and wheat prices has no effect on domestic prices, production, or 
consumption in Ethiopia. 
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· the explanation is that, even after the world price doubles, the export parity price for these 
commodities is below the domestic price, implying that grain exports remain unprofitable. 
We can draw four overall conclusions from these findings.   First, the expansion of the PSNP, the 
growth of local procurement food aid, and the sharp increase in world food prices do not help explain 
the rise in domestic food prices in Ethiopia.  The income transfers under the PSNP program are simply 
too small to account for more than a few percentage points of increase in grain prices.  Local 
procurement also has a small net effect on food prices, and in any case the program was suspended 
during 2007 and 2008 when prices began increasing.  And world food prices are unlikely to have 
directly affected Ethiopian prices because neither the model nor empirical evidence suggest large 
flows of food exports during this period, flows which would be necessary to transmit world prices to 
domestic markets.  These results suggest that explanations for the increase in prices must lie 
elsewhere.  
Second, programs that influence the distribution of staple grains and cash resources have a valuable 
role to play in providing a safety net for the poorest and most vulnerable households, but they do not 
have large effects on national prices, production, and consumption.  Thus, they can complement efforts 
to raise long-term agricultural productivity, including agricultural research and extension, but they 
cannot be considered a substitute for cannot substitute for these policies and programs.   
Third, the effects of many of these policy shocks vary widely across commodities and across regions, 
suggesting the value of agricultural models that capture the spatial diversity of Ethiopia.  This is 
particularly true of programs such as the PSNP, imported food aid, and the local procurement program, 
which are at least partially targeted to specific regions of the country.  
Fourth, the ESGMM, being a spatial equilibrium model, describes the interaction of different 
commodity markets in a number of regions within the country.  It provides a more spatially 
disaggregated description of the impact of alternative policies or shocks than a standard economy-wide 
model.  However, the ESGMM it does not analyze the impact at the household level, which would be 
necessary to estimate the impact of policies and shocks on poverty and the proportion of households 
falling below a threshold of nutritional status. In order to carry out this kind of analysis, it would be 
necessary to link the ESGMM to household data on production and consumption patterns and make 
additional assumptions about household behavior.  Although this type of micro-simulation analysis is 
beyond the scope of this study, it would be a useful direction for the extension of this study.     
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Chapter 6:  Summary and Policy Implications 
 
6.1 The issues re-stated 
Since late 2005, Ethiopian grain markets started exhibiting some unusual trends.  This was puzzling at 
least for three reasons. First, prices in Ethiopia started increasing long before food prices began to 
spike in the world market. This is evident in government’s decision to ban cereal export in early 2006; 
and the rapid assessment of rising prices carried out by the International Food Policy Research 
Institute and the Ethiopian Development Research Institute (EDRI).18  Second, prices were rising 
despite consecutive years of good harvest, which defied historical relationship between production and 
market prices.  For instance, in 2002 producer prices collapsed by an average of 60 percent in response 
to what was then considered to be a bumper crop of 9 million tons, about 50 percent lower than the 
2006-2007 cereal harvest 18.2 million tons. Finally, domestic prices of cereals have historically been 
within export and import parity bands. Prices of both wheat and maize, which hovered around import 
parity until 2006, fell significantly below import in the wake of rising food prices during 2007, making 
these commodity completely non-tradable.  
These puzzling trends have been the source of major concerns for the Government of Ethiopia and its 
development partners.  In addition to well-documented political and social consequences, an increasing 
body of recent literature suggests that even a temporary increase in food prices can have long-term 
economic consequences on nutritional status, labor productivity, and survival chances (Hoddinott 
2006; Myers 2005).  Accumulation of these effects, as documented in many country case studies, 
results in macroeconomic instability, social unrest, and overall reduction in economic growth 
(Timmer, 1988; Rashid et al. 2008). At the operational level, understanding these puzzling trends in 
Ethiopian cereal markets had direct implications for local food aid procurement by the World Food 
Program (WFP) and other agencies. Since most of locally procured food is distributed through 
humanitarian assistance and various social safety net programs, the unusual changes in grain markets 
posed challenges to the implementation of those essential food security programs.  
The European Union, being one of the largest donors of local and regional procurement of food, was 
particularly concerned about these trends. Therefore, following an extensive consultation with various 
stakeholders, the Joint Research Centre (JRC) of the EU developed a technical specification of project 
to extend the scope of the usual Cereal Availability Study (CAS), which provides the guideline about 
the size of local procurement; and account for the unusual developments in the Ethiopian cereal 
markets.  IFPRI consortium in collaboration with the Ethiopian Development Research Institute 
                                               
18 Getnet, K., E. Gabre-Madhin, and S. Timrat (2006) 
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(EDRI) and the Ethiopian Institute of Agricultural Research (EIAR) was selected to carry out the 
study.  
The project was designed to (i) provide evidence based answers to many commonly held hypotheses, 
(ii) generate key parameters used in assessing cereal availability, and (iii)  assessing the impacts of 
various policy interventions, including procurement and distribution through safety net programs. 
Some initial studies, conducted by the World Bank and IFPRI, came up with the following hypotheses 
behind rising cereal prices:  
1. Reduced domestic cereal availability due to (a) increased cross border exports or cereals, (b) 
trade disruptions due to stock-holding bans, and (c) reduced availability due to reduction in 
food aid inflow in the past couple of years.  
2. Demand has out-paced supply due to overall economic growth and increased incomes; as well 
unprecedented expansion of social safety net programs.  
3. Increased diversification and changes in consumption patterns of both rural and urban 
households.  
4. Increased storage by both households and grain traders.  
5. Increased cross border trade. Inflationary pressure from increased money supply, new job 
creation, and disbursement of large volumes of credit to both rural and urban sectors. 
6. Inflationary pressure from increased money supply, new job creation, and disbursement of 
large volumes of credit to both rural and urban sectors. 
 
The hypotheses 1-5 are examined with set of four studies and the hypotheses 6 was extensively 
analyzed by the World Bank (2007). Although providing evidence on these hypotheses was critical for 
policy decisions, it was also important to examine how various policy interventions could affect grain 
markets in terms of prices, trade, and availability of cereals. This is accomplished by simulating the 
impacts with the help of a spatial equilibrium model.   
6.2 The key findings 
The study has generated primary information to answer widely held hypotheses about changes in the 
Ethiopian cereal markets since late 2005. Organized in five broad headings, this section presents the 
key results of the study. In addition to drawing from the main analytical chapters of this report, we also 
present results from IFPRI’s ongoing research in order to complement / clarify the key findings.   
 
Household survey 
The household survey—called Ethiopian Agricultural Market and Household Survey (EAMHS)—was 
designed to cover a wide range of issues. But the central focus was on estimating some of the 
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parameters critical for assessing cereal availability and income growth. In this regard, the following 
results can be highlighted: 
· The cereal production estimates are lower than those of the Central Statistical Agency’s 
Agricultural Sample Survey, mainly because of lower yield estimates.  This is consistent with other 
sources which point to an overestimation of cereal yields in Ethiopia, including lower yields for 
maize, sorghum, and teff in neighboring countries. A recent World Bank study finds that cereal 
yields in Ethiopia has grown much faster than any other developing countries in recent history 
(World Bank, 2008).  Given there has not been substantial growth in modern input use, it is not 
clear what really account for this amazing growth.    
· The estimated portion of marketed surplus of cereals is 21-31 percent. These estimates are similar 
to the 2000-01 Ethiopian Agricultural Sample Enumeration and the estimates from the Grain 
Marketing Research Project of the Michigan State University in the 1990s. For the three grains that 
are procured locally (maize, wheat, and Sorghum), the marketable surplus estimates are 27, 21, and 
22 percents, respectively.   
· There do not appear to be any major changes in agricultural marketing behavior over the past five 
years that would explain the higher cereal prices.  Farmers report selling a smaller percentage of 
the harvest than before, but this is due to the size of the harvest rather than increases in 
consumption.  There is some evidence of farmers, particularly larger farmers, selling later in the 
season, but this would affect the seasonality of prices rather than causing a trend of rising prices. 
· The EAMHS does provide evidence of gradual diversification away from low-value crops such as 
cereals and pulses toward higher-value crops including some vegetables, coffee, and chat and 
toward livestock production, wage income, and non-farm business income.   However, cereals and 
other staple crops continue to account for a large share of cropped area and rural income. 
· Farm households report improvements in a number of dimensions of the rural economy, 
particularly advisory services, marketing information, the number of crop buyers, and rural roads.  
The EAMHS results suggest that more rural households are reporting improved well-being over 
the past four years than are reporting deterioration.  Nonetheless, the gains appear to be 
concentrated among larger farmers, who benefit from higher prices, and among those in Amhara 
and Oromia.   
 
Grain traders’ survey 
One of the key hypotheses behind rising cereal prices was that the grain market went through 
significant structural changes in terms of its conduct and performance.  It was commonly perceived 
that: (i) transactions costs went up due to high fuel costs, (ii) traders’ were storing larger quantities for 
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a longer period of time, and (iii) there was an increased concentration of certain types of traders. These 
hypotheses are tested by combining 2008 survey with that IFPRI / ILRI 2002 traders’ survey. We draw 
the following conclusions from the analyses:  
      1. The study finds that, compared to 2002, there have been reductions in various components of 
transactions costs in real terms (inflation adjusted) in 2008. The following findings regarding 
transactions costs can be highlighted:  
a. There have been no statistically significant differences between 2008 and 2002 in real price 
differentials (difference between purchase and sales price); net margins per quintal, and total 
out of pocket transactions costs.  
b. Transportation costs per quintal of trade has fallen despite higher fuel prices, perhaps 
because increase fuel costs is compensated by significant improvement in infrastructure over 
the past few years.  
c. Compared to 2002, the proportion of costs spent on taxes has fallen; and so has the 
payments to intermediaries, which might be attributed to reduction in tax burden improved 
access to cellular phones, respectively.  
d. In the presence of market failure, such as information asymmetry, prices discovery becomes 
expensive, which in turn contributes towards increased transactions costs. This study finds 
that, compared to 2002, traders are able to follow more markets; collect price information 
more easily; and find buyers and sellers much quickly. This is clearly consistent with the 
reduction in transaction costs and improved market efficiency  
 
2.  Although not statistically significant, the study finds some changes in the storage behaviors of 
the traders. In particular: 
a. Average stock of the wholesalers in 2008 is found to be larger than that of 2002. In 2008, 
average stock of a wholesaler was 57 tons, which compares to 10 tons in 2002. This 
difference, however, was not found to be statistically significant, mainly because of fewer 
wholesalers (small sample) low power of the statistical test.  
b. The typical assemblers in 2002 held an average stock of 93 tons, which declined to 90 tons 
in 2008 with statistically insignificant differences.  
c. Average stock of the retailers increased only from 56 ton to 57 tons; and this increased was 
not statistically significant.  
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d. To examine whether the market efficiency is hindered by bottlenecks, the study has also 
explored testing for increasing returns to scale. These analyses suggest that there is some 
evidence of increasing returns to scale for one category of traders (assemblers) and one 
component of transactions costs (costs on intermediaries).  Further diffusion of cellular 
phone technology and better market information can contribute towards reducing these costs 
and improve market efficiency.  
 
Rapid assessment of cross border trade  
This component of the study heavily relied on rapid assessments, review of public documents, and 
monitoring of four major cross border trade points, namely Humera, Metema, Assosa/Kumruk and 
Moyale. In carrying out the study, both primary and secondary data have been used. The primary data 
were collected using Rapid Market Appraisal (RMA) method. Expert field researchers from the 
regional offices of the Ethiopian Institute of Agricultural Research interviewed officials of the Bureaus 
of Agriculture and Rural Development and experts of Customs Agency at different level. In addition, 
the team also conducted interviews with farmers group, local traders, and community leaders. This 
section provides a summary of that exercise.  The study finds little evidence on commonly held 
notions that cross border trade played significant roles in domestic price increase. In particular, the 
study finds that:  
1. Since 2002/3, the trend shows that both legal and illegal trade values have increased, although 
the legal trade has increased faster than the illegal trade values. The estimated value of legal 
trade in 2003/04 was only US$ 31 thousand, which jumped to more than US$ 42 million in 
2007/08. By contrast, illegal export increased from US$ 1.4 million to 52 million during the 
same time period.  
2. The value of agricultural commodities exported formally through the cross border made 
quantum jump from ETB 0.13 million in 2003/04 to ETB 421 million (equivalent to US$ 38 
million) in 2006/07.  
3. However, the estimated size of the cross border trade is not found to be large enough to 
influence the domestic market prices of cereals. Assuming 25 percent of the country’s total 
cereal production of 18 million tons is marketed, total marketable surplus would be 4.5 million 
tons. With an average price US$300 per ton, the value of total marketable surplus is US$ 1.35 
billion, implying that the value of cereals traded across border is less than three percent!   
4. While it shows an increasing trend, size of the livestock trade across border is still small. 
During 2003/04 to 2006/07, total trade value of livestock was estimated to be about US$ 18 
million of which 2006/08 accounted for US$ 12 million dollars.    
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Policy simulation with spatial equilibrium model 
The main objective of setting up the spatial equilibrium model was to assess the potential impacts of 
policy intervention—such as procurement of grain recommended by CAS; increasing the size of safety 
net programs, or assessing export potentials—on various market indicators. While only a set of 
simulations are carried for this report, this model allow assessing other policy scenarios along with 
updating the current ones. From the materials presented in this report, the following overall 
conclusions can be drawn:  
1. The expansion of the PSNP, the growth of local procurement food aid, and the sharp increase 
in world food prices do not help explain the rise in domestic food prices in Ethiopia.   
a. The income transfers under the PSNP program are simply too small to account for more 
than a few percentage points of increase in grain prices.   
b. Local procurement also has a small net effect on food prices, and in any case the program 
was suspended during 2007 and 2008 when prices began increasing.   
c. Finally, world food prices are unlikely to have directly affected Ethiopian prices because 
neither the model nor empirical evidence suggest large flows of food exports during this 
period, flows which would be necessary to transmit world prices to domestic markets.   
d. These results suggest that explanations for the increase in prices must lie elsewhere.  
2. Programs that influence the distribution of staple grains and cash resources have a valuable role 
to play in providing a safety net for the poorest and most vulnerable households, but they do 
not have large effects on prices, production, and consumption.  Thus, the safety net programs 
can be considered as complementary efforts to raise long-term agricultural productivity, but 
they should not be considered as a substitute for agricultural growth programs.   
3. The effects of many of these policy shocks vary widely across commodities and across regions, 
suggesting the value of agricultural models that capture the spatial diversity of Ethiopia.  This 
is particularly true of programs such as the PSNP, imported food aid, and the local procurement 
program, which are at least partially targeted to specific regions of the country.  
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6.3 Implications for future CAS and other food policy interventions 
Contrary to commonly held hypotheses, this study has found little evidence on: (a) increased storage at 
both household and market levels, (b) statistically significant changes in market conduct and 
performance; (c) no statistically significant changes in seasonality; and (d) cross border trade to be too 
small to contribute towards rising cereal prices.  On the other the study provides on increased rural 
wellbeing in terms of a host of indicators; and there seems to be a gradual move towards 
diversification from cereals to high value crops. One central piece of findings of the study is that the 
cereal yield estimates, published by the CSA, are found to be overestimated by more than 30 percent. 
This can partly explain rise in cereal prices. While launching of the PSNP might have contributed to 
the price rise, the magnitude of the price increase was small.19  
Relating these results with other IFPRI ongoing studies, a coherent picture emerges for explaining the 
puzzling trends in Ethiopian grain markets. It appears to be a combination of three main factors: (i) 
overestimated production, (ii) unprecedented monetary expansion, (ii) increased price expectations in 
the wake of rising global food price trends, and (iii) a shortage of foreign currency reserves, resulted 
mainly by ballooning fuel subsidies (Rashid and Dorosh 2009).  These factors can be demonstrated by 
the figure below.  
Figure 6.1 Exports and Import Parity Prices of Wheat 
 
  
 
                                               
19 It’s less than one percentage point according to World Bank (2007) and about 2 percent according to Rashid et al. (2008).  
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Notice three different episodes of price patterns in the figure. First, until about May 2007, domestic 
prices were literally tracking with the international parity prices. This was a shift from historical trends 
when domestic prices generally remained much below import parity. Second, while domestic prices 
kept rising, they fell far below import parity by March 2008. In the third stage, domestic prices started 
shooting way above import parity despite rapid decline in international prices. This period reflects the 
balance of payment crisis or shortage of foreign exchange. Although domestic prices were almost 
US$200 above the import parity—meaning a rough profit of $200 per metric ton—private importers 
could not import because the central bank did not have the necessary foreign exchange to support 
private sector imports.  
Figure 6.2 Exports and Import Parity Prices of Wheat 
 
 
Figure 6.2 represents the same export and import parity data for maize. It shows more or less the same 
pattern as the wheat graph since April 2008. What is interesting in this graph is that harvesting season 
of the 2007 showed the same trend as previous years, a dip in November-December, despite rapidly 
accelerating world prices. The balance of payment crisis is clearly visible from March-April 2008, 
with the difference between domestic price and import parity reaching $210 in August 2008.    
All these results point to the fact that rising food prices in Ethiopia has been the outcome of 
overestimated production, monetary policy misalignment, and the balance of payment problems 
resulting from sharp increases in fuel prices. This study does not find any structural changes in the 
production marketing systems. Quite contrary to prevailing perceptions, the study finds that the grain 
market efficiency has actually improved due to improved access to road, information, and other 
infrastructure that resulted in reduced costs of transactions in grain trade. Thus, once macroeconomic 
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stability is restored and production forecasting / estimate improve, local and regional procurement will 
once again be possible. The key parameters generated by this study can then be used to assess the 
cereal availability; and the model developed under this study can be used to triangulate and better 
predict the consequences on markets due to procurement, safety net transfers, as well as transoceanic 
food aid imports.   
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Appendix Tables for Chapter 5 
 
Table A-5.1   Regional food balance sheets for four main cereals 
 
         Net  Net  Net aid  Per capita 
  Population Production inflow imports Inflow Consumption consumption 
     (thousand)      (thousand tons)   (kg/person) 
 Addis 2,973 0 154 0 -100 54 18 
 Mekele 3,707 64 19 0 18 101 27 
 Desse 9,514 66 460 0 27 553 58 
 D. Dawa 6,619 218 149 0 10 377 57 
Maize Bale 12,890 819  0 8 827 64 
 Hossana 13,411 695 -17 0 21 698 52 
 Jimma 9,446 1,245 -551 0 1 695 74 
 B. Dar 8,826 783 -263 0 7 527 60 
 Gonder 3,907 141 50 0 8 199 51 
  Total 71,293 4,031 0 0 0 4,031 57 
 Addis 2,973 10 174 0 0 184 62 
 Mekele 3,707 125 33 0 0 158 43 
 Desse 9,514 381 7 0 0 388 41 
 D. Dawa 6,619 19 207 0 0 226 34 
Teff Bale 12,890 254 71 0 0 325 25 
 Hossana 13,411 437 -248 0 0 189 14 
 Jimma 9,446 333 -73 0 0 260 28 
 B. Dar 8,826 585 -192 0 0 393 45 
 Gonder 3,907 145 21 0 0 166 42 
  Total 71,293 2,289 0 0 0 2,289 32 
 Addis 2,973 18 235 0 -60 193 65 
 Mekele 3,707 153 19 0 83 256 69 
 Desse 9,514 402 0 0 126 528 56 
 D. Dawa 6,619 41 261 0 47 349 53 
Wheat Bale 12,890 1,159 -714 0 37 482 37 
 Hossana 13,411 480 -258 0 96 318 24 
 Jimma 9,446 166 154 0 2 322 34 
 B. Dar 8,826 298 167 0 31 496 56 
 Gonder 3,907 62 136 0 37 235 60 
  Total 71,293 2,779 0 0 400 3,179 45 
 Addis 2,973 0 46 0 -20 26 9 
 Mekele 3,707 176 95 0 4 275 74 
 Desse 9,514 524 -192 0 5 337 35 
 D. Dawa 6,619 413 -109 0 2 306 46 
Sorghum Bale 12,890 122 294 0 2 418 32 
 Hossana 13,411 217 -19 0 4 202 15 
 Jimma 9,446 318  0 0 318 34 
 B. Dar 8,826 170 94 0 1 266 30 
 Gonder 3,907 372 -209 0 2 164 42 
  Total 71,293 2,312 0 0 0 2,312 32 
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Table A-5.2   Impact of eliminating locally procured food aid with no displacement 
 
National cereal consumption (1000 tons)   Regional cereal consumption (1000 tons)   
  Before After Change     Before After Change   
Maize 4031 4031 0%   Addis            451             458  1%  
Teff 2289 2289 0%   Mekele            813             791  -3%  
Wheat 3179 3179 0%   Desse         1,828          1,802  -1%  
Sorghum 2312 2312 0%   D_Dawa         1,259          1,260  0%  
National cereal production (1000 tons)   Bale         2,042          2,050  0%  
  Before After Change   Hossana         1,416          1,406  -1%  
Maize 4031 4031 0%   Jimma         1,567          1,597  2%  
Teff 2289 2289 0%   B_Dar         1,668          1,684  1%  
Wheat 2779 2779 0%   Gonder            768             765  0%  
Sorghum 2312 2312 0%        
Net imports incl. food aid (1000 tons)   Cereal movement by region of origin   
  Before After Change       Before After Change 
Wheat 400 400 0%   Maize Hossana 22  -100% 
   -   Maize Jimma 577 548 -5% 
   -   Maize B_Dar 273 255 -7% 
   -   Teff Hossana 247 248 1% 
National average price (Birr/quintal)   Teff Jimma 72 74 2% 
  Before After Change   Teff B_Dar 193 192 0% 
Maize 172 156 -9%   Wheat Bale 722 704 -2% 
Teff 393 380 -3%   Wheat Hossana 249 243 -3% 
Wheat 271 256 -6%   Sorghum Desse 190 185 -3% 
Sorghum 246 231 -6%   Sorghum D_Dawa 111 107 -3% 
Regional prices (Birr/quintal)      Sorghum Hossana 16 15 -3% 
    Before After Change  Sorghum Gonder 210 208 -1% 
Maize Addis 175            159  -10%      - 
Maize Mekele 203            186  -8%      - 
Maize Desse 196            179  -9%      - 
Maize D_Dawa 201            184  -8%         - 
Maize Bale 154            147  -5%  Cereal movement by destination region   
Maize Hossana 142            127  -10%      Before After Change 
Maize Jimma 136            119  -12%  Maize Addis 153 54 -65% 
Maize B_Dar 153            136  -11%  Maize Mekele 36 38 5% 
Maize Gonder 184            168  -9%  Maize Desse 478 493 3% 
Teff Addis 406            394  -3%  Maize D_Dawa 151 160 5% 
Teff Mekele 405            393  -3%  Maize Gonder 54 59 9% 
Teff Desse 398            386  -3%  Teff Addis 174 174 0% 
Teff D_Dawa 432            420  -3%  Teff Mekele 32 33 1% 
Teff Bale 411            399  -3%  Teff Desse 8 9 17% 
Teff Hossana 372            360  -3%  Teff D_Dawa 207 207 0% 
Teff Jimma 366            354  -3%  Teff Bale 71 72 1% 
Teff B_Dar 355            343  -3%  Teff Gonder 20 20 1% 
Teff Gonder 387            375  -3%  Wheat Addis 231 176 -24% 
Wheat Addis 265            249  -6%  Wheat Mekele 27 32 19% 
Wheat Mekele 304            288  -5%  Wheat Desse  1 - 
Wheat Desse 278            269  -3%  Wheat D_Dawa 262 269 3% 
Wheat D_Dawa 281            265  -6%  Wheat Jimma 151 155 3% 
Wheat Bale 221            204  -8%  Wheat B_Dar 164 173 6% 
Wheat Hossana 231            215  -7%  Wheat Gonder 137 141 3% 
Wheat Jimma 266            249  -6%  Sorghum Addis 46 26 -43% 
Wheat B_Dar 293            277  -6%  Sorghum Mekele 95 98 3% 
Wheat Gonder 302            286  -5%  Sorghum Bale 292 296 2% 
Sorghum Addis 266            251  -6%  Sorghum B_Dar 94 95 1% 
Sorghum Mekele 257            242  -6%      - 
Sorghum Desse 224            208  -7%      - 
Sorghum D_Dawa 228            213  -7%          - 
Sorghum Bale 288            273  -5%       
Sorghum Hossana 249            234  -6%       
Sorghum Jimma 258            244  -6%       
Sorghum B_Dar 238            223  -6%       
Sorghum Gonder 207            192  -7%       
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Table A-5.3   Impact of eliminating locally procured food aid with full displacement 
 
National cereal consumption (1000 tons)   Regional cereal consumption (1000 tons)   
  Before After Change     Before After Change   
Maize 4031 4031 0%   Addis            457             459  0%  
Teff 2289 2289 0%   Mekele            790             785  -1%  
Wheat 3179 3179 0%   Desse         1,807          1,798  -1%  
Sorghum 2312 2312 0%   D_Dawa         1,258          1,259  0%  
National cereal production (1000 tons)   Bale         2,052          2,053  0%  
  Before After Change   Hossana         1,407          1,404  0%  
Maize 4031 4031 0%   Jimma         1,595          1,602  0%  
Teff 2289 2289 0%   B_Dar         1,682          1,687  0%  
Wheat 2779 2779 0%   Gonder            764             764  0%  
Sorghum 2312 2312 0%        
Net imports incl. food aid (1000 tons)   Cereal movement by region of origin   
  Before After Change       Before After Change 
Wheat 400 400 0%   Maize Hossana 17  -100% 
   -   Maize Jimma 551 546 -1% 
   -   Maize B_Dar 263 254 -3% 
   -   Teff Hossana 248 249 0% 
National average price (Birr/quintal)   Teff Jimma 73 73 0% 
  Before After Change   Teff B_Dar 192 191 0% 
Maize 157 154 -2%   Wheat Bale 714 702 -2% 
Teff 381 377 -1%   Wheat Hossana 258 244 -6% 
Wheat 256 253 -1%   Sorghum Desse 192 185 -4% 
Sorghum 231 228 -1%   Sorghum D_Dawa 109 107 -2% 
Regional prices (Birr/quintal)      Sorghum Hossana 19 16 -20% 
    Before After Change  Sorghum Gonder 209 208 -1% 
Maize Addis 160            157  -2%      - 
Maize Mekele 187            184  -2%      - 
Maize Desse 180            177  -2%      - 
Maize D_Dawa 186            182  -2%         - 
Maize Bale 144            145  0%  Cereal movement by destination region   
Maize Hossana 126            125  -1%      Before After Change 
Maize Jimma 120            117  -3%  Maize Addis 154 54 -65% 
Maize B_Dar 137            134  -2%  Maize Mekele 19 37 91% 
Maize Gonder 169            165  -2%  Maize Desse 460 492 7% 
Teff Addis 394            390  -1%  Maize D_Dawa 149 159 7% 
Teff Mekele 393            389  -1%  Maize Gonder 50 58 16% 
Teff Desse 386            382  -1%  Teff Addis 174 174 0% 
Teff D_Dawa 420            416  -1%  Teff Mekele 33 31 -5% 
Teff Bale 399            395  -1%  Teff Desse 7 8 13% 
Teff Hossana 360            356  -1%  Teff D_Dawa 207 207 0% 
Teff Jimma 354            350  -1%  Teff Bale 71 72 1% 
Teff B_Dar 343            339  -1%  Teff Gonder 21 20 -2% 
Teff Gonder 375            371  -1%  Wheat Addis 235 177 -25% 
Wheat Addis 251            246  -2%  Wheat Mekele 19 29 50% 
Wheat Mekele 290            285  -2%  Wheat D_Dawa 261 269 3% 
Wheat Desse 258            266  3%  Wheat Jimma 154 156 2% 
Wheat D_Dawa 267            262  -2%  Wheat B_Dar 167 174 4% 
Wheat Bale 206            201  -2%  Wheat Gonder 136 141 4% 
Wheat Hossana 217            212  -2%  Sorghum Addis 46 26 -44% 
Wheat Jimma 251            246  -2%  Sorghum Mekele 95 98 2% 
Wheat B_Dar 279            274  -2%  Sorghum Bale 294 296 1% 
Wheat Gonder 288            283  -2%  Sorghum B_Dar 94 95 1% 
Sorghum Addis 251            248  -1%      - 
Sorghum Mekele 242            239  -1%      - 
Sorghum Desse 208            206  -1%      - 
Sorghum D_Dawa 212            210  -1%          - 
Sorghum Bale 273            270  -1%       
Sorghum Hossana 234            231  -1%       
Sorghum Jimma 245            242  -1%       
Sorghum B_Dar 223            220  -1%       
Sorghum Gonder 192            189  -1%       
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Table A-5.4   Impact of doubling locally procured food aid with no displacement 
 
National cereal consumption (1000 tons)   Regional cereal consumption (1000 tons)   
  Before After Change     Before After Change   
Maize 4031 4031 0%   Addis            451             446  -1%  
Teff 2289 2289 0%   Mekele            813             840  3%  
Wheat 3179 3180 0%   Desse         1,828          1,864  2%  
Sorghum 2312 2365 2%   D_Dawa         1,259          1,265  0%  
National cereal production (1000 tons)   Bale         2,042          2,042  0%  
  Before After Change   Hossana         1,416          1,430  1%  
Maize 4031 4031 0%   Jimma         1,567          1,543  -2%  
Teff 2289 2289 0%   B_Dar         1,668          1,660  0%  
Wheat 2779 2779 0%   Gonder            768             775  1%  
Sorghum 2312 2312 0%        
Net imports incl. food aid (1000 tons)   Cereal movement by region of origin   
  Before After Change       Before After Change 
Wheat 400 400 0%   Maize Hossana 22 47 115% 
Sorghum  53 -   Maize Jimma 577 600 4% 
   -   Maize B_Dar 273 289 6% 
   -   Teff Hossana 247 245 -1% 
National average price (Birr/quintal)   Teff Jimma 72 70 -3% 
  Before After Change   Teff B_Dar 193 193 0% 
Maize 172 186 8%   Wheat Bale 722 739 2% 
Teff 393 401 2%   Wheat Hossana 249 255 2% 
Wheat 271 285 5%   Sorghum Desse 190 186 -2% 
Sorghum 246 248 1%   Sorghum D_Dawa 111 106 -5% 
Regional prices (Birr/quintal)      Sorghum Hossana 16 11 -33% 
    Before After Change  Sorghum Gonder 210 207 -2% 
Maize Addis 175            191  9%      - 
Maize Mekele 203            218  8%      - 
Maize Desse 196            211  8%      - 
Maize D_Dawa 201            217  8%         - 
Maize Bale 154            158  3%  Cereal movement by destination region   
Maize Hossana 142            157  11%      Before After Change 
Maize Jimma 136            151  11%  Maize Addis 153 251 65% 
Maize B_Dar 153            168  10%  Maize Mekele 36 33 -7% 
Maize Gonder 184            200  8%  Maize Desse 478 462 -3% 
Teff Addis 406            414  2%  Maize D_Dawa 151 142 -6% 
Teff Mekele 405            414  2%  Maize Gonder 54 49 -10% 
Teff Desse 398            406  2%  Teff Addis 174 174 0% 
Teff D_Dawa 432            440  2%  Teff Mekele 32 32 -2% 
Teff Bale 411            420  2%  Teff Desse 8 6 -20% 
Teff Hossana 372            381  2%  Teff D_Dawa 207 207 0% 
Teff Jimma 366            375  2%  Teff Bale 71 69 -2% 
Teff B_Dar 355            364  2%  Teff Gonder 20 20 -1% 
Teff Gonder 387            395  2%  Wheat Addis 231 286 24% 
Wheat Addis 265            280  5%  Wheat Mekele 27 20 -24% 
Wheat Mekele 304            319  5%  Wheat D_Dawa 262 253 -3% 
Wheat Desse 278            283  2%  Wheat Jimma 151 147 -2% 
Wheat D_Dawa 281            296  5%  Wheat B_Dar 164 155 -6% 
Wheat Bale 221            235  7%  Wheat Gonder 137 132 -4% 
Wheat Hossana 231            246  6%  Sorghum Addis 46 13 -71% 
Wheat Jimma 266            280  5%  Sorghum Mekele 95 100 4% 
Wheat B_Dar 293            308  5%  Sorghum Bale 292 296 1% 
Wheat Gonder 302            317  5%  Sorghum B_Dar 94 100 6% 
Sorghum Addis 266            267  0%      - 
Sorghum Mekele 257            258  0%      - 
Sorghum Desse 224            224  0%      - 
Sorghum D_Dawa 228            229  0%          - 
Sorghum Bale 288            289  0%       
Sorghum Hossana 249            250  0%       
Sorghum Jimma 258            271  5%       
Sorghum B_Dar 238            239  0%       
Sorghum Gonder 207            208  0%       
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Table A-5.5   Impact of doubling locally procured food aid with full displacement 
 
National cereal consumption (1000 tons)   Regional cereal consumption (1000 tons)   
  Before After Change     Before After Change   
Maize 4031 4031 0%   Addis            457             455  0%  
Teff 2289 2289 0%   Mekele            790             794  1%  
Wheat 3179 3180 0%   Desse         1,807          1,816  0%  
Sorghum 2312 2312 0%   D_Dawa         1,258          1,258  0%  
National cereal production (1000 tons)   Bale         2,052          2,052  0%  
  Before After Change   Hossana         1,407          1,407  0%  
Maize 4031 4031 0%   Jimma         1,595          1,589  0%  
Teff 2289 2289 0%   B_Dar         1,682          1,678  0%  
Wheat 2779 2779 0%   Gonder            764             764  0%  
Sorghum 2312 2312 0%        
Net imports incl. food aid (1000 tons)   Cereal movement by region of origin   
  Before After Change       Before After Change 
Wheat 400 400 0%   Maize Hossana 17 39 125% 
   -   Maize Jimma 551 555 1% 
   -   Maize B_Dar 263 271 3% 
   -   Teff Hossana 248 247 0% 
National average price (Birr/quintal)   Teff Jimma 73 73 1% 
  Before After Change   Teff B_Dar 192 192 0% 
Maize 157 159 2%   Wheat Desse  3 - 
Teff 381 385 1%   Wheat Bale 714 725 2% 
Wheat 256 260 1%   Wheat Hossana 258 271 5% 
Sorghum 231 234 1%   Sorghum Desse 192 199 4% 
Regional prices (Birr/quintal)      Sorghum D_Dawa 109 111 2% 
    Before After Change  Sorghum Hossana 19 23 18% 
Maize Addis 160            163  2%  Sorghum Gonder 209 211 1% 
Maize Mekele 187            190  1%      - 
Maize Desse 180            183  2%      - 
Maize D_Dawa 186            188  2%         - 
Maize Bale 144            144  -1%  Cereal movement by destination region   
Maize Hossana 126            129  2%      Before After Change 
Maize Jimma 120            123  2%  Maize Addis 154 254 65% 
Maize B_Dar 137            140  2%  Maize Mekele 19 2 -90% 
Maize Gonder 169            172  2%  Maize Desse 460 430 -7% 
Teff Addis 394            398  1%  Maize D_Dawa 149 138 -7% 
Teff Mekele 393            397  1%  Maize Gonder 50 42 -16% 
Teff Desse 386            390  1%  Teff Addis 174 174 0% 
Teff D_Dawa 420            424  1%  Teff Mekele 33 34 5% 
Teff Bale 399            403  1%  Teff Desse 7 7 -8% 
Teff Hossana 360            364  1%  Teff D_Dawa 207 207 0% 
Teff Jimma 354            358  1%  Teff Bale 71 70 -2% 
Teff B_Dar 343            347  1%  Teff Gonder 21 21 1% 
Teff Gonder 375            379  1%  Wheat Addis 235 294 25% 
Wheat Addis 251            255  2%  Wheat Mekele 19 10 -49% 
Wheat Mekele 290            294  2%  Wheat D_Dawa 261 254 -3% 
Wheat Desse 258            253  -2%  Wheat Jimma 154 151 -1% 
Wheat D_Dawa 267            271  2%  Wheat B_Dar 167 161 -4% 
Wheat Bale 206            211  2%  Wheat Gonder 136 130 -4% 
Wheat Hossana 217            221  2%  Sorghum Addis 46 66 44% 
Wheat Jimma 251            256  2%  Sorghum Mekele 95 93 -3% 
Wheat B_Dar 279            283  2%  Sorghum Bale 294 291 -1% 
Wheat Gonder 288            292  2%  Sorghum B_Dar 94 93 -1% 
Sorghum Addis 251            254  1%      - 
Sorghum Mekele 242            244  1%      - 
Sorghum Desse 208            211  1%      - 
Sorghum D_Dawa 212            215  1%          - 
Sorghum Bale 273            276  1%       
Sorghum Hossana 234            237  1%       
Sorghum Jimma 245            248  1%       
Sorghum B_Dar 223            226  1%       
Sorghum Gonder 192            194  2%       
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 Table A-5.6   Impact of eliminating imported food aid in the short run 
 
National cereal consumption (1000 tons)   Regional cereal consumption (1000 tons)   
  Before After Change     Before After Change   
Maize 4031 4031 0%   Addis            457             443  -3%  
Teff 2289 2289 0%   Mekele            790             757  -4%  
Wheat 3179 2824 -11%   Desse         1,807          1,742  -4%  
Sorghum 2312 2323 0%   D_Dawa         1,258          1,222  -3%  
National cereal production (1000 tons)   Bale         2,052          1,998  -3%  
  Before After Change   Hossana         1,407          1,361  -3%  
Maize 4031 4031 0%   Jimma         1,595          1,562  -2%  
Teff 2289 2289 0%   B_Dar         1,682          1,639  -3%  
Wheat 2779 2779 0%   Gonder            764             741  -3%  
Sorghum 2312 2312 0%        
Net imports incl. food aid (1000 tons)   Cereal movement by region of origin   
  Before After Change       Before After Change 
Wheat 400 45 -89%   Maize Hossana 17 25 41% 
Sorghum  11 -   Maize Jimma 551 554 1% 
   -   Maize B_Dar 263 262 0% 
   -   Teff Hossana 248 249 0% 
National average price (Birr/quintal)   Teff Jimma 73 72 -2% 
  Before After Change   Teff B_Dar 192 192 0% 
Maize 157 170 8%   Wheat Bale 714 741 4% 
Teff 381 398 4%   Wheat Hossana 258 213 -17% 
Wheat 256 309 20%   Sorghum Desse 192 190 -1% 
Sorghum 231 247 7%   Sorghum D_Dawa 109 109 0% 
Regional prices (Birr/quintal)      Sorghum Hossana 19 19 -4% 
    Before After Change  Sorghum Gonder 209 209 0% 
Maize Addis 160            173  8%      - 
Maize Mekele 187            201  7%      - 
Maize Desse 180            193  7%      - 
Maize D_Dawa 186            199  7%         - 
Maize Bale 144            158  10%  Cereal movement by destination region   
Maize Hossana 126            139  10%      Before After Change 
Maize Jimma 120            133  11%  Maize Addis 154 155 1% 
Maize B_Dar 137            151  9%  Maize Mekele 19 19 -2% 
Maize Gonder 169            182  8%  Maize Desse 460 466 1% 
Teff Addis 394            411  4%  Maize D_Dawa 149 150 1% 
Teff Mekele 393            410  4%  Maize Gonder 50 51 1% 
Teff Desse 386            403  4%  Teff Addis 174 178 2% 
Teff D_Dawa 420            437  4%  Teff Mekele 33 29 -10% 
Teff Bale 399            416  4%  Teff Desse 7 7 -12% 
Teff Hossana 360            377  5%  Teff D_Dawa 207 207 0% 
Teff Jimma 354            371  5%  Teff Bale 71 73 2% 
Teff B_Dar 343            360  5%  Teff Gonder 21 20 -4% 
Teff Gonder 375            392  5%  Wheat Addis 235 171 -27% 
Wheat Addis 251            302  20%  Wheat Mekele 19 63 223% 
Wheat Mekele 290            341  18%  Wheat Desse  37 - 
Wheat Desse 258            322  25%  Wheat D_Dawa 261 265 2% 
Wheat D_Dawa 267            318  19%  Wheat Jimma 154 125 -19% 
Wheat Bale 206            257  25%  Wheat B_Dar 167 147 -12% 
Wheat Hossana 217            268  24%  Wheat Gonder 136 145 7% 
Wheat Jimma 251            302  20%  Sorghum Addis 46 36 -22% 
Wheat B_Dar 279            330  18%  Sorghum Mekele 95 95 0% 
Wheat Gonder 288            339  18%  Sorghum Bale 294 297 1% 
Sorghum Addis 251            267  6%  Sorghum B_Dar 94 98 4% 
Sorghum Mekele 242            258  7%      - 
Sorghum Desse 208            224  8%      - 
Sorghum D_Dawa 212            229  8%          - 
Sorghum Bale 273            289  6%       
Sorghum Hossana 234            250  7%       
Sorghum Jimma 245            264  8%       
Sorghum B_Dar 223            239  7%       
Sorghum Gonder 192            208  8%       
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Table A-5.7   Impact of eliminating imported food aid in the long run 
 
National cereal consumption (1000 tons)   Regional cereal consumption (1000 tons)   
  Before After Change     Before After Change   
Maize 4000 4026 1%   Addis            456             446  -2%  
Teff 2285 2278 0%   Mekele            789             763  -3%  
Wheat 3182 2889 -9%   Desse         1,802          1,752  -3%  
Sorghum 2314 2339 1%   D_Dawa         1,256          1,230  -2%  
National cereal production (1000 tons)   Bale         2,058          2,017  -2%  
  Before After Change   Hossana         1,392          1,361  -2%  
Maize 4000 4026 1%   Jimma         1,587          1,568  -1%  
Teff 2285 2278 0%   B_Dar         1,677          1,648  -2%  
Wheat 2781 2889 4%   Gonder            763             746  -2%  
Sorghum 2314 2339 1%         11,782       11,532  -2%  
Net imports incl. food aid (1000 tons)   Cereal movement by region of origin   
  Before   Change       Before After Change 
Wheat 400  -100%   Maize Jimma 505 516 2% 
   -   Maize B_Dar 291 292 0% 
   -   Teff Hossana 255 255 0% 
   -   Teff Jimma 69 68 -1% 
National average price (Birr/quintal)   Teff B_Dar 186 186 0% 
  Before After Change   Wheat Bale 713 774 9% 
Maize 160 167 4%   Wheat Hossana 250 219 -12% 
Teff 383 395 3%   Sorghum Desse 170 174 2% 
Wheat 257 296 15%   Sorghum D_Dawa 93 95 2% 
Sorghum 232 239 3%   Sorghum Gonder 237 241 2% 
Regional prices (Birr/quintal)          - 
    Before After Change      - 
Maize Addis 164            170  4%      - 
Maize Mekele 191            198  3%      - 
Maize Desse 184            190  3%      - 
Maize D_Dawa 190            196  3%         - 
Maize Bale 140            149  7%  Cereal movement by destination region   
Maize Hossana 136            141  4%      Before After Change 
Maize Jimma 124            130  5%  Maize Addis 153 155 1% 
Maize B_Dar 141            148  4%  Maize Mekele 16 16 -2% 
Maize Gonder 173            179  4%  Maize Desse 450 458 2% 
Teff Addis 397            408  3%  Maize D_Dawa 134 136 2% 
Teff Mekele 396            407  3%  Maize Gonder 43 44 2% 
Teff Desse 389            400  3%  Teff Addis 173 176 2% 
Teff D_Dawa 422            434  3%  Teff Mekele 36 32 -10% 
Teff Bale 402            413  3%  Teff Desse 7 6 -17% 
Teff Hossana 363            374  3%  Teff D_Dawa 206 205 -1% 
Teff Jimma 357            368  3%  Teff Bale 67 72 8% 
Teff B_Dar 346            357  3%  Teff Gonder 20 18 -9% 
Teff Gonder 377            389  3%  Wheat Addis 236 220 -7% 
Wheat Addis 252            289  15%  Wheat Mekele 12 55 347% 
Wheat Mekele 291            328  13%  Wheat Desse  32 - 
Wheat Desse 261            309  18%  Wheat D_Dawa 262 272 4% 
Wheat D_Dawa 268            305  14%  Wheat Jimma 155 126 -19% 
Wheat Bale 207            245  18%  Wheat B_Dar 163 143 -12% 
Wheat Hossana 218            255  17%  Wheat Gonder 135 146 8% 
Wheat Jimma 252            290  15%  Sorghum Addis 46 47 1% 
Wheat B_Dar 280            317  13%  Sorghum Mekele 84 83 -1% 
Wheat Gonder 289            326  13%  Sorghum Bale 298 302 2% 
Sorghum Addis 249            256  3%  Sorghum Jimma 2 4 116% 
Sorghum Mekele 240            247  3%  Sorghum B_Dar 71 73 4% 
Sorghum Desse 207            214  3%      - 
Sorghum D_Dawa 211            218  3%          - 
Sorghum Bale 271            279  3%       
Sorghum Hossana 234            240  3%       
Sorghum Jimma 267            274  3%       
Sorghum B_Dar 221            228  3%       
Sorghum Gonder 190            197  4%       
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Table A-5.8 Impact of eliminating the PSNP in the short run 
 
National cereal consumption (1000 tons)   Regional cereal consumption (1000 tons)   
  Before After Change     Before After Change   
Maize 4031 4031 0%   Addis            457             462  1%  
Teff 2289 2289 0%   Mekele            790             771  -2%  
Wheat 3179 3179 0%   Desse         1,807          1,796  -1%  
Sorghum 2312 2312 0%   D_Dawa         1,258          1,257  0%  
National cereal production (1000 tons)   Bale         2,052          2,062  0%  
  Before After Change   Hossana         1,407          1,400  0%  
Maize 4031 4031 0%   Jimma         1,595          1,611  1%  
Teff 2289 2289 0%   B_Dar         1,682          1,691  1%  
Wheat 2779 2779 0%   Gonder            764             762  0%  
Sorghum 2312 2312 0%        
Net imports incl. food aid (1000 tons)   Cereal movement by region of origin   
  Before After Change       Before After Change 
Wheat 400 400 0%   Maize Hossana 17 18 1% 
   -   Maize Jimma 551 541 -2% 
   -   Maize B_Dar 263 261 -1% 
   -   Teff Hossana 248 250 1% 
National average price (Birr/quintal)   Teff Jimma 73 70 -4% 
  Before After Change   Teff B_Dar 192 188 -2% 
Maize 157 150 -5%   Wheat Bale 714 708 -1% 
Teff 381 367 -4%   Wheat Hossana 258 261 1% 
Wheat 256 246 -4%   Sorghum Desse 192 192 0% 
Sorghum 231 221 -4%   Sorghum D_Dawa 109 107 -1% 
Regional prices (Birr/quintal)      Sorghum Hossana 19 20 5% 
    Before After Change  Sorghum Gonder 209 209 0% 
Maize Addis 160            153  -5%      - 
Maize Mekele 187            180  -4%      - 
Maize Desse 180            173  -4%      - 
Maize D_Dawa 186            178  -4%         - 
Maize Bale 144            138  -4%  Cereal movement by destination region   
Maize Hossana 126            119  -6%      Before After Change 
Maize Jimma 120            113  -6%  Maize Addis 154 154 0% 
Maize B_Dar 137            130  -5%  Maize Mekele 19 17 -13% 
Maize Gonder 169            161  -4%  Maize Desse 460 453 -1% 
Teff Addis 394            380  -4%  Maize D_Dawa 149 147 -1% 
Teff Mekele 393            379  -4%  Maize Gonder 50 49 -2% 
Teff Desse 386            372  -4%  Teff Addis 174 176 1% 
Teff D_Dawa 420            406  -3%  Teff Mekele 33 28 -15% 
Teff Bale 399            385  -4%  Teff Desse 7 4 -52% 
Teff Hossana 360            346  -4%  Teff D_Dawa 207 206 0% 
Teff Jimma 354            340  -4%  Teff Bale 71 73 3% 
Teff B_Dar 343            329  -4%  Teff Gonder 21 20 -1% 
Teff Gonder 375            361  -4%  Wheat Addis 235 238 1% 
Wheat Addis 251            241  -4%  Wheat Mekele 19 11 -45% 
Wheat Mekele 290            280  -3%  Wheat D_Dawa 261 261 0% 
Wheat Desse 258            245  -5%  Wheat Jimma 154 157 2% 
Wheat D_Dawa 267            257  -4%  Wheat B_Dar 167 169 1% 
Wheat Bale 206            196  -5%  Wheat Gonder 136 134 -1% 
Wheat Hossana 217            207  -5%  Sorghum Addis 46 46 0% 
Wheat Jimma 251            241  -4%  Sorghum Mekele 95 92 -3% 
Wheat B_Dar 279            269  -4%  Sorghum Bale 294 295 0% 
Wheat Gonder 288            278  -3%  Sorghum B_Dar 94 95 1% 
Sorghum Addis 251            241  -4%      - 
Sorghum Mekele 242            231  -4%      - 
Sorghum Desse 208            198  -5%      - 
Sorghum D_Dawa 212            202  -5%          - 
Sorghum Bale 273            263  -4%       
Sorghum Hossana 234            224  -4%       
Sorghum Jimma 245            237  -3%       
Sorghum B_Dar 223            213  -5%       
Sorghum Gonder 192            181  -5%       
 
117 
 
Table A-5.9 Impact of eliminating the PSNP in the long run 
 
National cereal consumption (1000 tons)   Regional cereal consumption (1000 tons)   
  Before After Change     Before After Change   
Maize 4000 3977 -1%   Addis            456             459  1%  
Teff 2285 2277 0%   Mekele            789             767  -3%  
Wheat 3182 3170 0%   Desse         1,802          1,783  -1%  
Sorghum 2314 2300 -1%   D_Dawa         1,256          1,249  -1%  
National cereal production (1000 tons)   Bale         2,058          2,059  0%  
  Before After Change   Hossana         1,392          1,378  -1%  
Maize 4000 3977 -1%   Jimma         1,587          1,594  0%  
Teff 2285 2277 0%   B_Dar         1,677          1,678  0%  
Wheat 2781 2769 0%   Gonder            763             757  -1%  
Sorghum 2314 2300 -1%        
Net imports incl. food aid (1000 tons)   Cereal movement by region of origin   
  Before After Change       Before After Change 
Wheat 400 400 0%   Maize Jimma 505 493 -2% 
   -   Maize B_Dar 291 288 -1% 
   -   Teff Hossana 255 256 1% 
   -   Teff Jimma 69 66 -5% 
National average price (Birr/quintal)   Teff B_Dar 186 181 -2% 
  Before After Change   Wheat Bale 713 704 -1% 
Maize 160 157 -2%   Wheat Hossana 250 253 1% 
Teff 383 375 -2%   Sorghum Desse 170 170 -1% 
Wheat 257 251 -2%   Sorghum D_Dawa 93 92 -1% 
Sorghum 232 228 -2%   Sorghum Gonder 237 235 -1% 
Regional prices (Birr/quintal)          - 
    Before After Change      - 
Maize Addis 164            161  -2%      - 
Maize Mekele 191            188  -2%      - 
Maize Desse 184            181  -2%      - 
Maize D_Dawa 190            186  -2%         - 
Maize Bale 140            138  -2%  Cereal movement by destination region   
Maize Hossana 136            132  -3%      Before After Change 
Maize Jimma 124            121  -3%  Maize Addis 153 153 0% 
Maize B_Dar 141            138  -2%  Maize Mekele 16 13 -16% 
Maize Gonder 173            169  -2%  Maize Desse 450 441 -2% 
Teff Addis 397            388  -2%  Maize D_Dawa 134 132 -2% 
Teff Mekele 396            387  -2%  Maize Gonder 43 42 -3% 
Teff Desse 389            380  -2%  Teff Addis 173 175 1% 
Teff D_Dawa 422            414  -2%  Teff Mekele 36 31 -13% 
Teff Bale 402            394  -2%  Teff Desse 7 4 -50% 
Teff Hossana 363            355  -2%  Teff D_Dawa 206 205 -1% 
Teff Jimma 357            348  -2%  Teff Bale 67 68 2% 
Teff B_Dar 346            337  -2%  Teff Gonder 20 20 -1% 
Teff Gonder 377            369  -2%  Wheat Addis 236 237 1% 
Wheat Addis 252            246  -2%  Wheat Mekele 12 4 -71% 
Wheat Mekele 291            285  -2%  Wheat D_Dawa 262 261 -1% 
Wheat Desse 261            253  -3%  Wheat Jimma 155 158 2% 
Wheat D_Dawa 268            262  -2%  Wheat B_Dar 163 164 1% 
Wheat Bale 207            201  -3%  Wheat Gonder 135 133 -1% 
Wheat Hossana 218            212  -3%  Sorghum Addis 46 46 0% 
Wheat Jimma 252            246  -2%  Sorghum Mekele 84 80 -4% 
Wheat B_Dar 280            274  -2%  Sorghum Bale 298 297 0% 
Wheat Gonder 289            283  -2%  Sorghum Jimma 2 2 14% 
Sorghum Addis 249            245  -2%  Sorghum B_Dar 71 71 0% 
Sorghum Mekele 240            236  -2%      - 
Sorghum Desse 207            203  -2%      - 
Sorghum D_Dawa 211            207  -2%          - 
Sorghum Bale 271            268  -1%       
Sorghum Hossana 234            229  -2%       
Sorghum Jimma 267            263  -1%       
Sorghum B_Dar 221            217  -2%       
Sorghum Gonder 190            186  -2%       
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Table A-5.10 Impact of doubling international food prices in the short run 
 
National cereal consumption (1000 tons)   Regional cereal consumption (1000 tons)   
  Before After Change     Before After Change   
Maize 4031 4031 0%   Addis            457             457  0%  
Teff 2289 2289 0%   Mekele            790             790  0%  
Wheat 3179 3179 0%   Desse         1,807          1,807  0%  
Sorghum 2312 2312 0%   D_Dawa         1,258          1,258  0%  
National cereal production (1000 tons)   Bale         2,052          2,052  0%  
  Before After Change   Hossana         1,407          1,407  0%  
Maize 4031 4031 0%   Jimma         1,595          1,595  0%  
Teff 2289 2289 0%   B_Dar         1,682          1,682  0%  
Wheat 2779 2779 0%   Gonder            764             764  0%  
Sorghum 2312 2312 0%        
Net imports incl. food aid (1000 tons)   Cereal movement by region of origin   
  Before After Change       Before After Change 
Wheat 400 400 0%   Maize Hossana 17 17 0% 
   -   Maize Jimma 551 551 0% 
   -   Maize B_Dar 263 263 0% 
   -   Teff Hossana 248 248 0% 
National average price (Birr/quintal)   Teff Jimma 73 73 0% 
  Before After Change   Teff B_Dar 192 192 0% 
Maize 157 157 0%   Wheat Bale 714 714 0% 
Teff 381 381 0%   Wheat Hossana 258 258 0% 
Wheat 256 256 0%   Sorghum Desse 192 192 0% 
Sorghum 231 231 0%   Sorghum D_Dawa 109 109 0% 
Regional prices (Birr/quintal)      Sorghum Hossana 19 19 0% 
    Before After Change  Sorghum Gonder 209 209 0% 
Maize Addis 160            160  0%      - 
Maize Mekele 187            187  0%      - 
Maize Desse 180            180  0%      - 
Maize D_Dawa 186            186  0%         - 
Maize Bale 144            144  0%  Cereal movement by destination region   
Maize Hossana 126            126  0%      Before After Change 
Maize Jimma 120            120  0%  Maize Addis 154 154 0% 
Maize B_Dar 137            137  0%  Maize Mekele 19 19 0% 
Maize Gonder 169            169  0%  Maize Desse 460 460 0% 
Teff Addis 394            394  0%  Maize D_Dawa 149 149 0% 
Teff Mekele 393            393  0%  Maize Gonder 50 50 0% 
Teff Desse 386            386  0%  Teff Addis 174 174 0% 
Teff D_Dawa 420            420  0%  Teff Mekele 33 33 0% 
Teff Bale 399            399  0%  Teff Desse 7 7 0% 
Teff Hossana 360            360  0%  Teff D_Dawa 207 207 0% 
Teff Jimma 354            354  0%  Teff Bale 71 71 0% 
Teff B_Dar 343            343  0%  Teff Gonder 21 21 0% 
Teff Gonder 375            375  0%  Wheat Addis 235 235 0% 
Wheat Addis 251            251  0%  Wheat Mekele 19 19 0% 
Wheat Mekele 290            290  0%  Wheat D_Dawa 261 261 0% 
Wheat Desse 258            258  0%  Wheat Jimma 154 154 0% 
Wheat D_Dawa 267            267  0%  Wheat B_Dar 167 167 0% 
Wheat Bale 206            206  0%  Wheat Gonder 136 136 0% 
Wheat Hossana 217            217  0%  Sorghum Addis 46 46 0% 
Wheat Jimma 251            251  0%  Sorghum Mekele 95 95 0% 
Wheat B_Dar 279            279  0%  Sorghum Bale 294 294 0% 
Wheat Gonder 288            288  0%  Sorghum B_Dar 94 94 0% 
Sorghum Addis 251            251  0%      - 
Sorghum Mekele 242            242  0%      - 
Sorghum Desse 208            208  0%      - 
Sorghum D_Dawa 212            212  0%          - 
Sorghum Bale 273            273  0%       
Sorghum Hossana 234            234  0%       
Sorghum Jimma 245            245  0%       
Sorghum B_Dar 223            223  0%       
Sorghum Gonder 192            192  0%       
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Abstract 
Unusual changes in grain markets have been the source of major concerns for the Government of Ethiopia and 
its development partners. Increase in cereal price presented serious challenges to the implementation of 
country’s food security programs. Local procurement of food by the WFP declined also in the recent years. 
Being one of the largest donors of local procurement of food, the European Union was particularly concerned 
about these developments. Thus, as a General Directorate in charge of supporting EU policies, the Joint 
Research Centre (JRC) of the EU developed the technical specification of a project to extend the scope of the 
usual Cereal Availability Study (CAS) in order to account for the developments in the Ethiopian cereal markets.  
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) consortium with the Ethiopian Development Research 
Institute (EDRI) and the Ethiopian Institute of Agricultural Research (EIAR) was selected to carry out the study.  
A number of preliminary analyses, undertaken by the World Bank and IFPRI had put forward a number of 
hypotheses to explain unusual high cereal prices. While the different hypotheses were widely debated in the 
country, there is limited primary information to validate or refute them. It is in this context that the current study 
was undertaken. The focus has been mainly on achieving the three following objectives: (1) To gather 
information regarding recent changes in cereal production, storage, and marketing patterns in order to test the 
hypotheses that have been proposed to explain the high price of cereals in Ethiopian markets. (2) To improve 
the general methodology of the past cereal availability studies. (3) To estimate the quantity of maize, sorghum, 
and wheat that can be procured from domestic markets in the 2008 for relief purposes without disturbing the 
local market. 
 
 
121 
 
How to obtain EU publications 
 
Our priced publications are available from EU Bookshop (http://bookshop.europa.eu), where you can place 
an order with the sales agent of your choice. 
 
The Publications Office has a worldwide network of sales agents. You can obtain their contact details by 
sending a fax to (352) 29 29-42758. 
 
 
122 
 
The mission of the JRC is to provide customer-driven scientific and technical support 
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